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INTRODUCTION

In many ways arbitration in the coal industry is a microcosm
of arbitration in general. It addresses the same range of issues and,
likewise, is the terminal point of a multi-step grievance procedure
designed to resolve a variety of contractual claims. Yet, in important ways arbitration in the coal industry, notably under the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (Agreement),' is sui

1. The Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) and United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA) have had a collective bargaining relationship since 1950. The BCOA represents primarily
eastern United States underground coal operators. The number of BCOA operators has declined from
a high of 234 under the 1978 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (Agreement) to 48 under
the 1988 Agreement as of February 1988. The decline in the UMWA membership is due in large part
to the westward movement of the coal industry by unorganized operators and the infusion of the
industry with job-displacing technology. See President's Commission on Coal (PCOC), STAFu FmDNOS
51-53 (March, 1980). The UMWA represents employees located in 30 states. Since its founding in 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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generis.2 The hazardous working conditions, history of wildcat strikes
and appellate arbitration structure have combined to make coal arbitration under the Agreement a unique system.
Statistics tell a dramatic story about unsafe working conditions
in the coal industry. Underground coal mining historically has had
one of the highest rates of disabling injuries. 3 While the majority
of mine fatalities in underground mines have resulted from roof falls
and haulage accidents 4 many non-fatal underground injuries have
resulted from machinery accidents and the handling of materials. 5
The most widely publicized cause of coal mine fatalities is the underground explosion, a phenomenon that was brought under control,
though not totally eliminated, by the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969.6 As the discussion below suggests, these unique safety
concerns in the coal industry have permeated a range of arbitration

issues.
Similarly, the grievance strike has distinguished the coal industry.
Unauthorized work stoppages during the contract term, popularly
1890 in Columbus, Ohio, its membership has been as high as 500,000 before World War II to approximately 70,000 today. Interview with Steven W. Lindner, Director, UMWA Department of Contract Services, Mar. 1, 1991. The most recent Agreement executed by the parties was the Agreement
of 1988, which became effective on Feb. 1, 1988 and will terminate on Feb. 1, 1993. References in
this article to the Agreement are to the 1974, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1988 Agreements. Where necessary,
the year of the Agreement will be specified. Unless otherwise indicated, quoted contractual terms are
from the 1988 Agreement.
In many ways the Agreement sets the standard for the organized sector of the bituminous coal
industry including those employers not covered by multi-employer bargaining. For example, under
the 1984 Agreement there were 82 BCOA signatories and 2414 non-BCOA signatories; under the 1988
Agreement the figures were 51 and 1779. Letter from Steven W. Lindner, dated March 22, 1991.
2. The coal industry has experienced first depression after World War II, then tremendous
growth in production beginning in the mid-60's and in employment beginning in the 1970's. See
Appendix II. With this growth came an increase in negotiating and wildcat strike activity. Production
itself in the industry began moving west in the 1960's, with western production accounting for 4%
of the total in 1967 and more than 20% in 1979. Concurrently, underground mines lost their dominant
share of mining production relative to surface mines, from 76.1% of all coal produced in 1950 to
37.9% of the total in 1979. Since organized labor, overwhelmingly the United Mine Workers of
America, dominated only the underground mining industry, its share of total bituminous coal production has declined from 78.5% in 1951 to 52.1% in 1977 as Appendix III shows. TiE ACCEPTABLE
RiEPLACEMENT OF IMPORTED Om WITH COAL, THE STAFF REPORT TO TE PRsIDErr's CoMlUssIo N ON
CoAL 46-52 (1980).
3. See Appendix IV.
4. See PCOC, STAF

REPORT, 35.

5. Id. at 36.
6. See PCOC, STAFF REPORT, 36-38 and Appendix V.
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known as wildcat strikes, have historically plagued the mining industry. 7 Among members of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) alone an average of 1500 annual wildcat strikes
occurred between 1971 and 1974.8 That rate doubled to 3000 per
year during the 1975 to 1977 period. 9 Researchers have speculated

that the inordinate number of unauthorized strikes in the organized
coal industry was due in part to the ineffectiveness of grievance
procedures in resolving disputes. 10 Indeed, a study published by
Jeanne N. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg in 1979 suggested that
miners lacked confidence in grievance procedures and believed that
strikes helped to resolve grievances in the miners' favor."
Against this backdrop the Arnold Miller administration of the
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) negotiated a grievance
procedure in the 1974 Agreement designed to substantially reduce
delay in grievance processing and institute employee confidence in
the procedure.12 The pre-1974 arbitration system suffered from a
trio of defects: excessive arbitration, inconsistency in arbitration
awards and a broad variability in the quality of arbitrators." The
Arbitration Review Board (ARB),' 4 established by the 1974 Agree7. See Appendix VI, which shows the number of workdays and amount of tonnage lost to
wildcat strikes in the bituminous coal industry between 1956-1979.
8. Brett and Goldberg, Wildcat Strikes in Bituminous Coal Mining, 32 INmus. & LAB. REL.
Rav. 465 (1979).
9. Id.
10. Id. This undisciplined strike activity has also been attributed in part to the onset of democratic reform within the union, ushered in by the administration of Arnold Miller. See P. CLAuc,
THE MInER's FsomT FOR DEMOCRACY 63. Five times more wildcat strikes have occurred in unionized
coal fields than in other industries. PPEsmENT's COMMSSION ON COAL, COAL DATA BOOK 144 (1980)
[hereinafter PCOC, COAL DATA BOOK].

II. Brett and Goldberg, supra note 8, at 477-79.
12. The Agreement of 1974 deleted a step in the grievance procedure and instituted the ARB.
Appendix VI outlines the grievance procedures found in the Agreement. See P. Clark, supra n.10,
73-4.
13. See Bourne, The Rise and Fall of the ArbitrationReview Board, 1988 LAB. L.J. 470 (1988)
(wherein the author points out that a reason for the inconsistency was the parties' policy against
circulating arbitration decisions and, thus, making available to arbitrators only those decisions that
supported a party's position; he also noted that arbitrators were selected on an ad hoc basis rather
than through the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service).
14. The ARB was established by the 1974 Agreement and survived until the end of the 1978
Agreement. The 1974 ARB was a tripartite Board, one union representative, one employer representative, and one umpire that heard appeals from panel arbitration awards alleged to conflict with other
awards, involve novel and substantial questions of contract interpretation, or be arbitrary, capricious

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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ment, purported to repair the arbitration system by bringing consistency and reliability to the decision making process through arbitral
review. 15 To control arbitral quality the 1974 Agreement also established district panels of arbitrators who would hear cases in the
first instance. 16 Reflecting the procedure's purpose of bringing consistency and reliability to the arbitration process, appeals to the ARB
were permitted when panel arbitrator decisions on the same issue

or fraudulent. See infra notes 16-17.
Of the approximately 750 appeals to the ARB under the 1974 Agreement, the ARB issued only
126 decisions. The low output has been attributed to the ARB's comprehensive review, lack of screening and member turnover. See Bourne, supra note 13, at 472 relying upon Valtin memorandum, infra,
n. 18. Under the 1978 Agreement, the volume of ARB cases was reduced through the removal of
the "arbitrary and capricious" basis for appeal and the adoption of a one-member Board format to
replace the three-member Board. Id. at 473. Interview with Steven W. Lindner supra note 1.
The Arbitration Review Board was discontinued after the expiration of the 1978 Agreement.
Starting with the 1981 Agreement, the parties in Article XXIII(k) gave precedential effect to "[a]U
decisions of the Arbitration Review Board rendered prior to the expiration of the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement... to the extent that the basis for such decisions have [sic] not been modified
by subsequent changes in [the] Agreement." This provision has contributed to the continuing unifornity of coal decisions. ARB members during the 1974 Agreement were Robert C. Benedict (UMWA),
Tom F. Waddington (Employer) and Rolf Valtin (Chief Umpire). This Board decided cases I - 126.
Under the 1978 Agreement the parties changed to a single umpire system, cases 78-1 to 78-33 being
decided by Paul L. Selby Jr. and 78-34 to 78-81 being decided by Richard I. Bloch as Chief Umpires.
An Interim Board operating after the expiration of the 1974 Agreement and before the onset of the
1978 Board substituted Thomas M. Phelan as Chief Umpire and retained the party members of the
1974 Board. The interim Board decided non-precedential decisions 127-415.
15. See Borne, supra note 13, at 471.
16. Article XXIII, Section (b) of the 1974 Agreement reads:
1. Within the 60 days following the effective date of this Agreement, the United Mine
Workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association will establish an
Arbitration Review Board composed of one representative of the UMWA, one representative
of the Employer and a chief umpire to be jointly selected by both parties. This 60-day
period may be extended by mutual agreement.
2. The chief umpire jointly selected by the parties shall serve for the balance of the
Agreement, unless removed by formal resolution adopted by either the International Executive Board of the United Mine Workers of America or the Board of Directors of the
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association.
3. In the event of removal, resignation, death or incapacity of the chief umpire, the
president of the UMWA and the president of the B.C.O.A. shall endeavor to select a
mutually acceptable successor within 15 days. In the event the parties fail to agree, they
shall request the aid of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in selecting a mutually
acceptable successor. The composition may be considered by the parties at the time when
renewal agreements are being negotiated.
4. The presidents of the UMWA, International Union and the B.C.O.A. shall jointly
establish a panel of impartial arbitrators for each UMWA district. These panels may be
changed, augmented or supplemented by mutual consent of the appointing parties. Arbitrators may be removed from a panel by either party upon 10 days advance written notice.
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conflicted, substantial contractual issues were at stake or the decision
was asserted to be tainted by arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent
17

conduct.

However, because of the parties' failure to establish operational
guidelines for the ARB, it experienced implementation problems and
did not review its first appeal until fourteen months after the effective date of the 1974 agreement when it faced a backlog of 400
appeals. Having started on the wrong foot, the ARB encountered
dissatisfaction from the parties and was discontinued after the expiration of the 1978 Agreement. 8 While the ARB issued only 207
decisions during its seven year tenure,' 9 available evidence shows that
the ARB was influential in producing greater consistency in arbitral
decision making under the Agreement. 20 The residual influence of
ARB decisions has continued and increased since the expiration of

17. Article XXIII, Section (c) reads in part:
5. Either party to an arbitration, upon receiving a final award by a panel arbitrator,
may petition the Arbitration Review Board to appeal the decision of the panel arbitrator.
Such petition shall include a statement of the grounds for the appeal, which shall consist
of one of the following:
(i) That the decision of the panel arbitrators in conflict with one or
more decisions on the same issue of contract interpretation by other panel arbitrators.
(ii) That the decision involves a question of contract interpretation
which has not previously been decided by the Board, and which in the opinion
of the Board involves the interpretation of a substantial contractual issue.
(iii) That the decision is arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent, and
therefore must be set aside.
Upon receipt of such petition, the Arbitration Review Board shall review the decision of
the panel arbitrator to determine whether grounds for appeal exist. If not, the Board will
so inform the parties. If so, the Board shall review the decision of the panel arbitrator
making whatever changes are necessary to assure that the final decision correctly resolves
all contractual questions and issues presented, and is consistent with prior decisions of the
Board. The Board's decision shall be made by majority vote, and shall issue its decision
within 15 days. Following review, the Board shall consign its decision and transmit a copy
to each party.
18. See Bourne, supra note 13, at 471-74, relying on Valtin, "Memorandum to Arnold Miller
and Joseph Brennan," dated Nov. 8, 1977.
19. Id. at 472. The interim ARB issued 289 non-precedential decisions after the expiration of
the 1974 Agreement but before the 1978 Agreement. Interview with Steven W. Lindner, supra note
1. This number is relatively small given the excessive arbitration of grievances, 1,000 per year under
the 1974 and 1978 Agreements, appealed at a 10% rate yielding about 600 appeals under the 1974
and 1978 Agreements alone. See id. at 472-73 for a discussion of the reasons for the low number.
20. Id. at 474-75.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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the 1978 Agreement. 21 This is due in part to the following provision

found in the 1981 and subsequent Agreements:
Article XXIII SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Section (k) Prior Agreement
All decisions of the Arbitration Review Board rendered prior to the expiration
of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978 shall continue to have
precedential effect under this Agreement to the extent that the basis for such
decisions have [sic] not been modified by subsequent changes in this Agreement.

The 126 awards decided under the 1974 Agreement and 81 awards
decided under the 1978 Agreement have precedential effect and have

been followed by virtually 100% of the panel arbitrators. 2 Remarkable is the residual impact of ARB precedents, reflected in the
increasing adherence of panel arbitrators to those decisions since
1981.23
In this paper the author has undertaken a study of the coal
decisions published by the Bureau of National Affairs and Commerce Clearing House, the two principal publishers of arbitration
awards, during the fifteen-year period between 1975 and 1990. This

fifteen-year period encompasses virtually the entire experience of the
BCOA and UMWA under the ground breaking Agreement of 1974. 24
The study will observe some basic statistical trends in the published
cases. 25 It will also seek to summarize substantive developments under the provisions of the 1974, 1978, 1981, 1984 and 1988 Agreements.2 6 It is anticipated that the paper will be used as a

21. Id.
22. Id. at 475.
23. Id. The parties have also experimented with grievance-mediation, whose success has been
documented in a substantial experiment conducted with noteworthy success. See Brett and Goldberg,
Grievance Mediation in the Coal Industry: A Field Experiment, 37 INDus. & LAB. REL. Rav. 49
(1983). The letter of mediation, dated Oct. 1, 1984, and contained in the 1988 Agreement, reflects
the parties openness to the continued the use of this procedure.
24. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for a discussfon of major changes brought
on by the 1974 Agreement.
25. See infra note 30.
26. Because the Agreement has not been substantially changed since the 1974 negotiations,
references in this article to contractual provisions will not identify the year of the Agreement unless
there is a special reason to do so. Generally, unless otherwise noted, quoted language will be taken
from the 1988 Agreement.
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comprehensive treatise of arbitral developments under the new contractual regime.
II.

TBE PUBLISHID CASES

Between January 1975, and January 1990, the Bureau of National Affairs and the Commerce Clearinghouse published a total
of 368 arbitration awards in Labor Arbitration Reports and Labor
ArbitrationAwards, respectively, involving signatories to the Agreement. 27 Generally, employer signatories were also members of the
BCOA; however, a number of signatory mine operators were nonBCOA members.2 Indeed, the number of companies authorizing
BCOA representation has declined from 154 listed under the 1974
agreement to 48 listed under the 1988 agreement.2 9
Of the 368 published awards 30 Discipline and discharge cases occurred most frequently. During the fifteen year period of this study
27. The only case falling outside this period but included in the study is Arch of West Virginia
and United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 5958, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 503 (1990)
(Feldman, Arb.), decided on Feb. 28, 1990.
28. For example, under the 1984 Agreement there were 82 BCOA signatories and 2,414 nonBCOA signatories; under the 1988 Agreement there were 51 BCOA and 1,779 non-BCOA signatories.
Letter from Steven W. Lindner (Mar. 22, 1991).
29. This count includes companies and subdivisions. See Agreement of 1974, 132-35, Agreement
of 1988, 244-45. The listed companies may not correspond to number of signatories, since companies
sometimes have more than one signatory.
30. See Appendix I. Of course, the published cases represent only a small percentage of cases
actually decided during the study period. If the general publication percentages of BNA and CCH
hold true for the coal industry, the 368 published cases represent roughly approximately 2,500 to
3,600 decisions filed for publication during the study period. This estimate is based on data showing
that between 1975 and 1990 CCH published a low of about 8% of the cases submitted for publication
(1981) and a high of about 19% (1990). Letter, Robert F. Bezouska, Manager, Editorial Library,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. While comparable specific data are not available from BNA, generally
BNA published 10-15% of its cases per year.
In addition to the decisions that are sent to BNA and CCH but not published there is an internal
network of unpublished arbitration awards that are collected by agents for the BCOA and UMW.
There are more than 20,000 such decisions on file. Through a centralized numbering system and the
indexing of contractual provisions the parties may regularly retrieve and cite unpublished awards to
arbitrators deciding coal cases. It should also be noted that a number of able panel arbitrators do
not submit their awards for publication. Interview with M. David Vaughn, April 30, 1991.
Indeed, the frequency of issues represented in published cases may not mirror their actual frequency. For example, BNA excludes three categories of cases from publication because of their limited
utility to readers: (1) credibility cases, (2) cases where factual uniqueness precludes the general application of the award, and (3) cases involving "routine" principles. See 93 Lab Arb. (BNA) v-vi
(1990). Yet, the sixteen general categories of reported issues provide a good sampling of arbitral
thinking on many important issues that arise under the Agreement. Thus, they have been an excellent
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
source of raw data about arbitral developments during the fifteen years since the ground- breaking 8
1974 Agreement.

Sharpe: A Study of Coal Arbitration under the National Bituminous Coal Wa

1991]

COAL ARBITRATION STUDY

74 of the 368 cases, or approximately 20% of the awards, involved
discharge and discipline issues.31 Fifty-eight, or approximately 16%,
dealt with work assignment issues. About 52% of the work assignment issues involved subcontracting, which apparently increased rapidly in importance for the parties in early 1978.32 As the table in
Appendix I indicates, an equally popular issue was compensation.
Even though a variety of questions fall into this category, surprisingly the birthday holiday pay issue predominated constituting about
21% of the compensation disputes.3 3 The following issues in declining order also arose with some frequency: seniority (14%), hours
(8%), safety (5%), work rules (4%), health (4%), procedure (3%),
management rights (2%), working conditions, arbitrability, successorship, discrimination, union security and miscellaneous issues (each
accounting for 2% or fewer of the published cases).
In the issue categories where a significant number of disputes
arose during the period covered by the study 34 the union was most
successful in challenging supervisory performance of unit work. In
those cases arbitrators sustained grievances about 64% of the time.
Yet, the work assignment category containing the unit work issue
featured 58 cases and an overall grievance success rate of only 410%.
In the more popular discipline and discharge area the union won
approximately 61% of the 74 published cases. Employers, on the
other hand, were most dominant in procedural disputes, winning
approximately 80% of the cases. In the work assignment category,
employers won 61% of the cases, faring particularly well (68%) in
subcontracting disputes. Employers also did well on issues dealing
with scheduling (71%), seniority (71%) working conditions (63%),
arbitrability (63%), safety (56%), health (54%) and compensation
(52%).
Discharge and Discipline
Procedural idiosyncracies and industry specific characteristics
make some discipline and discharge issues in the coal industry disA.

31. The dominant discharge and discipline issue, attendance, occurred in 22 of the 74 (29.7%)
cases.

32. Thirty of the 58 work assignment cases involved subcontracting.
33. Twelve of the 58 compensation cases involved birthday holiday pay.
five or more cases arose during the study
where1991
as a category
defined here
34. Significant
Disseminated
by The isResearch
Repository
@ WVU,
period.
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tinct. For example, the ARB announced general rules governing attendance. 35 Without such general and binding rules arbitral
jurisprudence on the attendance issue would have developed along
conflicting lines of authority that would make the selection of an
arbitrator outcome determinative. 36 Similarly, the industry's unique
concern with safety and unauthorized strike problems has left its
imprint on discipline cases. Other issues, such as drugs and alcohol
and insubordination, are common to all industries, yet raise special
concerns under the Agreement because of industry characteristics.
1. Attendance
The attendance issue accounts for the largest number of Discipline and Discharge Cases. 37 Grievants won about 55% of the published discharge and discipline cases involving attendance issues during
38
the study period.
Even though the ARB became extinct upon the expiration of the
1978 Agreement, as noted above, the 1981 and subsequent Agreements in Article XXIII, Section (k) gave precedential status to ARB
decisions arising under the 1974 and 1978 Agreements. Thus, many
ARB decisions continue to have vitality.
An example of how ARB decisions influence arbitral decision
making in attendance cases is found in AMAX Coal Co. and United
Mine Workers of America District 11, Local 1907. 39 In that case the
grievant had a remarkable record of excessive absenteeism related
to various periods of disability that were proved by physician statements. The company instituted an absentee control program to counsel and discipline employees with serious absentee problems. The
grievant was placed into the program and ultimately discharged for
falling to meet the goals of the program. Two contractual provisions
that were relevant to this case were Article XXII, Section (i) con35. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.

36. See Appendix VII.
37. Twenty-two of the 74 discipline and discharge cases or (approximately 30%) involved attendance.
38. The grievant won 12 of 22 (55%) of the attendance cases.

39. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 225 (1985) (Kilroy, Arb.).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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taning a standard attendance control program and Article XI, Section (c) containing a sickness and accident benefits plan. The latter
was established to protect employees against financial hardship resulting from sickness or accident suffered on or off the job. The
union argued that the grievant's receipt of benefits under Article XI
excused her disability related absences and insulated her from discipline. The union also argued that the company was precluded from
using its own absentee control program in lieu of the standard attendance control program contained in Article XXII(i). Drawing
heavily upon ARB No. 78-25 the arbitrator rejected both arguments.
ARB No. 78-25 specifically limited "proven sickness" as a defense
to the Standard Attendance Control Program set forth in Article
XXII, Section (i). The arbitrator said that "proven sickness" could
not prohibit discipline for absenteeism under other provisions of the
agreement. The arbitrator also quoted other general pronouncements
contained in ARB No. 78-25 specifically permitting illness related
absences to be used in determining excessive absenteeism unless a
company's specific absentee control programs permit the disciplinary
exemption of such related absences. The ARB decision goes on to
create a presumption in favor of counting illness related absences
toward excessive absenteeism unless contractually exempted. Because
the company's October 1983 Absentee Control Program in AMAX
had not exempted "proven sickness," the arbitrator found that the
company had properly counted these absences and discharged the
grievant for just cause. 4°
In attendance cases the proof of sickness clause of the Standard
Attendance Control Program has generated the most controversy.
Article XXII, Section (i)(4) excepts "proven sickness" from the serious penalty for being absent from work two consecutive days without the consent of the employer. The attendance question that arises

40. Other awards applying ARB No. 78-25 as binding precedent in attendance cases are: North

River Energy Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District 20, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 447 (1987)
(Witney, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found under the company's policy that absences resulting from
a job related injury do not count against an employee for purposes of discipline); Drummond Co.,
Inc. and United Mine Workers of America, District 20, 87-1 ARB
8157 (1986) (Feldman, Arb.)
(where the arbitrator referenced ARB No. 78-25 in finding that a preceding arbitration award should

not be res judicata in that case).
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most frequently is whether an employee has produced sufficient proof
of illness to be excused from absences under the standard attendance
control program of Article XXII, Section (i).
Section (4) of that article provides as follows:
(4) Absences of Two Consecutive Days
When an employee absents himself from his work for a period of (2) consecutive days without the consent of the Employer, other than because of proven
sickness, he may be discharged.

The employee bears the burden of proving the absence was caused
by illness. 41 Arbitrator Donald S. McPherson found in Beth Energy
Mines, Inc., 84 Complex and United Mine Workers of America,
District 5, Local Union 119742 that the grievant had not met his
burden of proving illness by simply relying upon a proven record
of psychological illness, especially where current medical evidence
did not indicate illness and the grievant had not sought treatment
during the period of his absence. 43 Similarly, Arbitrator Feldman
found insufficient proof of illness, where the employee produced
only subjective evidence of pain not based upon any objective medical findings. 44
An excusable illness under Article XXII, Section (i) is not simply
a condition that is related to an illness; rather, "it refers to a condition of illness which renders an employee physically unfit for
work. ' ' 45 Though a medical excuse covering the period of absence
is the best proof of illness, arbitrators will examine the entire record
to determine whether there is sufficient proof of illness. Often such
41. See Beth Energy Mines, Inc., Eighty-Four Complex and United Mine Workers of America,
District 5, Local Union 1197, 85-2 ARB
8628 (1985) (McPherson, Arb.).
42. Id.

43. In Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Blue Creek No. 3 Mine, Atger, Alabama and United Mine
Workers of America, District 20, Local No. 1928, 79-1 ARB 8237 (1979) (Clarke, Arb.) the arbitrator
found that the grievant had failed to meet his burden of proving illness where his proof of narcotic

addiction and reactive depression only covered some and not all of the days of absence.
. 44. See Quarto Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District 5, Local Union
1941, 84-1 ARB

8183 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.).

45. See id. at 3986 (citing North American Coal Corporation, Powhatan No. 3 Mine and United
Mine Workers of America, Local Union 2262, ARB No. 6-77-763 (1977) (Dworkin, Arb.), aff'd ARB

Dec. No. 128 (Mar. 2, 1978)). See also United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 6023
and Allied Chemical Corp., Semet-

Solvay Division, 78-1
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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proof takes the form of evidence corroborating the grievant's subjective complaints or other indications of illness. 46
Although a company may ultimately reject a questionable medical excuse, it cannot reject a medical excuse without evidence that
tends to establish its fraudulence or inaccuracy. 47 Arbitrator David
T. Kennedy has suggested the following procedure, where "a Company has a reasonable basis to challenge an excuse":
If an employer has reasonable cause to question an excuse which has been presented, the employer should put the employee to work under protest and then
investigate the doubtful excuse. If the excuse turns out to be genuine, the Company and employee have not been harmed because the employee has been allowed
to work. If it turns out to be fraudulent in some way, the Company can proceed
to take such action as it feels is warranted . . 41

The Company may reject a grievant's medical excuse, however,
if other evidence shows that illness was not the reason for the grie49
vant's absence.

2.

Safety Cases

As noted in Section I, the mining industry has historically had
a special concern about safety issues. This concern has found congressional expression in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.50

46. See Jim Walter Resources, Inc., and United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local
Union 2397, 85-1 ARB 8283 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.) (wherein the arbitrator found sufficient proof
of illness in the grievant's statement that he was in severe back pain during the period of absence,
that he took pharmaceuticals during the entire period, that he visited an emergency room, because
of excruciating back pain, that he visited a doctor's office during the period even though he was
unable to secure treatment, that his back problems were a continuing problem and not simply an
isolated episode, and that he kept an appointment at the end of the absence period with his treating
physician; the arbitrator found that this evidence cumulatively constituted proof of illness under Article
XXII).
47. Crystal Coal Company and United Mine Workers of America, 84-1 ARB 8046 (1983)
(Stoltenberg, Arb.).
48. See id. at 3200.
49. See AMEX Coal Co., Chinook Mine and United Mine Workers of America, Local Union
No. 1216, 83-1 ARB 8279 (1983) (Witney, Arb.) (wherein the arbitrator looked beyond and rejected
the grievant's medical excuse, finding that he would have worked, had he not been arrested and
detained in jail).
50. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1977). Current events show that safety concerns continue to be a contentious issue in the industry. See U.S. to Fine Coal Companies $5 Million for Safety Violations on
Dust Samples.
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Similarly, mining states have passed their own laws regulating the
hazards of mining.5 1 Recognizing the importance of safety concerns
the parties in Article III of Agreements from 1974 through 1988
have affirmed the right of employees to a safe and healthful work
place. They have affirmed also their own responsibilities, obligations2
and duties under federal and state mine safety and health laws.1
Under Article III the parties have resolved to cooperate among themselves and with federal and state officials to improve mining safety
and health.53
Companies also use Article III to justify discipline including discharge of employees. These cases typically involve alleged employee
conduct that violates federal or state law and may turn on whether
the employee actually engaged in the conduct 4 Other cases involve
the question of whether an employee can properly be held respon55
sible for violating safety and health laws.
The most difficult safety cases involve a charge of insubordination, where the employee has asserted his safety rights. In these
cases the employer's right to discipline confronts the employee's con-

51. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 20-3-10 (1982).
52. Article III of the Agreement provides in part:
Section (b) Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, As Amended.
The parties to this contract, finding themselves in complete accord with the FNDINas AND
PURPOSE declared by the United States Congress in section 2 of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health of 1977 do hereby affirm and subscribe to the principles as set forth in such
[sic] section 2 of the Act.
(1) In consequence of this affirmation, the parties not only accept their several responsibilities, obligations and duties imposed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, but
freely resolve to cooperate among each other and with the responsible officials of federal
and state governments in determined efforts to achieve greatly improved performance in
coal mine health and safety.
(2) Neither party waives nor repudiates any administrative, procedural, legislative, or judicial
rights under or relating to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., Robinson Run Mine, Jones Run Portal and United Mine
Workers of America, Local No. 1501, District No. 31, 82-2 ARB 8600 (1982) (Stoltenberg, Arb.)
(where the arbitrator resolved against the grievant a credibility dispute about whether the grievant
was smoking inside a mine in violation of federal law).
55. See, e.g., North American Coal Corp. and United Mine Workers of America, District 6,
Local No. 1810, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1095 (1985) (Talmadge, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that
a miner helper could not be held equally responsible with the mining machine operator for a long
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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tractually guaranteed right to a safe working environment. Article
III, Section (i) provides as follows:
Section (i) Preservation of Individual Safety Rights.
(1) No Employee will be required to work under conditions he has reasonable
grounds to believe to be abnormally and immediately dangerous to himself beyond
the normal hazards inherent in the operation which could reasonably be expected
to cause death or serious physical harm before such condition or practice can be
abated. When an Employee in good faith believes that he is being required to
work under such conditions he shall immediately notify his supervisor of such
belief and the specific physical conditions he believes exist. The Employee shall
state the factual basis for his belief but shall not be required to cite applicable
law or regulation. Unless there is a dispute between the employee and management
as to the existence of such condition, steps shall be taken immediately to correct
or prevent exposure to such condition utilizing all necessary employees including
the involved Employee.

Quite apart from the safety rights contained in the preceding

section of the Agreement, a well-settled principle of arbitral jurisprudence gives an employee the right to refuse to carry out a work
assignment if he believes that the assignment entails an undue risk
to his health and safety. 56 Thus, employees asserting their safety
rights in defense of a charge of insubordination are often viewed

by arbitrators as having two contractual bases - the "just cause"
provision (Article XXIV(a)) and the safety rights provision (Article
III, Section (i)). An employee failing to comply with Article III,

Section (i) by immediately notifying his supervisor or specifying the
factual basis for his belief may still be saved by Article XXIV(a)

of the Agreement on the theory that discipline and discharge would
57
be without just cause.
Employees are also susceptible to discipline for unsafe perform-

ance as prescribed by company rules that are not inconsistent with
state and federal laws.58 Additionally, safety concerns may figure

56. See Peabody Coal Co., No. 7 Montcoal Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local 6608, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1002 (1986) (Volz, Arb.) (citing Allied Chemical Corp., 66-3
ARB 9022 (1966) (Hilpert, Arb.)). See also, e.g., Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
587 (1982) (McCollister, Arb.).
57. Peabody Coal Co., No. 7, Montcal Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local 6608, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1002 (1986) (Volz, Arb.).
58. See
ArticleRepository
III, § (g). @ WVU, 1991
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into arbitral review of terminations for unsatisfactory performance. 59
Arbitral sensitivity to mine safety issues may render arbitrators less
sympathetic to the plight of employees disciplined for performance
problems.
A special status is enjoyed by members of the Mine Health and
Safety Committee (MHSC). 60 This status affects the company's authority to discipline employees for safety violations. Article III, Section (d) of the Agreement mandates a MHSC made up of experienced
and trained miners and selected by the local union to inspect the
mine and make recommendations to the employer, should it discover
conditions that endanger the lives and bodies of the employees. Section (d)(5) of Article III also is an immunity provision that prevents
an employer from suspending or discharging committee members
for official actions. This often means that employers' attempts to
characterize the actions of MHSC members as insubordinate or violations of safety rules are frustrated. For example, in Consolidation
Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District No. 6,
Local 1110,61 a committee member successfully challenged his disciplinary suspension for insubordination and violation of company
safety rules when he conducted an inspection in a "dangered-off"
area despite the supervisor's instructions not to do so. In response
to the company's argument that the immunity clause prevented discipline only for a member's improper closure of the mine, the arbitrator said the following:
An analysis of the entire text persuades the arbitrator that clause (5) was intended
to provide disciplinary immunity for the full range of committee member conduct,
leaving removal from the committee as the only remedy which the company might
pursue in the event a member operated arbitrarily to close down an area of the
mine, an act obviously of enormous economic consequences to an employer.F

Grievants won about 61% of the published discharge cases involving safety concerns. This percentage reflects concurrent tenden59. See, e.g., Harrison & Western Corp. and United Mine Workers of America, District 30,
66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1067 (1976) (Cantor, Arb.) (where the arbitrator upheld the termination of an
employee from a job due to an inability to perform the job; the arbitrator made it clear that mine
safety was an important factor in his decision).
60. See Agreement, Article III, Section (d).
61. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 473 (1982) (Ruben, Arb.).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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cies to permit the use of safety rights as an employee shield while

denying their use as an employer sword.
3.

Work Stoppages

As already noted, peculiar to the mining industry is a history of
settling grievance disputes through work stoppages. 63 Indeed, under
the settlement of disputes provision, Article XXIII, of the Agree-

ment from 1974 to the present the union has not explicitly agreed
to refrain from striking during the term of the agreement.6 Yet, the
Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,65

63. See also United States Steel Corp., Frick Coal District, Maple Creek Mine and United Mine
Workers of America, District 5, Local 1248, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 15 (1975) (Garrett, Arb.) (making
the point that the numerous unauthorized work stoppages at the mine evidenced the miners' lack of
confidence in the grievance procedure).
64. Union officials attribute the absence of a clear no-strike promise in the agreement to the
membership's "no contract, no coal" policy. The strike right is jealously guarded to the point where
the leadership is convinced that the membership would never agree to a no-strike clause. Several
provisions of the Agreement, in addition to the missing no-strike clause in Article XXIII, reflect the
parties' acceptance of the strike prerogative and recognition of the overall strike problem. See, e.g.,
Article XI § (c) (denying disability benefits where the disability occurs during a strike or work stoppage
but not where it occurs before a strike or work stoppage). See also Article XII § (e) (disqualifying
an employee from receiving the benefits of holiday pay where an absence before or after the holiday
is due to an unauthorized work stoppage, as distinguished from the typical disqualification for any
absence on the days immediately before or after the holiday). Interview with Steven W. Lindner,
supra note I. See also P. Clark, supra note 10 at 63-64.
65. 414 U.S. 368 (1974). See also Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
Under the leadership of Chief Umpire Rolf Valtin the ARB recognized in ARB No. 108 (1977) that
the Agreement imposes a no-strike obligation on the Union in Articles XXIII and XXVIII, even
though no explicit no-strike promise exists, noting:
[Ain Agreement which mandates the use of the disputes-settling machinery ending in arbitration and which nonetheless permits resort to strike or lockout action over disputes
which are subject to referral to the machinery would add up to a self-contradition. ARB
No. 108, p. 6.
While setting forth a historical perspective on the role of arbitration in American labor relations,
focusing particularly on its benefit to employees, the ARB also noted the unique circumstances of
the coal industry. Id. at 9-14. It acknowledged the relatively depressed state of labor relations in the
industry and discussed the need for a systematic settling of grievances in arbitration and without resort
to the use of economic pressure. Id. at 13-16. The ARB indicated its intent to apply a substantive
rather than formal approach to the factual question of whether picketing has occurred, one that would
cover the employees in that case who were simply observed in the vicinity of the targeted mines
without signs. Id. at 16-18. Though tempered by due process and equal protection concerns, the ARB
announced the following rule:
[W]e lump picketing with strike instigation and other strike-leadership manifestations as
being of the same gravity. They constitute a capital offense-by which we mean an offense
which itself
warrants
discharge
and which@Management
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held that the existence of a grievance procedure implies a no strike
obligation. Thus, grievance strikes are not sanctioned under federal
labor law. They are also unauthorized, if neither the union nor the
contract has sanctioned such work stoppages. 6
The parties do agree in Article XXVII that disputes not settled
by agreement "shall be settled by the machinery provided in the
'Settlement of Disputes' Article of [the] Agreement." 6 7 They also
agree to maintain the integrity of the contract without resort to
courts. 68 Even that agreement is qualified by the permission to use
"free collective bargaining as heretofore practiced in the industry"
where the dispute is national in character. 9
Picket lines associated with work stoppages are particularly effective in the mine industry, because of the tradition of loyalty and
brotherhood among miners and respect for the picket line.70 Thus,
picketing creates a major production concern among mine operators,
hence an occasion for discipline.
About seven percent of the discipline and discharge cases published between 1975 and 1990 involved unauthorized work stoppages.
These cases arise against the historical backdrop of the grievance
calling for the application of progressive discipline. Id. at 17-18.

In view of the ARB's radical departure from the tradition of miner strike prerogative, tacitly recognized
by management and the union, the ARB closed its decision with the following comment:
We have proceeded with awareness of the Miners' lot in relation to that of most others in
our society and with understanding of the origins of the Miners' repeated recourse to picketing and strikes. But we cannot at once be faithful to our role under the Agreement and
permit defiance of the grievance procedure. There is no choice for us on this score. The
choice is the Miners'. They cannot legitimately argue that their survival is dependent on

adherence to their picketing and striking tradition. For the shedding of that tradition merely
means acceptance of the grievance procedure as the proper dispute-settling forum-which,

in turn, amounts to no more than the honoring of the Agreement. There cannot be both
pride in the tradition and respect for the Agreement. Id. at 22.
Some observers believe that the ARB's decision in ARB No. 108 was the principal reason for the
decline in unauthorized grievance strikes. Interview with Steve Lindner, supra, n.1. Also, see Appendix
VI, showing a precipitous drop in wildcat strike activity starting in 1978, the year after ARB No.
108.
66. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 409-10 (1981).

67. See Article XXVII.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. See P. Clark, supra note 10 at 63-64. Consolidation Coal Co., Central Shop and United

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
Mine Workers, District 29, Local 6114, 77-1 ARB 8300

(1977) (Dyke, Arb.).
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strike,71 which comes into play in arbitral reasoning. For example,
in Jim Walter Resources, Inc. and United Mine Workers of America,
District 20, Local 1928,72 the company discharged a number of employees for leading an illegal work stoppage to protest the discharge
of a fellow employee for insubordination. The union denied that
the grievants were picketing, since they carried no signs and attempted to dissuade no one from entering the plant. 73 The arbitrator
denied the grievance finding that the grievants had engaged in picketing. 74 In explaining his affirmation of the severity of the discipline
the arbitrator said the following:
This arbitrator is aware that discharge is the most severe discipline that a company
may administer. However, I am mindful that the incident which precipitated the
walkout (the firing of [C.]) was a grievable matter. The grievance procedure adopted
by the parties was designed to handle precisely this type of incident. For employees
to resort to self help over such an issue undercuts the grievance procedure and
runs counter to the entire collective bargaining process between the company and
the union.
Persons engaged in unauthorized walkouts hurt not only the company but
fellow employees. Employees are deprived of the opportunity to earn a living.
The union itself suffers since its pension and benefit trusts are funded by employer
contributions based on tons of coal produced and employee hours worked. Article
XX(D). Wildcat strikes and unauthorized work stoppages have cut deeply into
trust assets. During the instant strike, newspapers carried the announcement of
possible reductions in benefits from the UMWA Health and Retirement Fund
because of lower contributions due to lowered production and work time lost
from strikes. The economic impact of this walkout which spread throughout the

71. See .supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; Appendix I.
72. 77-2 ARB. 8430 (1977) (Grooms, Arb.).
73. Id. at 4840.
74. In finding that the grievants had engaged in picketing the arbitrator defined picketing in
the following terms:
Picketing may include the posting of one or more members of a union at the entrance or
approaches to a place of work against which a strike is being conducted for the purpose
of watching or annoying the owner or workmen on the inside or for the purpose of interfering with the business or intimidating the patrons.
The arbitrator also cited Arbitrator Henry B. Welch's observations in Lanson Industries, Inc. and
International Brotherhoodof Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
612:
All the cases hold that to constitute picketing you don't have to walk up and down,
you don't have to patrol a beat, you don't have to carry a sign, you don't have to utter
a word or make any sound. All you have to do is just be there with fellow strikers in the
immediate vicinity of the plant entrance or the approaches to the plant entrance where you
can watch and observe anyone entering or leaving the plant.
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state and eventually idled most, if not all, underground and surface operations
in Alabama, is well known. The monetary loss to employer, employee, the union,
and citizens of this area is astronomical. 5

Arbitrators are, perhaps, less likely to be influenced by the history of grievance strikes in the industry as we move away from the
decade of the 70's.76 Arbitrator Marvin J. Feldman in Freeman United
Coal Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District
12, Local Union 1969, 77 was not persuaded by the company's argument that the historical background of unauthorized work stoppages in the mine industry should be a factor in the arbitrator's
decision. In that case the grievant had been discharged for picketing
to protest the holding of rescue team practice sessions on the premises of a non-signatory to the contract. 71 Only one team member
showed up for the practice. In this case, decided eight years after
Jim Walter Resources,7 9 the arbitrator distinguished the picketing at
issue from that plaguing the coal industry in the 1970's in the following terms:
From all of this it can hardly be stated that the grievant participated in picketing
in the classical sense. Simply put, the picketing of the coal industry in the 70's
was militant, caused loss of production, and was quite unlike the activity of the
grievant in all manner and respect. Therefore, it can hardly be indicated that the
grievant was guilty of any classical picketing as it is known in the coal industry.

Arbitrator Feldman regarded the grievant's picketing as only serious enough to warrant a fifteen day suspension rather than discharge and sustained the grievance with this modified penalty. 81
In some discipline and discharge cases involving work stoppages,
the peculiar history of the coal industry undermines rather than
strengthens the company's case. For example, in Arch of Illinois,
Inc., Horse Creek Mine and United Mine Workers of America, Local 13, District 12,2 the arbitrator cited the history of violence in
75. Id. at 4831-32.
76. The incidence of wildcat strikes receded precipitously beginning in 1978, see Appendix VI,
and continues at a low level, because of the effects of ARB 108. Lindner supra, note I.
77. 85-2 ARB 8518 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
78. Id. at 5125-26.
79. 77-2 ARB
8430 (1977) (Grooms, Arb.).
80. Id. at 5127.
81. Id. at 5128.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
20
82. 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1097 (1990) (Cohen, Arb.).

Sharpe: A Study of Coal Arbitration under the National Bituminous Coal Wa

1991]

COAL ARBITRATION STUDY

the coal industry in finding that the grievant did not engage in a
sympathy strike but stayed home because of threats to himself, his
family, and his property.83
The discipline and discharge cases involving work stoppages dramatically demonstrate how the uniqueness of the mining industry
might influence the application of well-settled arbitral principles. Not
only are other industry contracts likely to have no strike clauses,
but arbitrators are likely to have little trouble sustaining discharges
4
of employees who violate the no strike promise.
4.

Drugs and Alcohol

Mirroring the larger society, alcohol and drug issues become an
increasing problem in the reported cases starting around 1984. Before that date during the study period no discipline and discharge
cases involving alcohol and drug abuse were published. From 1984
to the end of the study period seven, just under 100%0,of the discipline and discharge cases involved drugs and alcohol. And as discussed below an additional four cases reported during the study
period dealt with the employer's authority to implement drug testing
programs. Five of the seven alcohol and drug cases related to intoxication on the job, while the other two dealt with whether discipline was proper under the company's testing program. 85

83. Id. at 1097. The grievant's refusal to work was in the context of a strike by the company's
miners in sympathy with miners who engaged in a strike against the Pittston Coal Company.
84. See, e.g., BERC Building Maintenance Co., Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 487 (1981).
85. Freeman United Coal Co., Fidelity No. 11 Mine and United Mine Workers of America,
District 12, Local 5134, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.); Boone Energy and United
Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 1696, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1985) (O'Connell, Arb.);
Consolidation Coal Co., Mid-Continent Region, Burning Star No. 4 Mine and United Mine Workers
of America, District 12, Local 1825, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 729 (1986) (Hoh, Arb.); Consolidation
Coal Co., Western Region, Emery Mine and United Mine Workers, District 22, Local 1261, 82-2
ARB 8605 (1982) (Sass, Arb.); and Donaldson Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America,
District 17, Local 340, 89-1 ARB
8089 (1988) (Zobrak, Arb.). Two other mining cases reported
during the study but not decided under the National Wage Agreement are the Pittsburgh & Midway
Coal Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 1332, 88-2 ARB 8480
(1988) (Cohen, Arb.) and Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local 1332, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 431 (1988) (Cohen, Arb.). Of these seven cases including the
two Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. cases, companies won 81% of the time. The reasons for
this winning percentage for companies are probably articulated best by Arbitrator Cohen in the Pittsburgh & Midway
Mining
Co., 91 Lab.
Arb. (BNA)
Disseminated
by The Coal
Research
Repository
@ WVU,
1991 431, 434, where in denying the grievance21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

Given the heavy machinery and equipment that is used in the
coal work place, intoxicated employees pose too great a hazard to

be tolerated. Thus, the safety implications of intoxication in the
mining industry have led to an unusually high rate of denied grievances in discipline and discharge cases involving intoxication.86 And
the reasoning of arbitrators in these cases reveals a pattern of concern about the effects of intoxication upon miner safety. For example, in denying the grievance in Freeman United Coal Co. and
United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 5134,87 Arbitrator Raymond R. Roberts said the following:
One thing distinguishes this case and places it upon an entirely different
footing from any of the other cases shown in the evidence. Grievant was in an
extreme state of intoxication so that he was dangerous to himself and others.
Whether or not that condition was a product of disease, Grievant should have
recognized his condition and the danger it presented. Grievant nevertheless went
ahead to operate dangerous equipment producing an immediate danger and jeopardy not only to his own life but also that of his fellow employees. Mine roads,
especially in and about well traveled areas where haul truck [sic], powder trucks,
Employees coming to work and other traffic is present, is dangerous enough. In
a state of extreme intoxication under which Grievant sought to operate under
those conditions, accident and injury is [sic] almost inevitable."

Similarly, Arbitrator John F. Sass in Consolidation Coal Co.,
Western Region, Emery Mine and UnitedMine Workers of America,
District 22, Local No. 1261,89 denied the grievance partially based
on he following stated concern:
There can be no doubt that the coal industry, and this company in particular,

considers the intoxication of employees during work hours to be a very serious
offense indeed. The company here has submitted numerous prior arbitration awards
in the coal industry which in turn refer to a host of other prior awards dealing
with alcohol problems. In every single case, the Arbitrator upheld management's

he said the following:
Some observations of the coal mining industry must first be made. Foremost among this
is that statistics show that coal mining is the most dangerous occupation in which American
workers can engage. Therefore, the requirement that the company maintain a safe and
healthful work place must be taken literally and not merely as some pious statement.
86. See id. Cf. cases cited in Erxouiu & Eucouiu, How AnirrATiON Wonixs 709 (4th ed.
1985).
87. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 865 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
88. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
22
89. 82-2 ARB 8605 (1982) (Sass, Arb.).

Sharpe: A Study of Coal Arbitration under the National Bituminous Coal Wa

1991]

COAL ARBITRATION STUDY

decision to discharge an employee who was found to be under the influence of
alcohol. The reason for this, aside from the obvious adverse effect on employee
work and efficiency, is the potentially hazardous results that could be caused by
the actions of any one intoxicated employee in a coal mine setting. Thus, what
might be considered in other industries to be a rather hard-nosed approach to
problems of employee intoxication appears to be reasonablyjustified here....
(emphasis added) 90

On the other hand, concerns about safety in the mining work
place cannot substitute for proof of intoxication. For example, in
Boone Energy and United Mine Workers of America, District 17,

Local 1696,91 Arbitrator Edward J. O'Connell sustained the grievances of four employees who tested positive for four proscribed

substances. Noting the failure of the blood and urine tests to demonstrate whether the grievants were intoxicated, the arbitrator said
the following:
It is the uncertainty, which the expert witness for the company candidly acknowledged, which renders the test results, by themselves, as an unreliable indicator of whether or not an individual is under the influence of any intoxicant,
other than alcohol, when the sample is drawn. This lack of refinement in the
science of testing is tragic in a sense because it can require the return to work
of an individual who has in the past and may well in the future report to work
under the influence, thereby endangering not only his life but the lives of others.
In a contractual setting which calls for the application of the just cause standard
to discharge matters no other [result] is possible, however, since to uphold the
discharge would involve guesswork and speculation as to the condition of an
employee, and not proof.-

And in Donaldson Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 17, Local 340,91 the arbitrator refused to uphold

discipline based upon a positive drug test, where the employer had
not given employees and the union notice of the company's newly

implemented drug policy. The arbitrator held that the purpose of
drug testing is to warn rather than to trap employees. 94 In sustaining
the grievance, the arbitrator affirmed the basic principle of industrial
95
due process.

90. Id. at 5703.
91. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233, 237 (1985) (O'Connell, Arb.).
92. Id.
93. 89-1 ARB
8089 (1988) (Zorak, Arb.).
94. Id. at 3456.
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5. Unsatisfactory Performance
The remaining discipline and discharge cases may be thought of
as falling into the category of unsatisfactory performance. Negli-

gence, 96 inadequate performance, 97 and unsafe performance98 cases
are all species of unsatisfactory performance. The salient feature of
arbitral analysis running through the majority of these cases is the

96. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local
2488, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 776 (1984) (Creo, Arb.) (where the Arbitrator sustained an employee's
grievance growing out of a disciplinary suspension for negligent performance of his duties - the
arbitrator citing disparate treatment by the employer); Alabama Bi-Products, Mary Lee No. 1 Mine
and United Mine Workers of America, Local 7813, District 20, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 793 (1985)
(Gibson, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local 1784, 84-2
ARB 8452 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the grievance as to discharge but
imposed a 10 day suspension on the grievants for negligently permitting a methane gas buildup in
the mine in violation of safety regulations); Eastern Coal Corp. and United Mine Workers of America,
District 30, Local 5737, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 759 (1987) (Hewitt, Arb.) (where the arbitrator upheld
the disciplining of the grievant for accident proneness, since a number of the incidents reflected the
grievant's negligence).
97. Kanawha Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local 3453, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
912 (1986) (Murphy, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the grievance because of the company's
failure to prove that the grievants had failed to perform the task at issue); Southern Ohio Coal Co.
and United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1886, 76-2 ARB 8608 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.)
(where the arbitrator with extreme reluctance sustained the grievance growing out of the company's
mass discipline of nine grievants for leaving the foreman behind on the man trip from the mine; the
company had failed to identify the perpetrators); Consolidation Coal Co. and United Mine Workers
of America, District 12, Local 9721, 84-1 ARB. 8295 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the off duty
union president's conversation of less than sixty seconds with an on duty employee was de minimis,
not initiated by the grievant and not planned and the arbitrator rescinded the company's letter of
reprimand to the union president); A&C Transport Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District
29, Local Union 8783, 85-2 ARB 8542 (1985) (Zobrak. Arb.) (where the arbitrator reduced the discharge to a 3-day suspension, because of the company's inconsistency in monitoring and enforcing
company policy of drivers checking oil and water levels before operating their trucks).
98. See, e.g., Harrison & Westin Corp. and United Mine Workers of America, District 30, 66
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1067 (1976) (Cantor, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the termination of the
grievant for inability to perform his job); Consolidation Coal Co., Eastern Division, Ireland Mine
and United Mine Workers, District No. 6, Local 1110, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 473 (1982) (Ruben, Arb.)
(where the arbitrator held that the company had not proved the grievant guilty of unsafe performance
and the company could not discipline the grievant, a member of the mine health and safety committee,
for insubordination in connection with the performance of his official duties); United Mine Workers
of America, Local Union No. 6023 and Allied Chemical Corp., Semet- Solvay Division, 78-1 ARB
8006 (1977) (Dyke, Arb.) (where the arbitrator reversed the discharges of two employees despite
their violation of a company rule newly promulgated in response to a mining accident fatality that
resulted from conduct similar to grievant's). Consolidation Coal Co., Midwest Region, Rose Valley
No. 6 Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local Union 1557, 78-2 ARB 8558
(1978) (Ipavec, Arb.) (where the arbitrator overturned a disciplinary suspension of the grievant for
failure to wear his safety glasses, because the discipline did not conform to the company's posted
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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arbitrator's concern about safety. For example, Arbitrator Charles
F. Ipavec in Southern Ohio Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 6, Local 1886,99 while upholding the grievance because of the company's insufficiency of proof said the following:
Matters of safety, to prevent injuries and loss of life, must always be given
a paramount position. The members of the bargaining unit rightfully may expect
that the members of supervision will always be concerned about the safety of all
of the people in the mine. Conversely, the members of supervision can expect
that all of the members of the bargaining unit will be concerned about the safety
of all of the people in the mine. 00

In Eastern Coal Corp. and United Mine Workers of America,
District 30, Local 5737,101 Arbitrator Thomas L. Hewitt upheld the
discipline of an "accident prone" grievant noting the following:
Accident prone persons do not necessarily perform acts which cause accidents to
occur to them. Often the accidents are the result of the lack of awareness of
their surroundings and the lack of attention to the job they are performing ....
The accident repeater course and the notice to the grievant emphasize the importance of the employee looking out for his own safety and paying closer attention to his environment while performing his job duties. 02

And in Consolidation Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of
America, Local 1784,103 Arbitrator Roger I. Abrams reversed the
discharge of the grievant but imposed a ten day suspension, based
on his finding that the grievant should have known and corrected
°4
the condition that led to a buildup of methane gas in the mine1
Arbitrator Abrams' award was based in part on his belief that it
would cause classified employees to be vigilant to safety concerns.
In his analysis he noted:
The union argues that the Grievants' attention was on the bad top and that is
a real possibility. However, there are many hazards to watch out for, not the
least of which is a methane build-up as a result of poor ventilation. A methane
build-up in a coal mine presents a danger of extraordinary proportions. Worrying

99. 76-2 ARB 8608 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.).
100. Id. at 7041-42.
101. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 759 (1987) (Hewitt, Arb.).
102. Id. at 762.
103. 84-2 ARB 8452 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.).
104. by
Id. The
at 4986-87.
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about a bad top cannot excuse failure to assure proper ventilation in the work
area. 105

The published cases demonstrate that safety concerns in the mining industry are of paramount importance in the resolution of discipline and discharge cases.
6. Other Cases
Discipline and discharge cases involving such offenses as insubordination and fighting in the coal industry are virtually indistinguishable from such cases outside the industry. For example, in
ConsolidationCoal Co., Shoemaker Mine and United Mine Workers

of America, District 6, Local 1473 ,106 the arbitrator applied a conventional analysis to find that the grievant had been insubordinate
and deserved discharge.

°7

In doing so, the arbitrator noted the spe-

cial character of insubordination as an offense not subject to the
progressive discipline norm. 10 8 And in accordance with well-settled
arbitral principles the arbitrator found that the instructions were
clear, understood to be an order, and accompanied by the supervisor's statement of the penalty for failure to comply. 10 Even though
membership on the MHSC provides an employee with some immunity as seen in ConsolidationCoal Co. and United Mine Workers
of America, District No. 6, Local 1110, the severity of insubordination as a cause for discipline may well lead to the narrow con10
struction of this immunity. 1
105. Id. at 4987.
106. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 927 (1981) (Nelson, Arb.).
107. Id. at 932-34.
108. Id. at 933.
109. Id. at 932-33. See also Southwestern Illinois Coal Corp. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 12, Local 1392, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 806 (1392) (Hewitt, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
found the grievant's off duty fight with the company's labor relations representative to be work related
and upheld the discharge). Cf. AMEX Coal Co., Ayrshire Mine and United Mine Workers of America,
District 11, Local 1907, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1029 (1984) (Kilroy, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained
the grievance as to insubordination, because the company failed to prove an intentional disregard of
the management directive manifested either verbally or non-verbally); Consolidation Coal Co., Morgantown Operations, Pursglove No. 15 Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 31, Local
2122, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 111 (1986) (DiLauro, Arb.) (where the company failed to prove the supervisory authority of the directing employee).
110. 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 473 (1982) (Ruben, Arb.). See, e.g., Jim Walter Resources, Inc. and
United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 2245, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1115 (1983) (Williams,
Arb.) (where the arbitrator found the grievant guilty of insubordination even though the incident
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
leading to discipline occurred while the grievant was serving in his official capacity as safety committee
chairman).
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Perhaps unlike the trend in other industries, there is only one
reported case of sexual harassment during the study period, 1 1 This
dearth of cases is somewhat surprising in view of some evidence
suggesting that sexual harassment has been a problem for women
miners. 12 In Consolidation Coal Co., Morgantown Operations,
Pursglove No. 15 and United Mine Workers of America, District
31, Local 2122,113 the arbitrator essentially reduced the grievant's
offense from a charge of sexual harassment to that of extreme invasion of privacy and blatant disregard for his fellow employees.
The evidence did not show that the grievant had entered the female
bathhouse, shower and dressing area and looked around as alleged
by the company.114 Rather, it showed that the grievant had opened
the door and looked into the shower and dressing area for a few
seconds before leaving. 1 5 Based on the state of the record, the arbitrator reduced the grievant's penalty from discharge to suspension
16
without pay or benefits for sixty days.
B.

Compensation
Coal miners are among the highest paid workers, 17 and compensation cases constitute a substantial chunk of the arbitrators'
caseload. As indicated in the Frequency Table, Appendix I, 58 of
the 368 cases published during the study period involved compensation issues.1 8 Almost 45% of the published compensation cases
decided during the study period involved issues of holiday pay, reporting pay and bereavement pay." 9
1. Holiday Pay
Virtually all of the holiday pay grievances involved the birthday
holiday.1 2t The employee birthday holiday is one of eleven holidays
111. Before 1973 virtually no women worked as miners. In 1977 there were 992 women miners,
and in 1978 approximately 2800 (approximately 1% of the miners). PCOC, THE A3mcAN COAL

MINER, A REPORT ON ComuiNrry AND LrvINO CONDITONS IN THE COALFmDS 191 (1980).
112. Id. at 193.
113. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 940 (1982) (Stoltenberg, Arb.).
114. Id. at 942.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 943.
117. PCOC, CoAL DATA BOOK, 132-33 (1980).
118. See Appendix I.
Disseminated
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observed under Article XII and is celebrated in honor of John L.
Lewis, the late President and most powerful leader in the history
of the UMWA.121 Most of the litigation about birthday holidays
concerned the designated birthday. Article XII, Section (g) permits
an employee to designate a birthday holiday when a calendar birthday falls on a day when the employee is not scheduled to work.
Article XII, Section (q) establishes the birthday holiday in the following terms:
If the Employee's birthday occurs on a day when the mine or other facility at
which he is employed works, the Employee has the option of taking his birthday
off and receiving one shift of pay at his regular rate, including his regularly
scheduled overtime, or he has the option of working on his birthday and receiving
triple time for all time worked.
If an Employee's birthday falls on any day on which he is not scheduled to work,
including but not limited to February 29 or on any other scheduled holiday or
during the vacation period or on a Saturday or Sunday, he may designate another
day to celebrate his birthday holiday by electing one of the following:
(1) designating another day to be off (and taking off such day) within the first
ten (10) days of actual work by the Employee following the birthday holiday for
which he shall be entitled to his regular rate, including regularly scheduled overtime, or
(2) designating another day to work (and working such day) within the first ten
(10) days of actual work by the Employee following the birthday holiday for
which he shall be entitled to triple time, which is three times his straight time
rate, for all time worked on that day.

Considerable controversy has surrounded the question of whether
an employee must work the days before and after his birthday in
order to preserve the right to designate a birthday under Section
(g). While Article XII Section (e) provides that an employee must
work on these qualifying days in order to receive holiday pay for
birthdays not worked, it uses the following ambiguous language:
Employees who do not work on ... holidays will be paid their regular earnings
for such day, including regularly scheduled overtime rates provided such Employee
was not absent his last scheduled day prior to or his first scheduled day following
the holiday because of an unauthorized work stoppage.

9721, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 367 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) is the only reported holiday pay decision during
the study period that did not raise a birthday holiday issue.
121. See Article XII, Section (a). See also PCOC, Tna AMERIcAN COAL MINER, A REPORT ON
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
CommuNrry AND Livao CONDMONS IN THE CoALPIELDs 4 (1980); P. Clark, supra note 10 at 4-19. 28
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Do the qualifying days, before and after the holiday, under this
provision attach to the designated birthday holiday or the calendar
birthday? This controversy is capsulized in two cases decided by
Arbitrator Jack Clarke. In 1981 Arbitrator Clarke decided Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Mine No. 3 v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 20, Local Union No. 1928.l2 The issue was whether the
company violated the 1981 Agreement when it refused to allow the
grievant to designate an alternative birthday and work that day for
triple pay when his calendar birthday fell during a sympathy strike.
Disagreeing with another arbitrator and refusing to give precedential
effect to ARB No. 105, the arbitrator held that the company did
violate the Agreement.' 23 The arbitrator reasoned that changes in
Article XII, Sections (d) and (g) evidenced:
an intent on the part of the drafters of the 1981 Coal Agreement to change that

aspect of ARB Decision No. 105 which required an employee not to be absent
from work because of an unauthorized work stoppage on the day immediately
2
before and immediately after his actual birthday.'1

Five years later, in 1986, Arbitrator Clarke, again confronted
with the issue, reversed his earlier decision. He said that the company
did not violate the Agreement by depriving an employee of the opportunity to designate an alternative birthday holiday and to work
on that designated birthday for triple pay, where the employee was
absent on the day before the calendar birthday holiday because of
an unauthorized work stoppage. 12s Upon further reflection the arbitrator had concluded that the parties in their Agreement had not
amended ARB No. 105. He noted that the parties had not specifically associated the qualifying days provision with the designated
birthday (rather than the calendar birthday) in Section (e) of Article
XII as they had specified designated birthday holiday work for premium pay treatment in Section (d),126 The arbitrator held that an
employee must work on the days before and after the calendar birth122. 82-1 ARB 8100 (1980) (Clarke, Arb.).
123. Id. at 3486-88.
124. Id. at 3488.
125. Freeman United Mine Coal Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
Local 9978, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 665 (1986) (Clarke, Arb.).
126. Id. at 668-69.
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day, rather than designated birthday, in order to preserve the right
to designate an alternative birthday. 27
Another issue that has divided arbitrators is whether a company
can require advance notice of the alternative birthday designation.
The majority view is that the company can require a reasonable
advance notice before an employee's calendar birthday that he intends to designate a certain day as his birthday holiday.2 8 This management right is viewed as part of an employer's right to efficiently
direct the work force. 129 The minority view is that the contractual
language spelling out the designation right is clear and unambiguous.
Since the clear terms of the contract do not provide for such notice,
a minority of arbitrators refuse to rewrite the contract in a way that
would give companies the right to require advance notice.1 30
What of the employee who is prevented from working on his
birthday by forces beyond his control? Should an employee who
intends to work on his birthday and earn triple pay but is prevented
from doing so have a right to designate an alternative birthday?
Based on fairness concerns, arbitrators hold that in such unpreventable circumstances employees should not be deprived of the right
to earn extra money on the birthday holiday.' 3' In Badger Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers of America, 32 the arbitrator noted that the
objective of Article XII is to "afford the employee the opportunity
to work his birthday and to be paid triple time or not to work his
birthday and receive straight time." The arbitrator thought that the
127. Id. at 667, 669.

128. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local Union
9721, 83-2 ARB 8533 (1983) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator cites his award for the company
as the majority rule and cites arbitral support for this view).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co., Mine 34 v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 2236, 761 ARB 8175 (Krimsly, Arb.) (where the arbitrator uses this rationale to sustain the grievance). See
also Consolidation Coal Co., 83-2 ARB
8533 (1983) (Feldman, Arb.) (citing cases in support of
the minority position).
131. See, e.g., Badger Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America 86-1 ARB 8057 (1985)
(Probst, Arb.) (where the arbitrator granted the designation right because a major snowstorm prevented
the grievant from working on his birthday); Alabama By-Products Corp., Gorgas No. 7 Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 7813, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 992 (1977) (Grooms,
Arb.) (where the arbitrator granted the grievant the designation right because his birthday occurred
while he was serving jury duty).
132. 86-1 ARB.
8057 (1985) (Probst, Arb.).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3

30

Sharpe: A Study of Coal Arbitration under the National Bituminous Coal Wa
1991]

COAL ARBITRATION STUDY

denial of this option, where an employee was prevented from working due to forces beyond his control, would be contrary to the "spirit

that the negotiators brought to the Agreement.'

33

Whether an employee can redesignate his alternative birthday
holiday or is bound by the initial designation, 3 4 whether an unau-

thorized work stoppage occurred on a qualifying day, 3 5 whether an
employee who chose not to work on a scheduled Sunday work day
is entitled to premium pay,y 6 and whether an employee has a right
to designate an overtime shift as his birthday, 3 7 are also issues that
have been decided under the birthday holiday provision. On premium pay issues the parties' intent to create an opportunity for
employees to earn premium pay is the thread that runs through
arbitral decisions, causing close questions to be decided in favor of
38
preserving this opportunity.1
2.

Reporting Pay

Another of the compensatory allowances granted to unit em-

ployees is reporting pay under Article IX, Section (c) of the National
Wage Agreement. That provision essentially entitles unit employees

to four hours' pay for reporting to work unless the employer notifies
the employee not to report. 139 Under this provision the Employer

133. Id. at 3235.
134. See North American Coal Corp., Powhatan No. 3 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 2262, District 6, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 723 (1976) (Dworkin, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
held that the contract entitled an employee to no more than one designation of an alternative birthday).
135. See Windsor Power House Coal Co., Beach Bottom Mine v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local 6362, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 835 (1977) (Perry, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found an
unauthorized work stoppage on a qualifying day and denied the grievance).
136. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 2216,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 819 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that Article XII, Section
(g) gave an employee who chose to not work on a scheduled work day the right to his regular rate
including premium pay if that is his regular rate for the day).
137. See Amherst Coal Co., 3-A Surface Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local 1302, 87-2 ARB 8588 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the grievant
was not entitled to designate an overtime shift as his birthday holiday, since he had no right to the
overtime opportunity in that instance).
138. Note the different outcome in Amherst Coal Co., 3-A Surface Mine if the grievant had
been entitled to the overtime opportunity in question. Id. at 6407.
139. The provision read as follows:
Section (c) Reporting Pay
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does retain the discretion to assign other than regular work and to
deny reporting pay if the employee refuses to perform assigned work.
Thus, the reporting pay provision places the cost of employees' needlessly reporting to work on the employer rather than the inconvenienced employees. 140 Though the reporting pay provision is clear in
not obligating the employer to pay any portion of the four hours
"not worked by the Employee due to his refusal to perform assigned
work," that provision is complicated by the safety rights of employees under Article III of the agreement.
Article III permits employees exercising their individual safety
rights to refuse to perform under abnormally and immediately dangerous working conditions.1 41 How should refusals to perform work

Unless notified not to report, when an Employee reports for work at his usual starting
time he shall be entitled to four (4) hours' pay whether or not the operation works the full
four hours, but after the first four (4) hours, the Employee shall be paid for every hour
thereafter by the hour, for each hour's work or fractional part thereof. If, for any reason,
the regular routine work cannot be furnished, the Employer may assign the Employee to
other than the regular work. Reporting pay shall not be applicable to any portion of the
four hours not worked by the Employee due to his refusal to perform assigned work.
Notification of Employees not to report means reasonable efforts by management to communicate with the Employee.
140. Arbitrator Whyte described the purpose of reporting pay provisions as follows in S&S Corp.
v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1737, 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 609, 612 (1975) (Whyte, Arb.):
A reporting pay clause has a twofold purpose. It is designed, first, to compensate employees
for the time and expense involved in coming to work only to find that there is no work
for them. It is deemed to be the employer's duty to inform his employees of the fact that,
on given occasions, there is no work unless he is prevented from doing so because of reasons
beyond his control. The situation contemplated is one in which the employee is scheduled
for work but is then unscheduled and inconvenienced because of Company's failure to
properly manage the work to be performed and failure to give timely notice of the change
in scheduling. The second purpose is to penalize Company (i.e., force pay for no work)
because of a situation it mismanaged with resulting inconvenience and expense to employees.
141. Article III reads in part:
Section (i) Preservation of Individual Safety Rights
(1) No Employee will be required to work under conditions he has reasonable grounds to
believe to be abnormally and immediately dangerous to himself beyond the normal hazards
inherent in the operation which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm before such condition or practice can be abated. When an Employee in good
faith believes that he is being required to work under such conditions he shall immediately
notify his supervisor of such belief and the specific physical conditions he believes exist.
The Employee shall state the factual basis for his belief but shall not be required to cite
applicable law or regulation. Unless there is a dispute between the Employee and management as to the existence of such condition, steps shall be taken immediately to correct
or prevent exposure to such condition utilizing all necessary Employees, including the inhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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perceived to be abnormally and immediately dangerous be treated
under the reporting pay provision? Should such refusing employees
receive reporting pay? Half of the reporting pay cases published
during the study period addressed this issue.1 42 The majority view
among published arbitrators is that properly asserted safety objections to performing assigned work permit employees to both refuse
performance and receive reporting pay. 143 However, there is a minority view that the existence of an abnormally dangerous working
condition merely entitles employees to be excused from performing
assigned work and does not entitle them to reporting pay. 144 Dangerous conditions outside of the employer's control that frustrate

volved Employee.
(2) If the existence of such condition is disputed, the Employee shall have the right to be
relieved from duty on the assignment in dispute ....
(3) If the dispute remains unsettled following the investigation by a member of the Mine
Health and Safety Committee and involves an issue concerning compliance with federal or
state mine safety laws or mandatory health or safety regulations, the appropriate federal
or state inspection agency shall be called in immediately and the dispute shall be settled
on the basis of the findings of the inspector with both parties reserving all rights of statutory
appeal. Should the federal or state inspector find that the condition complained of requires
correction before the Employee may return to his job, the Employer shall take the corrective
action immediately. Upon correction, the complaining Employee shall return to his job. If
the federal or state inspector does not find a condition requiring correction, the complaining
Employee shall return to his job immediately.
(4) For disputes not otherwise settled, a written grievance shall be filed no later than five
working days after the findings of the inspector and the dispute shall be referred immediately
to step 3 as provided for in Article XXIII, Settlement of Disputes, Section (c)(3).
142. See Buffalo Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 8454, 90
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 939 (1988) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the grievants did not
qualify for reporting pay despite their safety objection to performing assigned work since the employees
did not properly assert their safety rights under Article III.); Peabody Coal Co., No. 10 Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America District 17, Local Union 2271, 87-1 ARB 8222 (1987) (Stoltenberg,
Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the grievants were entitled to reporting pay, since the employer
was unable to meet their safety objection by providing other safe work); Buffalo Mining Co., Mine
9-A v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 8454, District No. 17, 79-2 ARB 8391
(1979) (Ipavec, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that refusals to perform assigned work under the
safety disputes procedure of Article III is sufficient justification for reporting pay); Consolidation
8215 (1975)
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1808, 1975 ARB
(Stokes, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that Article IX, Section (c) relieved the employer of any
obligation to pay reporting pay where employees refused to perform assigned work, even if the refusal
was based upon a belief in abnormally dangerous working conditions).
143. See Buffalo Mining Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 939 (1988) (Feldman, Arb.); Peabody Coal
Co., 87-1 ARB 8222 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.); Buffalo Mining Co. 79-2 ARB 8391 (1979) (Ipavec,
Arb.).
8215 (1975) (Stokes, Arb.).
144. See Consolidation Coal Co. 1975 ARB
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an employee's efforts to report to work have not qualified employees
for reporting pay. 145 On the other hand, employer refusals to permit
employees to work where no notice has been given are found to be
straightforward violations of Article IX, Section (c). 14
There appears to be little dispute that the "reasonable efforts"
to notify employees not to report, called for in Section (c), do not
require contacting employees individually either ,face-to-face or by
telephone. 147 While these efforts certainly qualify as reasonable, employees may also be reached by telegram, television or radio announcements, mine postings or other means. Arbitrator Rimmel in
Clinchfield Coal Co., McClure No. 1 Mine v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 28, Local Union 2274,148 held that the employer's efforts were unreasonable under the circumstances. In that
case the employer attempted to place announcements of the following message on thirteen radio and two television stations:
By the authority of [K.], Vice President, Operations, Clinchfield Coal Co.-McClure
4
#1 Mine will be idle on the owl shift due to a fan failure.1 '

The evidence suggested that only three of the stations contacted
by the employer actually broadcasted the announcements. 5 0 Furthermore, the employees were not told which stations to listen to
for announcements, and there was evidence that some employees
lived so far from the mine that they needed to leave their houses

145. See Union Carbide Corp. and United Mine Workers of America, Local 6243, District 17,
79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 593, 596 (1982) (Lieberman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator refused to grant reporting
pay to an employee who was prevented by hazardous driving conditions from reporting to work
noting, "[There is no record of any employee ever having been paid for attempting to come to work
and then being unable to do so because of road conditions.").
146. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 71, 86-1
ARB 8133 (1986) (Murphy, Arb.) (where the employer prevented employees who had been attending
an employer sponsored compensation meeting from taking transportation into the mine after the
meeting ended; the arbitrator found this deprivation of work not to be backed by the appropriate
notice under IX(c)); Alabama By-Products Corp., Gorgas No. 7 Mine v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 20, Local No. 7813, 79-1 ARB 8082 (1978) (Clarke, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
reversed the employer's decision not to pay the grievant reporting pay where the grievant reported
to work for light duty and was refused an assignment).
147. See Clinchfield Coal Co., McClure No. 1 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
28, Local No. 2274, 86-2 ARB 8593 (1985).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5489.
150. Id. at 5491.
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before an announcement would have been made in the local media.1 51
The arbitrator said that the employer was estopped to claim reasonable notice where employees might have listened to as many as
twelve stations without hearing an announcement. 152 He noted that
employees would lose their standing to complain about not receiving
notice if they were given a list of stations to listen to and did not
listen. The arbitrator also noted that reporting to work under Article
IX, Section (c) means presenting oneself to a supervisor and not
1 53
simply coming onto the premises and then leaving.

3. Bereavement Pay
The two major issues arising under the bereavement pay provision of the agreement involve changes instituted in the 1974 Agreement. The 1971 provision allowed excused absences for up to three
consecutive days including the day of the funeral and pay for any
excused shifts the employee would have worked assuming he attended the funeral. 154 Besides expanding the category of "immediate
family" the 1974 provision allowed excused absences for "up to
three (3) days, two (2) to be consecutive and include the day of the
funeral and the third at the Employee's option." It also mandated
the receipt of pay if the employee attended the funeral. 55 The lan151. Id.
152. Id. at 5491.
153. Id. at 5491-92.
154. The 1971 contractual provision read as follows:
Article VII Allowances
Section (a) Bereavement Pay
When death occurs in an employee's immediate family (wife, mother, father, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, son, daughter, brother or sister) an employee upon request will be excused
for up to three consecutive days which includes the day of the funeral. The employee shall
receive pay at his regular rate for any such excused shifts he would have worked provided
it is established that he attended the funeral.
155. 1974 contractual language is as follows:
Article IX Allowances
Section (a) Bereavement Pay
When death occurs in an Employee's immediate family (spouse, mother, father, motherin-law, father-in-law, son, daughter, brother or sister, step-father, step-mother, grandfather,
grandmother and grandchildren), an Employee upon request will be excused for up to three
(3) days, two (2) to be consecutive and include the day of the funeral and the third at the
Employee's option. The Employee shall receive pay at his regular or applicable overtime
or premium rate, provided it is established that he attended the funeral.
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guage of the 1974 provision has been replicated in the 1978, 1981,
1984, and 1988 Agreements. Disputes under the new language have
involved the meaning of "consecutive days" and an employee's entitlement to bereavement pay when a bereavement related excused
absence occurs during an unauthorized work stoppage.
The facts of Consolidation Coal Co., Humphrey No. 7 Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America, District No. 31, Local 1058156
raise the question of whether "consecutive days" under Article IX,
Section (a) means scheduled work days or calendar days. As noted
above, the provision entitles an employee to his regular or applicable
premium pay for absences up to three days - two to be consecutive
and include the day of the funeral and the third at the employee's
option-if the employee attends the funeral. In Consolidation Coal
Co. a grievant's father died on Friday, October 31, and the grievant
selected this day as his option day. 157 On Thursday, October 30, the
company had scheduled the grievant to work on Saturday, November 1.158 The company excused the grievant on Saturday. The grievant was not scheduled to work on Sunday, and he attended his
father's funeral on Monday, November 3. The company paid the
grievant for Friday, his option day, and Monday, the day of the
funeral but not Saturday, since it was not consecutive with Monday,
the day of the funeral. 159 The union argued that Saturday was consecutive with Monday, since "consecutive days" in Article IX, Section (a) referred to scheduled work days and not calendar days as
claimed by the company. 160 The arbitrator denied the grievance citing
clear contractual language and ARB No. 197.161 The arbitrator noted,
however, that the union's interpretation of "consecutive days" as
scheduled work days would make more sense, since unscheduled
work days need not be excused under the provision and under the
156. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 179 (1987) (Wren, Arb.).
157. Id. at 179.
158. Id.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 181-82.
161. Id. See also Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., Big Creek Tiller Mine v. United Mine Workers of
America, District No. 28, Local Union 6167, 1975 ARB 8121 (1975) (Cantor, Arb.) (also adopting

the majority view). But cf. Consolidation Coal Co., Humphrey No. 7 Mine supra note 119 at 180182 (discussing the minority view contained in unpublished
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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interpretation adopted by the employer the amount of bereavement
pay depends on the happenstance of the funeral date. 162
The 1974 provision also changes the 1971 provision by deleting
any reference to lost pay as a condition for receiving bereavement
pay.163 In Valley Camp Coal Co., No. 1 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 6, Division No. 4, Local 1417,16 the
grievant requested bereavement leave on a scheduled work day that
could not have been worked because of an unauthorized work stoppage that occurred on that day. The grievant admittedly would not
have worked during the work stoppage. 6 5 The Company argued that
the grievant was not entitled to bereavement pay since such pay is
intended to prevent lost wages that otherwise would have been earned
and the grievant had no lost wages due to the work stoppage.'"
Arbitrator Ipavec found that the grievant was entitled to bereavement pay.167 He cited two parts of Article IX, Section (a). First, he
noted that an employee must be excused in order to receive bereavement pay. Second, he noted that unlike the 1971 provision the
1974 provision did not tie bereavement pay to lost work. Arbitrator
Ipavec concluded that where the unauthorized work stoppage occurs
after the excuse has been secured, the company must pay bereavement pay even though the employee would not have worked during
68
the unauthorized work stoppage.'
4.

Other Issues

Other compensation cases raise issues that are not unique to the
coal industry. They involve straightforward, factual disputes that

162. Consolidated Coal Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 179 (1987) (Wren, Arb.).
163. Compare the last sentence in the 1971 provision to that in the 1974 provision, see supra
notes 154-55.
164. 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1167 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.). This case presents a typical set of facts
that tests the import of the amendment.
165. Id. at 1169.
166. Id. at 1168.
167. Id. at 1171-72.
168. Id. at 1170-72. Accord U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 20, Local 7918, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 111 (1975) (Grooms, Arb.).
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turn on the arbitrator's findings, 169 or conventional contract interpretation issues that are resolved by the application of well settled
principles of construction.1 70 Arbitrators place the burden of proof
typically on the union as grievant in these contract interpretation

cases. 171
As with other multi-employer contracts, local agreements, permissible under Article XXVI, Section (b), often supplement arrangements reached under the Agreement. 72 Because of the special
place given to past practices that are not inconsistent with the Agreement under Article XXVI(b), contract interpretation cases in the
73
compensation area often involve discussions of past practices.
Other compensation issues include military pay,174 training
169. See, e.g., Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local
1890, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 523 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (involving a factual dispute about whether
the grievant was asked to work overtime).
170. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. No. 10 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
12, Local 9819, 89-1 ARB
8111 (1988) (Hewitt, Arb.) (involving the entitlement of employees to
a full day's pay where work was prevented by equipment malfunction - Articles IX, Sections (c)
and (d), III, Section (o) and IV, Section (d)(4)); Fox-Ten Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local 7950, 82-2 ARB 8544 (1982) (Nicholas, Arb.) (involving the appropriate wage rate
for computing vacation pay under Articles XIII, Section (d) and XIV, Section (f)); Alabama ByProducts Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 1881, 76-2 ARB 8568 (1976)
(Grooms, Arb.) (involving the entitlement of trainees under Article XVI, Section (g) to pay for training
time); Consolidation Coal Co., Georgetown No. 12 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
No. 6, Local Union No. 7690, 78-1 ARB 8259 (1978) (Ipavec, Arb.) (involving the basis of vacation
pay under Articles XIII, Section (d) and XIV, Section (f)); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Wharton
No. 4 Mine, Barrett, West Virginia v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 17, Local No.
781, 78-1 ARB
8107 (1978) (Wren, Arb.) (involving whether the grievant was entitled to his shift
differential on a temporary assignment under Articles VI, Section (c) and IX, Section (e)).
171. See Donaldson Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 17, Local
Union No. 340, 86-2 ARB
8617 (1986) (Zobrak, Arb.); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 6, Local 1890, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 523 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.).
172. See, e.g., Arch of West Virginia, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17,
Local Union 5958, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 891 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found
the company in violation of a local agreement when it began paying employees on a bi-weekly rather
than weekly basis).
173. See Peabody Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local Union 1503,
92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1086 (1989) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where past practices were dispositive of the
issues); Peabody Coal Co., No. 10 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local
9819, 89-1 ARB
8111 (1988) (Hewitt, Arb.); Saginaw Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local Union No. 9695, 83-1 ARB 8153 (1983) (Nicholas, Arb.) (where past practice helped
the arbitrator to frame the issue).
174. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, District 17, Local 2236, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1038 (1976) (Cantor, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found the grievant entitled to military pay under
Article IX, Section (d), even though an unauthorized work stoppage occurred at the mine during the
time).
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pay, 175 and injury pay.1 76 While these cases are generally straightforward, injury pay cases sometimes raise definitional questions that
affect an employee's entitlement to pay. Employees who are injured
on the job are paid for the complete shift upon proof of medical
treatment under Article III, Section (o)(5);'" however, that provision
will not support shift pay for injuries that are not caused by working
conditions. 178 Under Article III, Section (o)(5) an employee is only
paid until he reaches the portal when the employee becomes sick
during the shift. 179 In Island Creek Coal Co., V.P. No. 2 Mine v.

United Mine Workers of America, Local 1568,180 the arbitrator held
that the word "sick" "refers to some condition arising from circumstances unrelated to work in the mine - e.g., nausea, a headache due to external causes." '1 8' Injuries, on the other hand, are
1 82
caused by mining conditions.
The validity of side agreements providing for special compensation to employees varies from company to company. Arbitrator
175. See Badger Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 31, Local No.
1512, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 756 (1977) (Wren, Arb.) (where the union could not prove in the absence
of a local agreement or past practice that the company agreed to pay for training under Article XVI,
Section (e)).
176. See Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Flattop/NEBO Mine v. United Mine Workers of America,
8518 (1982) (Clarke, Arb.) (where the union failed
District 20, Local Union No. 6255, 82-2 ARB
to show a binding practice requiring injury pay under Article XXVI, Section (b)).
177. See Peabody Coal Co., Pawnee No. 10 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
12, Local 9819, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1027 (1987) (Hoh, Arb.).
178. See Island Creek Coal Co., V.P. No. 2 Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, Local
1568, 84-2 ARB 8316 (1984) (Mittelman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that the grievant's illnesses
were not caused by conditions in the mine since they were avoidable).
179. Article III, Section (o)(5) reads as follows:
(5) When an Employee is injured during his shift, he shall be promptly removed from
the mine, and, upon submission of proof of medical treatment for that injury, he shall be
paid for the complete shift. When an Employee becomes sick during his shift, and leaves
because he cannot perform his work, he shall be paid until he reaches the portal.
Agreement of 1988.
180. 84-2 ARB 8316 (1984) (Mittelman, Arb.).
181. Id. at 4407.
182. Id. at 4407. Regarding the smoke inhalation that grievants claimed caused the illness in
question the arbitrator said the following:
In any event, with regard to smoke inhalation, it is well known that such inhalation can
involve actual physical trauma, e.g., burning or irritation to the respiratory system. Such
a sudden, unexpected physical trauma is sufficient, in my opinion, to constitute an "injury"
for purposes of Article III, Section (o)(5), of the 1981 Agreement.
Id. As this case demonstrates, the factual issue may be decided against the grievant even though the
legal issue is decided in her favor.
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Wren reached different conclusions regarding the same side agreement in Amherst Coal Co., MacGregor Cleaning Plant v. United
Mine Workers of America, DistrictNo. 17, Local Union No. 5958. 183
Between the first award sustaining the grievance and the second
award denying the grievance, the company and union entered into

a new collective bargaining agreement and the grievant was put on
notice that the side agreement would be short-lived.'m Thus, the
elements of promissory estoppel that supported the arbitrator's first
award were no longer present at the time of the second award.185
C.

Work Assignment
In descending order of frequency, work assignment cases concern

subcontracting, filling job vacancies, supervisory performance of unit

work, jurisdictional disputes, and a variety of other issues that arise
only occasionally. Approximately 16% of the reported cases during
1 86
the study period involved work assignment issues.
1. Jurisdictional Disputes
Article IA is the work preservation article of the Agreement. It
assures that the work jurisdiction of unit employees will not be undermined by managerial work assignments that divert unit work from
the employees who customarily perform it. 87 Potential sources of
183. 82-1 ARB 8258 (1982) (Wren, Arb.) (sustaining the grievance on the basis of the company's
inducement of the grievant and its unjust enrichment); 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1181 (1985) (Wren, Arb.)
(denying the grievance where the grievant could no longer show the company's inducement).
184. 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1181, 1181-82 (1985) (Wren, Arb.).
185. Id. at 1184.
186. Fifty-eight of 368 cases or 15.7% concerned the aforementioned work assignment issues.
187. Article IA Scope and Coverage
Section (a) Work Jurisdiction
The production of coal, including the removal of overburden and coal waste, preparation, processing and cleaning of coal and transportation of coal (except by waterway or
rail not owned by Employer), repair and maintenance work normally performed at the mine
site or at a central shop of the Employer and maintenance of gob piles and mine roads,
and work of the type customarily related to all of the above shall be performed by classified
Employees of the Employer covered by and in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.
Contracting, subcontracting, leasing and subleasing, and construction work, as defined herein,
will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
Nothing in this section will be construed to diminish the jurisdiction, express or implied, of the United
Mine Workers.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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such diversion are exempt employees, 18 supervisory employees, 189
and independent contractors. 190 As discussed below an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictional disputes involved the company's assignment of work to independent contractors.1 9' However, some work
assignment disputes involve different classifications of unit employees.1 92 Unlike subcontracting and supervisory performance of unit
work, the Agreement does not specifically address the resolution of
intraunit jurisdictional disputes.
The Arbitration Review Board in ARB No. 78-11 explained that
the "concept of work jurisdiction" has its genesis in the rights of
seniority, which distribute job preferences among employee members

188. Article IA reads in part:
Section (b) Exemptions Clause
It is the intention of this Agreement to reserve to the Employers and except from this
Agreement an adequate force of supervisory employees to effectively conduct the safe and
efficient operation of the mines and at the same time, to provide against the abuse of such
exemptions by excepting more such employees than are reasonably required for that purpose.
Coal inspectors and weigh bosses at mines where men are paid by the ton, watchmen,
clerks, engineering and technical forces of the Employer, working at or from a district or
local mine office, are exempt from this Agreement.
All other Employees working in or about the mine shall be included in this agreement
except essential supervisors in fact such as mine foremen, assistant mine foremen who, in
the usual performance of their duties, may make examinations for gas as prescribed by
law, and such other supervisors as are in charge of any class of labor inside or outside the
mines and who perform no production work.
The union will not seek to organize or ask recognition for such excepted supervisory
employees during the life of this contract.
The Employers shall not use this provision to exempt from the provisions of this
Agreement as supervisors, more men than are necessary for the safe and efficient operation
of the mine, taking into consideration the area covered by the workings, roof conditions,
drainage conditions, explosion hazards, and the ability of supervisors, due to thickness of
the seam, to make the essential number of visits to the working faces [sic] as required by
law and safety regulations.

189. Article IA reads in part:
Section (c) Supervisors Shall Not Perform Classified Work
Supervisory employees shall perform no classified work covered by this Agreement
except in emergencies and except if such work is necessary for the purpose of training or
instructing classified Employees. When a dispute arises under this section, it shall be adjudicated through the grievance machinery and in such proceedings the following rule will
apply: the burden is on the Employer to prove that classified work has not been performed
by supervisory personnel.
190. See infra note 206.
191. See infra notes 203-236 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Balmoral Truck Garage v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local
5815, 87 Lab.by
Arb.
967 (1985)
(Volz, @
Arb.).
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of the seniority unit and state a preference to unit jobs. 19 Though
the issue in ARB No. 78-11 concerned the employer's authority to
establish a new seniority unit at a research and development facility,
the ARB did note in passing the "conventional handling and deciding of work jurisdictional claims."' 9 4 It affirmed the propriety of
examining past practice and custom as the "usual method of deciding such claims."' 195
Arbitrators have used ARB No. 78-11 to resolve intraunit jurisdictional disputes. For example, in Balmoral Truck Garage v.
United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 5815,196 Arbitrator Marlin M. Volz was confronted with the question of whether
employees of the construction crew or a mechanic from the Truck
Garage should have performed the work of repairing a parking lot.
The arbitrator noted that ARB No. 78-11 and Article XIX of the
Agreement showed that Article IA is not only concerned with protecting unit employees from outsiders such as supervisors and independent contractors, but "can be construed as serving a larger
purpose of protecting also established work jurisdictional claims of
separate employment units of the Employer."' 197 Noting the dearth
of contractual guidance on resolving intraunit jurisdictional disputes
the arbitrator said:
It must be recognized that Section (a) of Article IA does not provide guidelines for resolving jurisdictional disputes between such employment units, nor does
any other written provision within the National Wage Agreement expressly do
so. As has been repeatedly held by panel arbitrators and the Arbitration Review
Board, the question of work jurisdiction is to be determined by past practice and

custom and by local agreement. Here no local agreement was shown to exist.
This leaves as a basis for decision what the ARB in its Decision 78-11 described
at page 11 as the "conventional handling and deciding of work jurisdiction claims
between the units," which is to use the "usual method" to examine "past practice
and custom."'"

193. ARB No. 78-11, 7 (1979).
194. Id. at 11.
195. Id.
196. 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 967 (1985) (Volz, Arb.).
197. Id. at 969. Article XIX, Section (a) reads in part: "An Employee shall normally be assigned
to duties customarily involved with his regular classified job ...
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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The arbitrator then carried out a typical analysis of jurisdictional
dispute cases first noting the union's burden of showing contractual
provisions that grant jurisdiction over the disputed work exclusively
to the grievant. 199 His analysis focused on whether the nature and
place of the work reserved it exclusively to the grievant. Finding
that the union failed to carry its burden of showing exclusive work
jurisdiction, Arbitrator Volz denied the grievance. °
Other jurisdictional disputes involve the use of exempt rather
than unit employees to perform the disputed work. 201 These cases
turn on whether the disputed work is customarily performed by unit
employees or related to the production of coal under Article IA,

Section (a) . 202
2.

Subcontracting

Though approximately 52% of the work assignment cases involved subcontracting, 2 3 the frequency of subcontracting disputes
has escalated in recent years. Between 1975 and 1980, only one subcontracting case was reported. 2 Approximately 96% of the subcontracting cases were decided in the 1980's with increasing frequency
after 1985.205 The Agreements of 1981, 1984, and 1988 have all per-

199. Id. at 969-70.
200. Other cases involving intraunit jurisdictional disputes are: Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. United
Mine Workers of America, District 31, Local Union 2059, 86-2 ARB 8550 (1986) (Feldman, Arb.);
Jim Walter Resources v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 2245, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 689
(1984) (Nicholas, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., Franklin Mine No. 125 v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 6, Local 1360, 82-1 ARB 8209 (1981) (Murphy, Arb.); Valleycamp Coal Co.,
Shop No. 8 v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 17, Local 1054, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
267 (1978) (Wren, Arb.).
201. See, e.g., Muskingum Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No.
1818, 89-2 ARB 8356 (1988) (Nicholas, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., Blacksville No. 1 Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America, District 31, Local 1588, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 36 (1988) (Wren,
Arb.).
202. See Consolidation Coal Co., 82-1 ARB 8209 (1981) (Murphy, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
in denying the grievance characterized the research and development of a new technology as distinct
from other cases (even related to research) where the work was customarily related to the production
of coal.
203. Thirty of the 58 cases or 52% presented subcontracting issues.
204. Southern Ohio Coal Co., Meigs Mine No. 1 v. United Mine Workers of America, District
No. 6, Local 1890, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 891 (1978) (Ipavec, Arb.).
205. Approximately 70% of the reported subcontracting decisions were issued after 1985.
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mitted subcontracting under Article IA with restrictions. 2°6 As noted
by Arbitrator Roberts in Peabody Coal Co., Camp No. 1 Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America, District23, Local 1 793,207 Article
IA of the Agreement distinguishes production work, repair and
maintenance work, and construction work. Arbitrator Roberts summarizes the contractual subcontracting scheme as follows:
1. The production and processing of coal and the immediate support work associated therewith including certain enumerated aspects is work over which the
Miners have exclusive jurisdiction. That work simply may not be contracted out
under the contract and certainly may not be contracted out in the absence of fire
emergency.
2. The Miners are given jurisdiction of only that repair and maintenance work
which is customarily performed at the Mine or Central Shop. If the repair and

206. Article IA reads as follows in part:
Section (g) Contracting and Subcontracting
(1) Transportation of coal - The transportation of coal as defined in paragraph (a) may
be contracted out under the Agreement only where contracting out such work is consistent
with the prior practice and custom of the Employer at the mine; provided that such work
shall not be contracted out at any time when any Employees at the mine who customarily
perform such work are laid off.
(2) Repair and Maintenance Work - Repair and maintenance work of the type customarily
performed by classified employees at the mine or central shop shall not be contracted out
except (a) where the work is being performed by a manufacturer or supplier under warranty,
in which case, upon written request on a job-by-job basis, the Employer will provide to
the Chairman of the Mine Committee a copy of the applicable warranty or, if such copy
is not reasonably available, written evidence from a manufacturer or a supplier that the
work is being performed pursuant to warranty; or (b) where the Employer does not have
available equipment or regular Employees (including laid-off Employees at the mine or
central shop) with necessary skills available to perform the work at the mine or central
shop.
(3) The Employer may not contract out the rough grading and mine reclamation work.
Section (i) Construction Work
All construction of mine or mine related facilities including the erection of mine tipples
and sinking of mine shafts or slopes customarily performed by classified Employees of the
Employer normally performing construction work in or about the mine in accordance with
prior practice and custom, shall not be contracted out at any time unless all such Employees
with necessary skills to perform the work are working no less than 5 days per week.
Provided further that where contracting out of such construction work customarily performed by classified Employees at the mine is permitted under this Agreement, such contracting shall be in accordance with prior practice and custom. Where contracting out is
permitted under this section, prior practice and custom shall not be construed to limit the
Employer's choice of contractors.
207. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1251 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
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maintenance work falls within that category the Company is prohibited from
contracting it out with certain exceptions enumerated above. Other repair and
maintenance work may be contracted out free of prohibition.
3. Construction work which the Miners customarily perform may not be contracted out unless the Miners are working five days per week in which case it
may be. All other construction work may be freely contracted out subject only
to the restraints of prior practice and custom.2

This scheme suggests an analytical inquiry that Arbitrator Roberts concisely describes in the following way:
Given the scheme of the contract, the initial issue in dealing with the merits of
any dispute ... is to determine the category in which the work falls under the
contract. In most instances, the issue thus presented is to determine whether the
work should be categorized as construction work or as repair and maintenance
work. Once this issue is resolved, the next step in the analysis of the case is to
apply the contractual rules applicable to the contracting out of that type of work.

The facts of Peabody Coal Co., presented yet another issue under

the subcontracting provision. Since the work in that case was of a
mixed character, containing elements of both new construction and

maintenance and repair evoking different contractual rules, the arbitrator was called upon to define the difference between construction and maintenance and repair. He did so in the following terms:
By basic definition, construction involves the creation of something new where
nothing previously existed or the addition of something so totally new to an
existing thing that it may be regarded as having an independent new existence.
Repair and maintenance work on the other hand, involves working to an existing
thing, ordinarily to renew it, but also in some cases to modify and improve it.
Repair and maintenance work may involve the replacement of parts with new
parts but it is nevertheless repair and maintenance work if there is a continuity
of existence of the original thing. For example, if a mine pickup truck gets a
new engine or four new tires, the original truck continues as an entity and may
be regarded as having been repaired and maintained. On the other hand, if the
truck is replaced, it is essentially a new independent existence even though it
replaced an old truck and this would be true even if parts off the old truck were
salvaged and incorporated into the new truck such as by keeping the tires or
engine off the old truck. In such a case the new truck is essentially a new construction manufacture. The distinction can sometimes become one of degree and
sometimes it is necessary to look at the immediate purpose of the work in order
2 10
to draw the distinction.

208. Id. at 1256.
209. Id. at 1256-7.
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Because of the closeness of the factual question in Peabody Coal

Co. the arbitrator was forced to base his characterization of the
work on his understanding of "the purpose or reason for its performance." ' 21' This inquiry into the purpose for the work brought
the arbitrator to the conclusion that the work was new construction
21 2
rather than maintenance and repair.

Under Article IA, Section (g)(2), the union has the burden of
proving that the work was customarily performed by unit employees. 21 3 If the union establishes customary performance, the company must prove that the subcontracting falls within one of the
exceptions under Section (g)(2). 21 4 The union fails to meet its burden
of proving customary performance where it can show no more than
a mixed practice of unit and other employees (e.g., exempt em21 5
ployees) performing the disputed work.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the subcontracting provisions of Article IA preserve work traditionally done by unit employees. This work preservation objective is clearly stated in Section
(a).21 6 While most of the subcontracting cases under Article IA have
involved the questions of whether repair and maintenance were customarily performed by unit employees or whether the employer had
available equipment or skilled employees to perform the work, 217 the

211. Id. at 1258.
212. See AMAX Coal Co., Chinook Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 11,
Local 1216, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 942 (1984) (Kilroy, Arb.) (where the arbitrator applied part of the
aforementioned analytical scheme through a series of questions that led to a denial of the grievance).
213. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1251 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
214. See, e.g., Drummond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1553, District
20, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 473 (1984) (Nicholas, Arb.).
215. See Peabody Coal Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1027 (1987) (Hoh, Arb.).
216. See supra n. 187.
217. See, e.g., McElroy Coal Co./ McElroy Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
6, Local 1638, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 566 (1989) (McIntosh, Arb.); Cannelton Industries, Inc., Kanawha
Division v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 8843, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705 (1988)
(Stoltenberg, Arb.). In both cases the grievants were partially or fully successful based on the application of res judicata. Also raising the issues of performance and availability of equipment or
skilled employees are: Freeman-United Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
Local 1969, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 649 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.); Southern Ohio Coal Co., Racoon Mine
No. 3 v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1957, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1262 (1987) (Lieberman,
Arb.); Peabody Coal Co., Lynnville Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 11, Local
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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most intriguing cases have involved the question of whether unit
employees are attempting to expand or merely preserve unit work.
The pivotal work preservation language of Section (g)(2) is "work
of the type. ' 218 Depending upon the broadness of interpretation,
that language could encompass much work never done but capable
of being done by unit employees. In a well-reasoned decision Arbitrator Robert W. Kilroy in AMAX Coal Co., Ayrshire Mine v.
United Mine Workers of America, District LL and its Local Union
No. 1907,219 cited the following excerpt from ARB No. 78-48 as
setting forth the proper test:
The process of drawing lines on the basis of what work was and was not
previously performed is sensitive and appropriately performed by the District Arbitrator on the basis of the parties' presentations at arbitration. It is not enough
that previously performed work be merely similar to that in dispute. Surely the
skills and techniques inherent in maintenance and repair work in general are often
applicable to a variety of tasks, some more closely related than others. But the
labor agreement is cast in terms of performance. The emphasis must not be on

Workers of America, District 11 and its Local Union No. 1907, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1281 (1987)
(Kilroy, Arb.); Island Creek Coal Co., Virginia Pocahontas No. 5 Mine and Preparation Plant v.
United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 2232, 87-1 ARB 8040 (1986) (Stoltenberg, Arb.);
AMAX Coal Co., Ayrshire Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1907, 85-2 ARB
8325 (1985) (Witney, Arb.); Laurel Run Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of American, District
31, Local Union 1829, 85-1 ARB 8247 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.); Island Creek Coal Co., Beatrice
Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1374, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 62 (1985) (Stoltenberg,
Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., Eastern Region Shoemaker Mine v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 6, Local 1473, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1037 (1985) (Duda, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., Mine
No. 12 v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 7690, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 646 (1985)
(Rybolt, Arb.); North American Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local
1785, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 388 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.); Island Creek Coal Co., Central Shop v.
United Mine Workers of America, District 28, Local 1671, 84-2 ARB 8615 (1984) (Mittelman, Arb.);
McWane Coal Co., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 6969, 84-1 ARB 8151
(1984) (Nicholas, Arb.); AMAX Coal Co., Chinook Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
11, Local 1216, 83 Lab. Arb. BNA 942 (1984) (Kilroy, Arb.); Peabody Coal Co., Camp. No. 1 Mine
v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 1793, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1251 (1984)
(Roberts, Arb.); Shannopin Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 4, Local 6159,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 725 (1984) (Hewitt, Arb.); Peabody Coal Co., Linnville Mine v. United Mine
Workers of America, District No. 11, Local 9926, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1229 (1983) (Duda, Arb.);
Hobet Mining and Construction Co., Inc., Hobet 21 v. United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local 2286, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 158 (1982) (Hayes, Arb.); Reitz Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 2, Local 6410, 82-2 ARB 8364 (1982) (Feldman, Arb.); Itmann Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers of America, District 29, Local Union No. 9690, 79-1 ARB 8296 (1979)
(Feldman, Arb.).
218. See language of (g)(2) supra note 206.
219. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1281 (1987) (Kilroy, Arb.).
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whether a particular task is similar to that which has been previously performed,
but on whether it has, in fact, been performed. This is not to say that meaningless
distinctions should be endorsed; that the brand name has changed is irrelevant
if the work remains the same. Moreover, at some point, work will be so closely
identifiable as to be reasonably deemed the same task. Thus, if it may be determined that the work is the essential equivalent of that which has been previously, by custom, allocated to the Bargaining Unit, it may not be subcontracted
20
except inthose contractually-stipulated instances.

In AMAX Coal Co., the question was whether a swing box on
mobile hydraulic cranes was improperly rebuilt by an outside con-

tractor rather than unit employees. The union claimed that it had
repaired similar units, making the rebuilding of the swing box "work
of the type" to be performed by unit employees.2 t In the following
terms the arbitrator denied the grievance finding that the work on
the other units was similar but not substantially equivalent to the
rebuilding of swing boxes:
To allow "work of the type" to be defined by similarities would lead to an
expansion of work jurisdiction and experiment in terms of human resources, time,
and cost far beyond the ability of management to control. To allow "work of
the type" to be bound by skills and functions such as "assembling/disassembling
gears, bearings and seals" would immediately require any work of this nature to
be done by classified employees without any consideration of resources and other
demands upon time and personnel. Similarities, skills and functions tests would
abridge the rights of management to manage personnel and assets. It would completely negate the longstanding "customary" language and binding precedence.
If carried to its extreme, this interpretation would go beyond the net of job
m
security to require the company to become a manufacturer of parts.

In Arbitrator Kilroy's view substantial equivalence means
' 223
"[a]ctual, ascertainable performance.
Arbitrators will strictly enforce the company's obligation to use
unit employees to produce coal under Article IA, Section (a).22 And
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id. at 1284-5.
Id. at 1284.

224. See Cannelton Industries, Inc., Kanawha Div. v. United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local Union No. 8843, 79-1 ARB

8268 (1979) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator rejected

the company's argument that a non-unit crew from the equipment's manufacturing corporation could
produce 60 to 80 tons of coal while testing the equipment without violating Article IA, Section (a)).
See also McWane Coal Co., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 6969, 84-1 ARB
8151 (1984) (Nicholas, Arb.) (where the company improperly contracted out the removal of coal
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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even construction that consists of the replacement of old parts with
new ones will be deemed repair construction rather than new con-

struction where it simply overhauls an existing system.2 However,
an arbitrator will uphold the company's decision to contract out the
work if employees demonstrate an inability to perform the work
even where work is of a type performed by unit employees. Work
that cannot be performed cannot be claimed. 226
Where violations are found, the remedy consists of returning unit
employees to the status quo ante.227 Where a local agreement exists
that is valid under Article XXVI, Section (b), a remedy for its breach
will involve an order that the company comply with the local agreement.2 The remedy normally runs to members of the work force
who would be performing the unit work and not to the entire unit. 229

The union has the burden of showing a basis for monetary relief. 210

225. See Itmann Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 29, Local Union No.
9690, 79-1 ARB 8296 (1979) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that the replacement of
two old sump pumps and the installation of a new third one was repair construction since the sump
pump system existed before the repair and replacement of the pumps).
226. See Freeman-United Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 1969,
90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 649 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the unit's inability
to perform the work justified subcontracting whether the inability was due to lack of skills, lack of
equipment, or the company's inability to appropriately direct the working force).
227. In Cannelton Industries, 79-1 ARB 8268 (1979) (Feldman, Arb.), the remedy for improper
production of coal was the amount of time taken to produce the coal times wages at time and a half
since the arbitrator found that an overtime shift would have performed the work. Similarly, in Itmann
Coal Co., 79-1 ARB 8296 (1979) (Feldman, Arb.), the arbitrator awarded wages in the amount of
the time of performance of the work times the regular rate of pay. And in McWane Coal Co., 841 ARB 8151 (1984) (Nicholas, Arb.), the arbitrator awarded the union a cease and desist order
which gave unit employees an immediate opportunity to do the work.
228. See Island Creek Coal Co., Virginia Pocahontas No. 5 Mine and Preparation Plant v.
United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 2232, 87-1 ARB 8040 (1986) (Stoltenberg, Arb.)
(where the arbitrator ordered the company to make the union whole for the use of a subcontractor
by awarding unit employees wages on an hour-for-hour basis with the contractor's employees pursuant
to the local agreement).
229. See, e.g., Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20,
Local Union 2394, 88-1 ARB 8026 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator ordered that proportionate wages be paid to three grievants rather than the entire group of mechanics who could have
performed the contract at work).
230. See McElroy Coal Co./McElroy Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6,
Local 1638, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 566 (1989) (McIntosh, Arb.) (where the arbitrator denied monetary
relief due to the absence of supporting evidence); Cannelton Industries, Inc., Kanawha Div. v. United
Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 8843, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705 (1988) (Stoltenberg,
Arb.) (where the arbitrator limited the company's liability because of the union's conflicting evidence
on the number
of days
that theRepository
contracted work
consumed).
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When grievances arising out of this conduct reach arbitration,
a key issue may be the applicability of res judicata principles as
enunciated in ARB No. 78-24. In recent cases employers have tested
the limits of preexisting arbitration awards by engaging in further
subcontracting. 23'
3. Supervisory Performance of Unit Work
The UMWA has been most successful in work assignment disputes that deal with supervisory performance of unit work. It has
won almost 65% of the reported supervisory performance cases decided during the study period.
Article IA, Section (c) prohibits supervisory employees from performing classified work unless the work is necessary to training or
instructing classified employees or is performed to meet an emergency. 232 Demonstrating a preference for work preservation in close
cases, that provision imposes the burden of proof on the employer
to prove the nonperformance or proper performance of unit work
by supervisory personnel. 233
Where employers have been successful, they have shown that
supervisors were instructing unit employees or doing work that was
di minimus. 234 Recently, in Cannelton Industries v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 17, Local Union 8043,235 the arbitrator
read the "emergency" exception in Article IA, Section (c) to cover
employer attempts to meet business exigencies by using non-unit
231. See, e.g., McElroy Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America District 6, Local 1638,

93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 566 (1989) (McIntosh, Arb.).
232. See supra note 189. Under the Agreement classified work describes unit work - work to
be done by employees represented by the union.

233. But see Consolidation Coal Co., Mathews Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 19, Local 1569, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 892 (1975) (Stokes, Arb.) (where the arbitrator denied the
grievance because the grievant had not submitted any facts in support of its allegations in a case
where the employer's facts were weak).
234. See Consolidation Coal Co., Mathews Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
19, Local 1569, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (1975) (Stokes, Arb.); Consolidation Coal Co., Mathews
Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 19, Local 1569, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 892 (1975)
(Stokes, Arb.); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 19, Local
7425, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 925 (1976) (Cantor, Arb.).

235. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 824 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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employees including a supervisor where employees made themselves
6
unavailable for work.23
Remedially, arbitrators have limited recoveries to actual wages
lost and cease and desist orders. They have been unwilling to impose
237
penalties not supported by contractual provisions.
D.

Seniority Cases

Seniority under the Agreement, like a small minority of seniority
provisions in other industries,2 8 is based on a combination of length
of service and job qualifications. Article XVII, Section (a) defines
seniority as follows:
Seniority at the mine shall be recognized in the industry on the following basis:
length of service and the ability to step into and perform the work of the job
at the time the job is awarded.

The highest incidence of grievances in published seniority cases
concerns filling vacancies, bumping rights during layoffs, 239 recalls
from layoff panels and job postings. The question of ability to step
into and perform the work pervades the first three categories and
is the greatest source of seniority disputes.
1. Ability to Perform
Employers are typically successful where a grievance protests denial of an employment opportunity because of inability to perform

236. Id. at 828-29. Cf. Central Appalachian's Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 17, Local 9619, 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 787 (1975) (Hunter, Arb.) (where the arbitrator granted
the grievance, since the grievant's honoring of a non-work related picket line was deemed to not
constitute an unauthorized work stoppage).
237. See, e.g., Barnes & Tucker Co. v. United Mine Workers, District 2, Local 1269, 85-1 ARB
8307 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator refused to impose punitive damages in the absence
of contractual support, even though the employer had been a repeat offender. Arbitrator Feldman
noted that his authority was limited "only to [making] the person whole," and that he was not to
penalize the employer in the absence of contractual authority).
238. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts Basic Patterns, 75:1 (1989).
239. A senior employee's right to displace a more junior employee whose job the senior can
perform is a by
bumping
right.
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the work. 4 However, the union has prevailed in a number of ability
to perform disputes, where the employer's method of evaluation,
fairness in administration of ability testing, and evaluation criteria
were called into question. For example, in Consolidation Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers of America, District No.6, Local 7690,241
the arbitrator acknowledged the "presumption of legitimacy" to be
accorded management decisions related to filling vacancies and the
union's burden of showing management decisions to be arbitrary or
discriminatory. 2 The arbitrator explained:
This [presumption of legitimacy and union burden of proof are] firmly rooted
in management's expressly reserved and multi- faceted right to run the enterprise
by determining the nature and extent of the work, directing the methods by which
it is to be accomplished, setting standards of production and measuring the performance of its employees.'

Squarely within the scope of this right and essential to its effective exercise, lies management's authority to evaluate the qualifications of its employees against the requirements of positions at

the mine. Management does not, however, have an entirely free hand
240. Filling Vacancies
See, e.g., Jim Walter Resources, Inc., v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local
2368, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 915 (1983) (Clarke, Arb.); Emery Mining Corp. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 22, Local 1769, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1211 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.); Saganaw
Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 9695, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 943 (1986) (Stoltenberg, Arb.); Peabody Coal Co., v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 1793, 87
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 758 (1985) (Volz, Arb.); Old Ben Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, District 11,
Local 5179, 77-1 ARB 8037 (1977) (Witney, Arb.); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District No. 6, Local No. 1890, 82-2 ARB 8417 (1982) (Ruben, Arb.); Peabody Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 1793, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 556 (1987)
(Feldman, Arb.); Alabama By-Products Corp. v. United Mine Workers, District 20, Local 1288, 771 ARB 8302 (1977) (Grooms, Arb.).
Layoffs
Shrewsbury Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 340, 86-2 ARB 8440
(1986) (Duff, Arb.); Arch of West Virginia, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17,
Local 5851, 89-1 ARB 8064 (1988) (Lieberman, Arb.); Hawks Nest Mining Co. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 17, Local 3029, 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (1989) (Volz, Arb.).
Layoff Panels
Shrewsbury Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, Local No. 1054, 85-2 ARB 8547 (1985) (Duff,
Arb.); Kelley Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 2343, 85-2 ARB 8357 (1985)
(Probst, Arb.); Amherst Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 5958, District 17, 86
2 ARB 8604 (1986) (Heekin, Arb.).
241. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1981) (Ruben, Arb.).
242. Id. at 789.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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in the matter, for it is obligated to post all permanent vacancies for
bidding and award each job to the most senior employee who has
the immediate ability to perform the job. 2 In determining whether
management has met its obligations, arbitrators recognize that ascertaining an employee's "ability" often involves a judgment call.
Because it is the primary responsibility of management to make such
judgments and because it has superior knowledge both of the details
and duties of the job and of the relevant qualifications of the employee, its judgments command respect and are not lightly to be
disregarded.
Yet, in Consolidation Coal Co. 245 the arbitrator sustained the
grievance of a first class mechanic in the Dozer Garage who had
been passed over in favor of a more junior employee for a similar
job in the Shovel Maintenance Department. The grievant had been
denied the position, because he failed an ad hoc quiz, developed by
the superintendent of the Shovel Maintenance Department and based
on events that occurred in the Shovel Maintenance Department on
the day of the quiz.'-" The arbitrator noted that written and oral
examinations are appropriate means of determining ability. 247 The
arbitrator further noted that employees may also qualify for. a job
by experience, by receiving a favorable review of the overall performance file, and by passing an actual performance test.48 He
pointed out, however, in the following terms that written and oral
examinations must themselves meet certain tests:
First, the test must be "valid." By that, the arbitrator means that the test must
actually measure the particular element which it sets out to evaluate. In the present
case, the test given by the company must have accurately measured the grievant's
then ability to maintain and repair the shovels and drills assigned to the bull crew.
Second, the test must be reliable. By this the arbitrator means that it must consistently be able to separate out those who have the ability from those who do
not. Thus, if a significant number of candidates "pass" the test, who in fact do
not have the requisite job ability, or, if a significant number of candidates "fail"

244. See discussion infra at notes 255-66 and accompanying text.
245. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1981) (Ruben, Arb.).
246. Id. at 786.
247. Id. at 791.
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the test, who in fact do have the requisite job ability, then the test is not reliable.2

9

Noting that 75% of the questions only "tested [the grievant's]
nominal familiarity with the equipment serviced by [mechanics in
the Shovel Maintenance Department]," the arbitrator held the test
administered by the employer invalid. 210 It did not afford the grievant an adequate opportunity to demonstrate his ability or management an adequate opportunity to fairly consider the grievant's
ability. The arbitrator awarded the grievant a five- day trial period
to make out such a demonstration.
Similarly, in Arch of Illinois v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 1392,2 11 a realignment case, the arbitrator
sustained a grievance concerning a test used to determine the grievant's ability to perform the work. In that case the grievant complained about the conclusions drawn from the test rather than the
validity of the test itself. The arbitrator affirmed the prevailing standard of review - that an arbitrator is limited to reviewing an em2 2
ployer's qualifications decisions for arbitrariness and capriciousness .
For the arbitrator, that standard amounted to an inquiry about
whether the employer's reasons for finding an inability to perform
were supported by the evidence. 253 After identifying the reasons given
by the employer and analyzing the evidence in support of each reason, the arbitrator found that the employer's conclusions were not
254
supported by the evidence.
2.

Job Postings

Grievants have been very successful in job posting cases, even
though they involve management's right to direct the working force
clearly set out in Article IA, Section (d).251As noted by Chief Umpire
Paul L. Selby, Jr. in ARB No. 78-26, job posting cases deal with

249. Id. at 791.
250. Id.

251. 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 376 (1990) (Fullmer, Arb.).
252. .d. at 378-79.

253. Id. at 379.
254. Id. at 378-80.
255. Arbitrators sustained five of the eight grievances related to job postings (62.5%) published

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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a "relationship between.., management rights and bargaining unit
rights. ' 1 56 Arbitrator Selby notes that while management has the

inherent power to direct the working force, that power is specifically
limited by various provisions of the Agreement, including Article
257
XVII, Section (i), governing job bidding.
However, the bargaining rights secured by Article XVII, Section
(i), do not prevent an employer from exercising its inherent authority
to determine whether permanent vacancies or new jobs exist. They
merely require the employer to fill such vacancies in a prescribed
manner. 8 Yet, such vacancies or new jobs need not be formally
announced in order to fall within the Article XVII, Section (i) limitation. Vacancies triggering the posting obligation may be shown
by the employer's "actions, direction of work duties, and administration of work tasks.

' 25 9

Where the grievant shows the employer

to have established a vacancy or new job, the arbitral ordering of
26°
a job posting is an appropriate remedy.
Job posting cases arise in a number of contexts, for example,
as challenges to the supervisory performance of unit work,26 1 the
filling of vacancies by temporary classifications under Article IV,
Section (e), rather than job posting, 26 2 the changing of duties and

responsibilities of a job after the vacancy occurs, 263 and the treatment

256. ARB No. 78-26 (1980).
257. Article XVII reads in part:
Section i. Job Bidding
Filling of all permanent vacancies and new jobs created during the term of this Agreement
will be made on the basis of mine seniority as set forth in the following procedure.
1. The job or vacancy shall be posted ....
258. See ARB No. 78-26 at 15.
259. Id. AMAX Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 11, Local 1216, 81-1
ARB
8211 (1981) (Sinicropi, Arb).
260. See ARB No. 78-26 at 17. See, e.g., Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 20, Local 2368, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 290 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
261. See ARB No. 78-26; Sewell Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 29,
Local 6207, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 126 (1979) (Wren, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that the job
of fire boss was not classified work as determined by past practice).
262. Id. (where the arbitrator held that the employer could not circumvent its obligation under
Article XVII, Section (i) by using the temporary assignment procedure to give an employee a regular
job).
263. North River Energy Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, 85 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 449 (1985) (Witney, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the employer could not circumvent
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of a vacancy as temporary rather than permanent. 264 The success of
grievants in job posting cases shows that arbitrators take seriously
the limitations on management rights found in Article XVII, Section
(i)

265

Like typical seniority provisions those under the Agreement touch
many aspects of the employment relationship. Specifically, Article
XVII of the Agreement addresses the definition of Seniority, Reduction and Realignment, Layoff Procedure, Rules Governing Panels, Recall Rights, Job Bidding, Training for Vacancy Not Filled By
Bidding, Transfer to Other Mines of Employer, Leave of Absence,
Loss of Seniority for Taking Supervisory Positions, and Shift Preference. Despite the many provisions of Article XVII, seniority is
also important to other provisions of the Agreement such as Articles
V (promotion of helpers) and XVI (training opportunities).2 66 Perhaps, as an affirmation of the acceptance of seniority as a principal
criterion for distributing employment preferences, seniority cases
constituted only about 14% of the issues decided in the published
cases during the study period. 267 All but two of those, Armco, Inc.,
Armco Coal Operationsand United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 6608, 2" and Alabama By- Products Corp. and United

the posting requirement after departing employees left vacancies by reducing the responsibilities of
remaining employees and posting a lesser position). See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 31, Local Union 1588, 88-2 ARB
8423 (1988) (Wren, Arb.) (where

the arbitrator found that an employer could not arbitrarily transfer the duties of a job to a different
job in order to avoid posting the former).
264. See ARB No. 78-26. See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 6, Local 1784, 84-2 ARB, 8582 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the Arbitrator found that
the third shift constituted a permanent vacancy, because the employer used a makeshift crew for a
substantial period). Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 9690,
85-1 ARB
8045, (1984) (Probst, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the union did not meet its
burden of proving that the employer had defined a permanent vacancy by active decision or in sub-

stance).
265. Grievants won five of eight (62.5%) of the job posting cases.

266. Article XVI, Section (g) makes the selection of employees for training opportunities a function of seniority and trainability. Under some circumstances involving senior employees Article XVII,
Section (i)(l1) limits a fully trained helper's right under Article V, Section (b) to be promoted to the
machine operator's job.
267. Fifty-two of the 368 cases reported during the study period dealt with seniority issues.

268. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 330 (1982) (Wren, Arb.) (dealing with employee entitlement to a
separate seniority unit at a new mine).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 1881,269 dealt with
layoff, panel or job vacancy issues.
E.

Safety and Health Issues
Article III of the Agreement contains thirteen provisions that

seek to preserve and improve the safety and healthfulness of the
mining environment. 270 As Section (b) reveals, the Federal Mine Safety

and Health Act of 1977 is integral to the rights and obligations
undertaken by the parties in Article 111.271 In addition to the Joint
Industry Health and Safety Committee,272 Article III establishes a

Mine Health and Safety Committee (MHSC or Committee) at each
mine.273 The MHSC is made up of miners employed at the mine

and is responsible for regularly inspecting the "mine and surface
installations, dams or waste impoundments and gob piles connected
therewith" for conditions that may endanger the lives or bodies of
employees. 274 In carrying out those duties, the MHSC must report
its findings and recommendations to the employer and, in extreme
cases, may cause the closing down of dangerous areas of the mine. 275
269. 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1270 (1984) (Clarke, Arb.) (dealing with seniority entitlement to vacation work).
270. See Article III, Sections (a)-(p) of the 1988 Agreement. Section (a) sets forth the basic right
to a safe working place in the following terms:
Every Employee covered by this Agreement is entitled to a safe and healthful place
to work, and the parties jointly pledge their individual and joint efforts to attain and
maintain this objective. Recognizing that the health and safety of the Employees covered
by this Agreement are the highest priorities of the parties, the parties agree to comply fully
with all lawful notices and orders issued pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977, as amended, and pursuant to the various state mining laws.
271. In part, Section 801 of Title 30, U.S. Code Annotated, reads:
(g) It is the purpose of this chapter (1) to establish interim mandatory health and safety
standards and to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of
Labor to develop and promulgate improved mandatory health or safety standards to protect
the health and safety of the nation's coal or other miners; (2) to require each operator of
a coal or other mine and every miner in such mine, comply with such standards; (3) to
cooperate with and provide assistance to the states in the development and enforcement of
effective state coal or other mine health and safety programs and (4) to improve and expand,
in cooperation with the States and the coal or mining industry, research and development
and training programs aimed at prevented coal or other mine accidents and occupationally
caused diseases in the industry.
272. See Article III, Section (c).
273. See Article III, Section (d).
274. See Article III, Section (d)(3).
275. by
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Article III, Section (i) also creates individual safety rights that permit
employees to refuse to work under conditions that are reasonably
believed to be abnormally dangerous. 276 Article III, Section (p) establishes a special expedited dispute settlement procedure for safety
and health disputes. 7 The procedures integrate the functions of the
MHSC, the Mine Safety and Health Administration and the Arbitrator. 278
1. Safety
Surprisingly few of the published cases during the study period
directly involved safety disputes. 279 The more interesting published

cases involved MHSC conduct and individual safety rights.
As noted, the MHSC enjoys the authority to inspect, report and
recommend, and in extreme cases, close down mining facilities.280
Belief in "imminent danger" justifies a MHSC decision to close an
area of the mine. 281 Such a closure subjects Committee members or
the entire Committee to the sanction of removal, where the employer
can prove the MHSC or some of its members acted arbitrarily and
282

capriciously.

276. See supra note 141.
277. See Appendix VII.
278. See Article III, Section (p).
279. Seventeen of the 368 cases or 4.6% directly involved safety issues. Another five cases,
indirectly involved safety questions while falling into other issue categories. See, e.g., Eastern Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 30, Local 5737, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 759 (1987)
(Hewitt, Arb.).
280. Relevant provisions of Article III read as follows:
Section (d) Mine Health and Safety Committee...
(3) The Mine Health and Safety Committee may inspect any portion of a mine or surface
installations, dams or waste impoundments, and gob piles connected therewith. If the Committee believes conditions found endanger the lives and bodies of the Employees, it shall
report its findings and recommendations to the Employer. In those special instances where
the Committee believes that an eminent danger exists and the Committee recommends that
the Employer remove all Employees from the involved area, the Employer is required to
follow the Committee's recommendation and remove the Employees from the involved area
immediately ....
281. Id.
282. This authority is contained in Article III, Section (d)(5) which reads in part as follows: "If
the Mine Health and Safety Committee, in closing down an area of the mine, acts arbitrarily and
capriciously, a member or members of such Committee may be removed from the Committee ...... 58
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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The ARB has explained the difference between "endangerment"
and "imminent danger" under Article III, Section (d)(3). 283 When
the Committee believes that conditions "endanger" the lives and
bodies of employees, it can report its findings and recommendations
to the Employer. 28 "Endangerment" assumes that the peril is sufficiently remote to reasonably permit employees to continue working
while remedial action is considered and undertaken. 215 On the other
hand, "imminent danger" connotes "extraordinary urgency" and
is synonymous with impending disaster. Only in such circumstances
can the proximity of the danger warrant the instant remedial action
of closing an area. 2 6 This distinction suggests that Committee members must act with care when invoking the more drastic remedy of
area closedown.
In removal cases that reach arbitration, the arbitrator will review
Committee action to determine whether it was based on a reasonable
belief that an imminent danger existed. Doing so entails a review
of the facts that were available to the grievant at the time of the
closedown decision as well as the grievant's testimony about how
the decision was reached. The "reasonable belief" standard gives
considerable discretion to the reviewing arbitrator and little predictability to Committee members. 87 In ARB No. 63, the ARB,
speaking through Chief Umpire Rolf Valtin, acknowledged the subjective component of this standard and held that reasonable belief

283. ARB No. 63 (1977).
284. See Article III, Section (d)(3).
285. See ARB No. 63, 1-6.
286. See ARB No. 63, 5-8. The ARB likened this standard to that governing the individual's
right to refuse to perform assigned work under Article III, Section (i). Id. at 10. The ARB also
rejected the view that the MHSC's belief must be objectively based in order for its members to avoid
removal. Saying that Article III, Section (d)(5) does not remove the right to err in good faith, the
ARB described the standard as follows: "there must be something of colorable substance in the picture
that inclines one to acceptance of genuineness and reasonableness of belief on the part of the Committee." Id. at 9.
287. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1473, 68 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 405 (1977) (Perry, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that the grievant's failure to close
down an area at an earlier time coupled with his testimony about why he closed it later, demonstrated
that he did not believe an eminent danger existed) Cf. North American Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of America, Local 2262, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 720 (1977) (Perry, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
found that the grievant had a legitimate basis for reasonably believing that an eminent danger existed,
even thoughbyother
suggested
that the
grievant's
belief was wrong).
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must be determined as of the time of the imminent danger notice
and not upon objective facts as examined under the "cold scrutiny
of informed hindsight." ' 8 Where removal is appropriate, its du289
ration is for the term of the contract.
Just as MHSC members may close imminently dangerous areas

of the mine, individual employees may refuse to work under conditions reasonably believed "to be abnormally and immediately dangerous." The MHSC is also involved in individual safety rights
disputes. When an Employee insists upon being relieved from assignments that are perceived to be immediately and abnormally dangerous, at least one member of the MHSC reviews the disputed
condition with mine management within four hours of the employee's notice. 290 If the MHSC and management agree that the condition
291
does not exist, the employee must return to the assignment.
It is not surprising that the "abnormally and immediately dangerous" clause has required interpretation by arbitrators. 292 As the
288. ARB No. 63, 9-10.
289. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Division 4, Local
1473, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 257 (1978) (Ipavec, Arb.).
290. If the parties do not agree, the dispute is ultimately decided by a government official or
an arbitrator. Article III, Section (i) reads in part:
Section (i) Preservation of Individual Safety Rights .... If the existence of such condition
is disputed, at least one member of the Mine Health and Safety Committee shall review
such condition with mine management with four (4) hours to determine whether it exists
and each party shall state the facts upon which it relies as to whether such condition exists
or does not exist. If there is agreement between the Mine Health and Safety Committee
member or members and in mine management that the condition does not exist, the Employee shall return to his regular job immediately (emphasis added).
(3) If the dispute remains unsettled following the investigation by a member of the Mine
Health and Safety Committee and involves an issue concerning compliance with federal or
state mine safety laws or mandatory health or safety regulations, the appropriate federal
or state inspection agency shall be called in immediately and the dispute shall be settled
on the basis of the findings of the inspector with both parties reserving all rights of statutory
appeal. Should the federal or state inspector find that the condition complained of requires
correction before the Employee may return to his job, the Employer shall take the corrective
action immediately. Upon correction, the complaining Employee shall return to his job. If
the Federal or State inspector does not find a condition requiring correction, the complaining
employee shall return to his job immediately.
(4) For disputes not otherwise settled, a written grievance shall be filed no later than five
working days after the findings of the inspector and the dispute shall be referred immediately
to step 3 as provided for in Article XXIII, Settlement of Disputes, Section (c)(3) ....
291. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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following quote shows, such interpretation grows out of a sensitivity

to the importance of safety rights as well as the potential for their
misuse:
The preservation of individual safety rights under the terms of the wage
agreement is an important if not the most important provision negotiated by the
Union over the sequence of the labor negotiations. It is important that nothing

would diminish the protection gainec4 by the miners over the years. On the other
hand, it is equally as important to protect the parties from any misuse of the

provisions that have been gained by the use of Article III, Section (i) for purposes
other than immediate avoidance of what the Employee believes to be an immediate
danger.293

Thus, an arbitrator will closely examine the circumstances of an

employee's refusal to work to determine whether conditions were
"immediately dangerous."
Arbitrators have equated the language of Article III, Section (i)
"abnormally and immediately dangerous" - to the "imminent
danger" language of Section (d) governing the MHSC's closedown
of areas of the mine. 294 The ARB endorsed this view in ARB No.
-

63. Thus, the perceived danger to employees invoking their individual safety rights under Article III, Section (i) must be imminent
within the meaning of Article III, section (d).
The "imminence" requirement heightens an arbitrators scrutiny
of conditions cited as justifying ex ante an employee's refusal to
work. For example, in Southern Ohio Coal Co., Meig's No. 2 Mine

and United Mine Workers of America, Local 1886,295 the grievants
abnormally and immediately dangerous ... beyond the normal hazards inherent in the
operation which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before
such condition or practice can be abated.
293. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1886, 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 677, 681 (1979) (Van Pelt, Arb.).
294. In Southern Ohio Coal Co., id., Arbitrator Van Pelt held that "immediately dangerous"
was to be interpreted the same as "imminent danger" found in the Federal Mine Health and Safety
Act and the Ohio Statutes. Section 802 (J) of 30 U.S.C.A. contains the following definition:
Imminent danger means the existence of any condition or practice in a coal or other mine
which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such
condition or practice can be abated.
Cf. Article III, Section (i) of the Agreement, which refers to conditions believed to be "abnormally
and immediately dangerous to [the Employee] beyond the normal hazards inherent in the operation
which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such condition
or practice can be abated."
295. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677 (1979) (Van Pelt, Arb.).
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claimed their invocation of Article III, Section (i) was proper, because they were being asked to serve under a supervisor who had
earlier permitted the existence of a dangerous condition. 296 Pointing
to the Union's evidence of only one instance of supervisory negligence, the arbitrator observed that the Union's position required a
finding that an imminent danger existed whenever the supervisor was
present. 297 Finding no evidence to support such a claim, the arbitrator went further to hold that an individual could not be an im-

minent danger under Article III, Section

(i).298

While the latter

pronouncement may be an overstatement, the arbitrator's conclusion
does reveal the potential difficulty in establishing "imminence."
To guard against the abuse of individual safety rights, Article
III, Section (i)(4) subjects to discipline employees not invoking their
safety rights in good faith.299 Is good faith under Section (i)(4) synonymous with reasonable belief under Section (i)(1). Since reasonable belief under (i)(1) is a prerequisite for receiving lost earnings
due to the invocation of individual safety rights, it can be read as
unrelated to the concept of good faith that bears upon the imposition
of discipline. The issue is somewhat complicated by the language
of good faith contained in Section (i)(1), the invocation provision.
The apparently interchangeable use of the terms "good faith" and
"reasonable grounds to believe" in the same provision, suggests they
may be indistinguishable.
Arbitrator George W. Van Pelt in Southern Ohio Coal Co.,3°°
made concurrent findings that the grievants did not have reasonable
cause to believe that an imminent danger existed but exercised their

296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 680.
Id. at 681-82.
Id. at 682.
Article III, Section (i)(4) provides in part:

In those instances where determination has been made, as provided above, that an
Employee did not act in good faith in exercising his rights under the provisions of this
Agreement, he shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, subject, however, to his
right to file and process a grievance. In no event, however, shall such discipline for failure
to act in good faith be imposed prior to the review between at least one member of the

Mine Health and Safety Committee and mine management required under paragraph (2)
of this Section (i).
300. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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rights under Article III, Section (i) in good faith. The arbitrator
reasoned as follows:
Good faith must, by necessity, encompass the intention of the individual.
One who is not acting in good faith would be acting for a purpose not intended
to be utilized under the guise the person claims and with full knowledge of that
person that it is not the true reason. An example would be to claim that an act
of a foreman or a company was unsafe to attain revenge because of a personal
grudge. In this case, from the testimony, the Arbitrator is convinced that the
grievants honestly believed - even though mistakenly so - that they were acting
within their rights and that the supervisor did constitute a danger ....
While
they were wrong in their belief, they nonetheless believed that their actions were
proper and ... they had no improper motive in claiming their rights under Article
III(i). The Arbitrator cannot find that they acted in bad faith. 301

This interpretation of Section (i) protects employers from abuse while
precluding a chilling effect on the exercise of individual safety rights.
In recognizing the importance of individual safety rights arbitrators interpret Section (i) as imposing upon employers the burden
of proving the absence of good faith. 0 2 Since the assignment of
burden of proof often reflects certain policy choices, 03 the employer's burden of proving bad faith in individual safety rights cases
favors employee invocation of safety rights without fear of discipline. The unfettered freedom to make legitimate safety claims necessarily will result in greater safety protection.
However, arbitrators do not uniformly assign the burden of proof
to employers in Article III, Section (i) cases. For example, Arbitrator
Samuel S. Perry in Southern Ohio Coal Co., Meigs Mine No. 1 v.
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1890, 30 treated the individual safety rights claim under Article III, Section (i) as any other
non-disciplinary case that imposes a burden on the Union to prove
the claim. The grievants' complaint about management's failure to
assign him to other available work after he invoked his safety rights,
raised an issue about whether other work was available. Arbitrator
Perry denied the grievance in part because the Union had not shown

301. Id. at 682.
302. See, e.g., Energy Mines, Inc., v. United Mine Workers of America, District 5, Local 1197,
87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 577 (1986) (Hewitt, Arb.).
303. See F. JAmIs & G. HAzAn, Crvm PRocEmmu,
§ 7.8, 324-25 (3d ed. 1985).
304. 77-2
ARBResearch
8471 (1977)
(Perry, Arb.).
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other work to be available. 05 The individual safety rights enjoyed
by mining employees under Article III, Section (i) would seem to
warrant an exception to the general rule that assigns the burden of
proof to the grievant in non-disciplinary cases.
Other safety issues decided during the study period involved the
employers' duty to provide efficient means of transporting injured
or sick employees, 3°6 whether an employer can require a maintenance
employee to sign inspection reports signifying the soundness of inspected mine equipment, 3° whether an employer violated provisions
of the special health and safety problems section of Article XXI,3°8
and whether an employer is obligated under the Agreement to continue the practice of furnishing injury and illness reports to affected
employees upon request. 3°9 Grievants tend to prevail in these cases,
another indication of the sensitivity of arbitrators to the safety con3 10
cerns of mine employees.
2. Health
In a comprehensive article published in an earlier Coal Issue of
this Law Review, Professor Marlin M. Volz comprehensively discussed the many sections of the Agreement of 1984 that concern
health and retirement benefits and health and safety matters. 31 Pro305. Id. at 5040.

306. See United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 19, Local 7425,
65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 345 (1975) (Sherman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator, under the circumstances, denied
grievances alleging that the Employer had failed to provide "safe, quick and efficient means of
transporting injured or sick Employees" and failed to provide a "safe man trip for every miner as
transportation in and out of the mines." Id. at 347.
307. See Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1766, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
224 (1980) (Wren, Arb.) (where the ahitrator sustained the grievance of a maintenance Employee
who would have exposed himself to the risk of litigation if required to sign such inspection reports).
308. See Peabody Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 9800 &
1894, 77-2 ARB 8415 (1977) (Witney, Arb.) (where the arbitrator denied the grievance requesting
a flagman at the intersection of a haulage and public roads under Article XXI, Section (e)(8) requiring
safeguards at such a crossing).
309. See AMAX Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local Union No.
7031, 87-1 ARB 8096 (1986) (Clarke, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the grievance, holding
that the employer was obligated under Article III, Section (f) and Article XXVI, Section (b) to maintain
the practice).
310. Approximately 61% of the cases in this category are won by grievants as shown in Appendix
I.
311. See Volz, Medical and Health Issues in Coal Arbitration, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 725 (1987). 64
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fessor Volz pointed out that 55 sections of the Agreement deal with

health matters. This Article will not duplicate Professor Volz' efforts. Rather, it will simply note that thirteen cases published during
the study period dealt strictly with health matters. Of that thirteen,

nine or about 70% concerned the right of Employees to sickness
312
and accident benefits under Article XI of the Agreement.
F.

Other Issues

Other significant issues treated by arbitrators during the study
period involved management promulgation of work rules, scheduling
of work, working conditions, successorship problems, management
rights and union security, discrimination, and procedure. The following discussion will highlight these issues paying some attention
to observable trends and incisive arbitral reasoning in the published

312. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1886, District 6,
80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 885 (1983) (Stoltenberg, Arb.); Alabama By-Products Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 20, Local 1288, 79-2 ARB 8425 (1979) (Clarke, Arb.); Yates Energy
& Development, Inc. v. United Miner Workers of America, District 14, Local No. 2498, 84-2 ARB
8374 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local
1949, 85-2 ARB 8452 (1985) (Probst, Arb.) (all dealing with the propriety of denying sickness and
accident benefits). Two of the thirteen cases (15%), Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 4, Local 1980, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 927 (1984) (Duff, Arb.) and Allen Creek
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 31, Local 1466, 86-1 ARB 8021 (1985)
(Feldman, Arb.), dealt with eligibility issues such as whether a chiropractor can certify the employee's
illness and whether a recall notice activates the employee's status for purposes of determining entitlement to benefits.
See also Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local
1928, 79-2 ARB 8535 (1979) (Clarke, Arb.) (addressing the loss of eligibility for sickness and accident
benefits under Article XI, Section (b), due to the Employee's acceptance of other employment while
receiving such benefits); Peabody Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 21, Local
1593 86-2 ARB 8359 (1986) (Gibson, Arb.) (dealing with whether the employer improperly influenced
the conclusions of a neutral doctor who examined the employee's physical fitness to return to work
from layoff - Article III, Section (j)). Cases dealing with employees' physical inability to perform
under Article III, Section Ci) see Peabody Coal Co v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6,
Local 1188, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 511 (1985) (Duda, Arb.) (refusal to recall from layoff); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1110, 72-2 ARB 8406 (1977) (Dyke,
Arb.) (refusal to recall from layoff); Donaldson Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 17, Local Union 340, 90- 1 ARB 8052 (1989) (Zobrak, Arb.) (termination of employment);
Peabody Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 1802, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1138 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) (dealing with whether a final determination of 100% disability had been
made under Article XIV, Section (c), thus affording a basis for non-disciplinary termination).
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cases. The enumerated issues constitute approximately 26% of the
decisions published during the study period.313

1. Work Rules
a.

In General

Conforming to the general trend in arbitral decision-making, the
unifying theme in published awards addressing work rule issues is
the employer's reasonable exercise of rule making authority.1 4 Under
the Agreements from 1974 through 1988 the Employer has retained
a management right to direct the working force under Article IA,
Section (d). 115 Other provisions such as Article III, Section (g) deal-

313. Eighty-six of the 368 published awards (23.3%) involved cases falling into the other issues
category. Thirteen of the cases involved employer work rules; 31 involved scheduling problems; 8
involved working conditions; 13 involved management rights and union security; 6 involved successorship issues; 5 involved discrimination; and 10 involved problems of procedure.
314. The following excerpts nicely summarize the dominant arbitral approach to work rule issues:
It is well established in arbitration that management has the fundamental right unilaterally to establish reasonable plant rules not inconsistent with work or the collective
agrepment. Thus, when the agreement is silent upon the subject, management has the right
to formulate and enforce plant rules as an ordinary and proper means of maintaining
discipline and efficiency and of directing the conduct of the working force. Management
also may establish and enforce plant rules to ensure the health and safety of Employees
or others....
After plant rules are promulgated, they may be challenged through the grievance procedure (including arbitration) on the ground that they violate the agreement or that they
are unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory. Most Arbitrators find even in contractual provisions
that specifically affirm the Employer's authority to promulgate plant rules a limitation that
such rules must be reasonable.
See, e.g., Schine Body & Equipment Co. v. United Steel Workers of America, Local 8557, 69 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 930, 935-36 (1977) (Roberts, Arb.).
This right to challenge applies also where the agreement expressly gives management
the right to establish plant rules. Indeed, in many of the more recent plant rule cases
management's general right to promulgate plant rules unilaterally was not challenged, such
right being stated expressly in the agreement; the challenge rather was to the content or
the particular application of some given rule ....
The test of reasonableness of a plant rule "is whether or not the rule is reasonably
related to a legitimate objective of management."
S. Robert Shaw Controls Co., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 283, 286 (1970) (Block, Arb.). Elkouri and Elkouri,
How Arbitration Works, (BNA) 553-55 (4th ed. 1985).
315. Article IA, Section (d) reads: "The management of the mine, the direction of the working
force, and the right to hire and discharge are vested exclusively in the Employer."
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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ing with employer rules for the protection of persons and property 1 6
Article XXII, Section (i) setting out the rules governing attendance,31 7 and Article XXVI, Section (b) specifying the role of local
agreements and past practice under the Agreement, 318 have a bearing
on the employer's promulgation and implementation of work rules.
Whether the employer's exercise of rule making authority is under its general right contained in Article IA or a specific contractual
provision, the Arbitrator's ruling invariably encompasses an analysis
of the practical concerns of reasonableness. Arbitrator Feldman applied such an analysis in Nacco Mining Co., Powhatan Mine No.
6 v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1810. 319 In
that case, the employer attempted to promote attendance at the mine
by instituting an attendance lottery held monthly and paying five
winners $100 each, provided that 25% of the work force were eligible
to participate. Among other things, eligibility required completion
of all scheduled work days and excluded any employee who left the
mine early for any reason, including illness or injury.3 2 Called upon
to assess the reasonableness of the early leave exclusion from eligibility, the arbitrator noted the uniqueness of the attendance program and the following:
Rules of necessity must meet certain requirements and standards. They must be:
1. Published

316. That Section provides:
Section (g) Safety Rules and Regulations:
Reasonable rules and regulations of the Employer, not inconsistent with Federal and
State laws, for the protection of the persons of the Employees and preservation of property
shall be complied with.
317. In part that provision reads:
Section (i) Attendance Control...
(3) Nothing in this section shall preclude the Employer from establishing or enforcing work
rules regarding tardiness and leaving the shift early.
318. In part that provision reads:
Section (b) Prior Practice and Custom:
This Agreement supersedes all existing and previous contracts except as incorporated
and carried forward herein by reference; and all local agreements, rules, regulations and
customs heretofore established in conflict with this agreement are hereby abolished. Except
where abolished by mutual agreement of the parties, all prior practice and custom not in
conflict with this Agreement shall be continued ....
319. 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 841 (1976) (Feldman, Arb.).
320. Id. at 842.
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Reasonable
Even handedly applied
Not be violative of any contractual prohibition. (This may
be considered part
3 21
the reasoning concerning the reasonableness of the rule.)

The arbitrator considered the employer's legitimate interest in
eliminating voluntary employee early departures to pursue activities
that are preferred to completing the shift. He affirmed the impro-

priety of this employee conduct and distinguished early departures
related to illness or injury as involuntary and not improper. 322 The
arbitrator concluded that legitimate illness and injuries are contractually recognized as appropriate reasons to leave the work area
and, hence, unreasonably used as a basis for denying eligibility for
323
the attendance lottery.
Past practice is an important constraint on an employer's rule
making authority. Unless such practices are superseded by the Agreement, Article XXVI, Section (b) preserves their vitality. 32 In some
cases, a threshold issue about whether a practice is binding may
exist. For example, in American Electric Power, Meigs Mine No.
2 v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 188625 Arbitrator
Abrams was confronted with the question of whether the employer's
attendance program to control early departures from work could be

321. Id. at 843.
322. Id. at 843-44.
323. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District No. 6, Local
1110, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 145 (1977) (Ipavec, Arb.) (applying a similar analysis to find that the end
rather than the beginning of the buzzer constitutes a more reasonable starting time for Employees
under the circumstances); Southern Ohio Coal v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Division
1, Local 1886, 77-2 ARB 8516 (1977) (Dworkin, Arb.) (where the Arbitrator sustained the grievance
of an employee who protested the employer's refusal to excuse his absence to drive his wife to the
doctor); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1110, 82-2
ARB 8405 (1982) (Nelson, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found unreasonable the employer's application
of the tardiness rule to an employee who was late because of a mudslide).
324. See, e.g., Saganaw Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 9695,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 735 (1984) (where past practice prevented the employer from discontinuing the
practice of giving written notification to employees and the union of monthly unexcused absences);
Clinchfield Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 28, Local 1476, 85 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 382 (1985) (Rybolt, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found the employer's absentee program to be
not administered with sound judgment, since the employer without notice departed from the past
practice of considering whether the employees absence was due to inclement weather before attaching
the AWOL label).
325. 85-2 ARB 8360 (1985) (Abrams, Arb.).
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unilaterally discontinued, despite the union's claim that past practice
prevented it. In upholding the employer's unilateral right to dis-

continue the program, Arbitrator Abrams addressed the union's argument as follows:
The mere fact that the Union was willing to go along with the company's
Early Quit Control Program does not mean that the program was a Product of
a joint agreement between the parties which became mutually binding as a "prior
practice and custom" under the Wage Agreement. It was a management prerogative to create this Program, expressly reserved to it under Paragraph 3 of
Article XXII (i) of the 1981 Wage Agreement. It remained the Company's prerogative to abolish that Program under Paragraph 3 of Article XXII(i) of the
present Wage Agreement which contains precisely the same language.326

b. Drug Testing
Reflecting the National trend, published work rules cases involving drug testing are a recent phenomenon 327 . The first case published during the study period was decided on June 8, 1987, 328 and

the latest was decided on October 28, 1988.329 Qnly four such cases
330
were published during the study period.

Like other work rules cases, arbitrators evaluate drug testing rules

to determine whether they are reasonably promulgated and implemented under the Agreement. 31 In addition to the employer's management right to direct the working force under Article IA Section
(d), the Agreement permits an employer to promulgate reasonable
safety rules (Article III, Section (g)) and to conduct physical ex-

326. Id. at 4494.
327. See generally Denenberg and Denenberg, Drug Testing from the Arbitrator'sPerspective,
11 NovA L. REv. 371, 371-73 (1987).
328. See Jim Walter Resources Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1928, 89 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 147 (1987) (Nicholas, Arb.).
329. Sharpels Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 2935, 91 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1065 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.).
330. See Maple Meadow Mining v. United Mine Workers of America, District 29, Local 1961,
90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.); Donaldson Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 17, Local 340, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471 (1988) (Sobrak, Arb.).
331. See Peabody Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 9819, 92
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1989) (Hewitt, Arb.) (where the arbitrator denied the grievance in part because
the "fully dressed" rule had been enforced without disparity). Donaldson Mining Co. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 17, Local 340, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471 (1988) (Sobrak, Arb.) (where
the Arbitrator held the Employer's new drug testing policy to be not binding, because it had been
unpublished and uncommunicated to Employees).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

69

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

aminations of employees under some circumstances (Article III, Section ()). 332 In ruling on questions of reasonableness coal industry
arbitrators have been guided by the developing literature on drug
testing. For example, in Maple Meadow Mining v. United Mine
Workers of America, District29, Local 1961, 333 the arbitrator struck
down two components of the Employer's drug testing program as
overly broad. 334 One component attempted to regulate off-duty conduct not necessarily having an impact on employment. And the other
permitted random testing without reasonable cause and made a pos335
itive test result the basis for discipline.
Article III, Section (g) requires some level of negotiations between the employer and the union, when the employer seeks to im336
plement a safety rule, although the specific level is uncertain. It
is clear that the obligation does not include the necessity of agreement between the parties before the policy can be implemented. 337
Concerns about employee privacy, the delivery of test specimens and

332. Article III, Section (j) partially reads as follows:
(1) Physical examination, required as a condition of or in employment, should not be
used other than to determine the physical condition or to contribute to the health and wellbeing of the Employee or Employees. The retention or displacement of Employees because
of physical conditions shall not be used for the purpose of effecting discrimination.
(2) When a physical examination of a recalled Employee on a panel is conducted, the
Employee shall be allowed to return to work at that mine unless he has a physical impairment
which constitutes a potential hazard to himself or others.
(3) That once employed, an Employee cannot be terminated or refused recall from a
panel or recall from sick or injured status for medical reasons over his objection without
the concurrence of a majority of a group composed of an Employer-approved physician,
an Employee-approved physician, and a physician agreed to by the Employer and the Employee, that there has been a deterioration in physical condition which prevents the Employee
from performing his regular work. Each party shall bear the cost of examination by the
physician as designated and shall share equally the cost of examination by the jointly designated physician.
(4) Where an Employer challenges the physical ability of an Employee or panel member
to perform his regular work and is subsequently proven wrong, the Employee shall be
compensated for time lost due to the Employer's challenge, including medical examination
expenses incurred in proving his physical ability to perform the requirements of the job.
333. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.).
334. Id. at 879-81.
335. Id. See Denenberg and Denenberg, supra note 327 at 398-402, 404-406.
336. In Sharpels Coal Corp., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.), the arbitrator
held that a single meeting about the employer's proposed policy occurring within the contractual ten
day period complied with the negotiation obligation.
337. Id.
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overreaching in the regulation of legitimate drug uses are also re-

flected in arbitral reasoning. 38 Employee success rates in drug testing
cases reflect the care that arbitrators are exercising in the protection
of employee privacy rights.3 39

2. Work Scheduling Issues
a. In General
True in general and under the Agreement, the scheduling of work
is an unassailable management right, if reasonably exercised. 340 The
Agreement specifically reserves to management the right to direct
the working force. 341 However, the Agreement is also richly laden
with specific provisions that are uniformly held by Arbitrators to

limit the broad grant of managerial power contained in Article IA,
Section (d). During the study period, the two principal arbitration

reporters published 31 cases dealing with shift, overtime, vacation,
and idle days work scheduling issues. 342 In each of these areas the
management right to schedule work has been circumscribed by spe-

cific provisions of the Agreement.
b.

Shifts

Arbitrators ruled with employers in virtually every one of the
shift scheduling cases.3 43 An employer has the right under Article
VIII, Section (c) to stagger the individual starting times of employees
to achieve greater efficiency as well as safety in the mine.3 4 Absent
a past practice or contractual language to forbid it, an employer

338. Id.
339. Grievants have achieved full or partial victory in all of the published drug testing decisions
during the study period. While the Frequency Table indicates three of four wins, that figure reflects
two partial victories.
340. See Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (BNA), 519-29, 531-36 (4th ed. 1985).
341. See Article IA, Section (d).
342. Of the 31 cases published, employers won 22 or 710%. This high winning percentage attests,
perhaps, to the dominant view among arbitrators that management authority reasonably exercised in
this area should not be interfered with.
343. Five of seven or about 71% of the grievances were denied.
344. See Peabody Coal Co., Power Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 14,
Local 1122, 83-2 ARB.
8339 (1983) (Gibson, Axb.).
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may institute rotating shifts in the interest of efficiency.3 45 A claim
of past practice cannot defeat management's right to discontinue
regular overtime when economic circumstances no longer warrant
it. 346 The employer's right to manage the mine efficiently permits it
to designate one of three rotating shifts as a maintenance shift,
despite the union's claim that such a designation violates Article
XIX, Section (c). Again, the management right prevails, where it is
exercised to increase efficiency through raising productivity. 347 Similarly, management does not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, where it assigns a dispatcher to work a set shift rather
than rotating shift. 348 Arbitrators have sustained shift scheduling
grievances only where employers have violated specific limitations
on the Article IA(d) management right, such as found in Article IV,
Section (d)(3). 341

345. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. and United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 2245,
77-1 ARB. 8134 (1977) (Grooms, Arb.). The arbitrator cited with approval the reserve rights doctrine
as enunciated in United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 9706, (Russell,
Arb.):
Management does not get its authority to conduct its business from the collective bargaining
agreement. It already has the authority and the collective bargaining agreement is the limitation on that authority. Therefore, management retains the authority or powers it did not
bargain away in the collective bargaining agreement. All arbitrators agree on that relationship between the parties. Therefore, management does not look to the contract for its
authority. It looks to the contract for limitation on its authority.
In Jim Walter Resources, Inc., the arbitrator noted the existence of several contractual provisions
that mention rotating shifts including Article VI(f) and found that none placed a limitation on the
employer's authority to institute rotating shifts.
346. Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 8843, 77-1 ARB.
8211 (1977) (Lieberman, Arb.). The arbitrator cites ARB No. 36 in support of his finding that the
management right prevails over past practice.
347. Northern American Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1810, 79-1
ARB. 8050 (1978) (Feldman, Arb.).
348. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1638, 851 ARB. 8162 (1985) (Duda, Arb.).
349. Article IV, Section (d)(3) reads as follows:
(3) All Employees at mines which produce coal six (6) days per week shall be given a fair
and equal opportunity to work on each of such six (6) days. Laying off individual Employees
during the week for the purpose of denying them six (6) days' work is prohibited.
See Quarto Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1785, 84 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 150 (1985) (Duda, Arb.) (holding that the employer's refusal to supply information to employees
that would enable them to determine the employer's compliance with Article IV, Section (d)(3) violated
the agreement). The only other union success in a shift scheduling case came on an arbitrability issue
in Saginaw Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 9695, 82 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 743 (1984) (Duda, Arb.).
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Vacation

The arbitral trend of upholding management's scheduling decisions is reflected also in published vacation cases. Arbitrators denied
90% of the grievances found in published cases during the study
period. 350 This success rate seems attributable to key provisions of
the vacation article (Article XIII). While employee vacation scheduling rights are set forth in considerable detail in Articles XIII and
XIV of the Agreement, key provisions afford management considerable discretion in resolving scheduling issues. For example, Article
XIII, Section (c) gives employees a right to their preferred vacation
period:
so long as this will not interfere with efficient operations as determined by the
Employer and so long as not more than 15% of the work force at a mine elects
to be off on the same day.

Similarly (e)(1) gives the right to take floating vacation days on
a consecutive or nonconsecutive basis:
at such times as desired by the Employee so long as approved by the Employer
at least 30 days in advance and in accordance with the principles of Section (c)
of this Article.

Provisions such as these along with the employer's general authority to manage the mine under Article IA, Section (d) combine
to give management broad discretion to make reasonable scheduling
351
decisions. The published cases affirm this broad discretion.
In one case where the union enjoyed a partial victory, the arbitrator held that past practice governed the scheduling of graduated

350. Four and one-half of tle five published cases (90%) favored management.
351. See Consolidation Coal Co., No. 19 Mine, Preparation Plant v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local 7690, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1068 (1978) (Van Pelt, Arb.) (holding that a contrary
practice did not negate the 30 day notice requirement of Article XIII, Section (e)); Saginaw Mining
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 9695, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310 (1984)
(Feldman, Arb.) (upholding the employer's right to deny a requested graduated vacation day on
production and efficiency grounds as reflected in its 15% rule); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Harris
Complex v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 1503, 82-2 ARB. 8340 (1982)
(Ipavec, Arb.) (upholding the Employer's notice to Employees of a change in vacation scheduling
practice as reasonable); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
Local 9721, 84-2 ARB. 8373 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (upholding the Employer's denial of consecutive
vacation days including graduated vacation on the basis of a 15% quota rule and denying the effectiveness of a contrary past practice).
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vacation days in the absence of an employer demonstration that its
restriction was based on maintaining efficient production at the
mine.152 The arbitrator expressly rejected the employer's attempt to
rely exclusively on reserved managerial authority, pointing to the
limitation in Article XIV, Section (g) (scheduling by mutual agreement). 353 He also disagreed with several other arbitrators who found
no contractual restriction on management's scheduling right. 5 4 The
noted excerpt captures the arbitrator's approach to the issue of reserved managerial authority under Article XIV, Section (g) and ex355
plains his reliance on past practice.

352.
30, Local
353.
354.
355.

Enoxy Coal Co., Pevler No. 21 and 23 Mines v. United Mine Workers of America, District
Union 1827, 83-2 ARB 8471 (1983) (Sergent, Arb.).
Id. at 5100.
Id.
In Enoxy Coal Co., the arbitrator said the following:
In the opinion of this arbitrator, those decisions cannot support a decision for the
Employer herein. To do so would be to yield to the Employer a greater amount of managerial discretion in scheduling graduated vacation than the Agreement permits. Rather than
remaining silent on the question of scheduling these days off, a situation which would result
in the Employer having complete discretion pursuant to its reserved management rights,
Article XIV, Section (g), expressly restricts this authority by providing that scheduling shall
be made by mutual agreement of the employer and employee. Thus, the Agreement clearly
recognizes that both parties have an interest in and certain rights regarding scheduling graduated vacation. The Employee's interest is fairly clear. He needs to schedule the vacation
at a time which is most convenient to him and which will permit him to get the most benefit
from the time permitted him away from work. The use he puts this time to, of course,
will vary from one individual to the next. Various recreational needs, work away from
employment, sporting interests, family ties and other activities commonly control this decision. The Agreement recognizes this interest, however, and requires that it be given expression in vacation scheduling unless an overriding managerial interest renders this impossible.
The Employer's interest is quite different. While other concerns may be discovered, two
primary interests of the Employer in scheduling graduated vacation are evident. First, the
Employer must have sufficient notice of the absence to enable it to compensate for the
missing employee at the mine. Secondly, the Employer must be able to limit the number
of employees who are absent at any one time so it can keep the mine efficiently producing.
Neither the employer nor the employee can arbitrarily withhold its agreement to schedule graduated vacation. Instead, they must agree on a time for this vacation which balances
the legitimate interests of both parties which are implicitly recognized in Section (g) of
Article XIV of the Agreement. Because the Agreement does not set forth a specific interest
which each party may advance in scheduling graduated vacation and because it does not
establish a mechanism through which those interests are to be expressed, a certain ambiguity
does arise. It is specifically silent with regard to the question raised herein as to whether
the graduated vacation can be taken in less than full-week segments. The Agreement recognizes that the Employer's managerial discretion is restricted in scheduling this time off,
but it is not explicit in determining how the scheduling should be effected. In this situation
past practice is a persuasive factor in deciding the method of scheduling which properly 74
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d. Overtime
Like the shift and vacation scheduling categories, employers enjoy a high success rate in overtime scheduling cases winning about

57% of the published awards during the study period. 56 As in the
other categories the lynchpin in this area is the reasonable use of
managerial authority. For example, employers may require mandatory overtime, but they may not replace the regular workday as
defined in Article IV, Section (b), with an extended day of excessive
hours.351 Employers must also accept an employee's reasonable excuse for not accepting the overtime assignment.3 5 8 The few cases lost
by management in this area have involved attempts to require overtime under unreasonable circumstances.359
An important provision of the Agreement is Article IV, Section
(d)(7) requiring the maintenance of a current overtime roster to aid
in equitably distributing overtime. 360 This provision reflects the parties' view that overtime is a valuable employment opportunity. At
the same time the equitable distribution feature restricts what would
otherwise be an exclusive right of management to allocate overtime. 361 The restriction is not of the most stringent variety. 362 Rather,

implements this provision of the Agreement.
Id. at 5100.
356. Arbitrators denied the grievance in four of the seven overtime scheduling cases published
during the study period.
357. See Arch of West Virginia, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local
1302, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1220 (1988) (Volz, Arb.).
358. Id. at 1223.
359. See Consolidation Coal Co., Ireland Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
6, Local 1110, 88-2 ARB. 8584 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where the employer revoked the grievant's
waiver of overtime and idle day work in violation of a long established practice); Consolidation Coal
Co., Ireland Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1110, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 836 (1989)
(Morgan, Arb.) (where the employer notified the grievant of an overtime assignment one-half hour
before the end of the shift).
360. Article IV, Section (d)(7) reads as follows:
Idle day work must be equally shared in accordance with past practice and custom.
An overtime roster must be kept up to date and posted at each mine for the purpose of
distributing overtime on an equitable basis to the extent practicable.
361. See ELKotRn & ELKoum; How An-rrRA iON WoRKs, 534-36 (4th ed. 1985).
362. See id. at 535 noting the following:
Many agreements do deal with the allocation of overtime. Some leave management
little or no discretion in the matter. For example, where the agreement provided that "overtime shall be distributed proportionately among all qualified employees" within a given
work group, it was held that day-to-day equalization of overtime was called for.
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the Agreement's term calling for distribution "on an equitable basis
to the extent practicable" gives employers some latitude in accomplishing equalization. In speaking about overtime equalization provisions in general, Elkouri and Elkouri have observed the following:
Arbitrators have recognized various considerations which may be relevant in
judging whether management has administered the overtime equalization provision
in a reasonable manner. Among others, these include such factors as ability to
do the required work, safety and plant protection, and reasonably assured availability. Arbitrators have disagreed as to whether the cost factor is a relevant
consideration. (footnotes omitted)s3

The dominant view among arbitrators is that the union has the
burden of proving that the employer improperly bypassed an employee in allocating overtime. 364 Arbitrator George W. Van Pelt's
approach in GilbertFuel Co., Muskingum Joint Venture and United
Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 1818,361 reflects this
dominant trend. In an award denying the grievant's claims for overtime payments based on roster disparities, he said the following:
Under the provisions of the Wage Agreement ... the [grievant has] an obligation to show that he was deprived of an overtime opportunity. In other words,
he must show that an employee with more overtime hours than he had was given
an overtime opportunity and that he was not offered the opportunity to his detriment. The employer then has the obligation to show the impracticability aspect.
An end-of-the-year cash equalization settlement based on raw figures on a roster
does not comply with these requirements. 3 "

363. Id. at 536.
364. Id. at 535.
365. 79-1 ARB 8248 (1979) (Van Pelt, Arb.).
366. Id. at 4033. In explaining the operation of the equalization provision Arbitrator Van Pelt
said the following:
Article IV, Section (d)(7) specifically provides that overtime be distributed on an "equitable basis" to the extent "practicable." Equitable cannot be interpreted as a "blanket
condition" of equality, but must be interpreted as being equal according to conditions
governing the situation. Further the term "practicable" must be used synonymous with
"possible."
Overtime work, for the most part, involves the necessity to extend the shift or even
double men over as a result of an emergency situation. This can be caused by a major
breakdown of equipment where repair of the equipment is required at the earliest possible
time. Other instances would be in the event of an equipment move. In either of the foregoing
instances, the necessity for overtime cannot be planned and, therefore, not scheduled in
advance. The advisability of sending a man home at the completion of his shift, who is
working on a breakdown, and calling in a man from another shift who might be lower in 76
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Idle Day Work

Dispositions in this category reflect the same employer success
rate as other scheduling cases published during the study period.
Employers won almost 71% of these disputes. 67
Under the Agreement different rules apply to the scheduling of
employees depending upon whether the mine is producing coal. On
coal production days all active employees are entitled to be scheduled
for work, and any use of less than the full complement of employees
can only be accomplished in accordance with the reduction in force
provisions of Article XVII, Section (b) (Seniority). By contrast, when
coal is not produced, referred to as idled days, the employer may
schedule employees without regard to the reduction in force provisions as long as the requirements of Article IV, Section (d)(7) are
complied with.3 68 If a day is initially scheduled as idle but then used

overtime, would be questionable. This practice could and probably would result in a delay
in getting the equipment back into operation. As a result, that practice could not only result
in a loss to the Company, but to the other mine workers who could not work their full
shift due to the down time of the equlpment. Id. at 4032.
367. Eight and one-half of the 12 published awards (70.8%) involving the scheduling of idle
days during the study period were won by employers.
368. See supra note 360 for a quotation of Article IV, Section (d)(7). In Pittsburgh & Midway
Coal Mining Co., Empire Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 14, Local 1627, 82
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1290, 1292 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) the arbitrator described the distinction between
production and idle days as follows:
It is well established under the terms of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, . . . , that when the mine produces coal, all active Employees of the Company are
entitled to be called out and to work. This is true whether the mine produces coal three
days or six days per week. It is also well established that if the Company sends Employees
home or fails to call them out for work on a production day, that amounts to a reduction
in force or a decrease in manning. The Company may only accomplish such a reduction
in force by implementation of and compliance with the provisions of Article XVII, Seniority,
Section (b), reduction realignment, laying off in accordance with seniority and ability to
perform the work on the job. Failure to work all Employees when the mine is engaged in
the production of coal without complying with Article XVII, Section (b) is a violation of
the Contract which will result in grievances being sustained and remedied....
The other side of the coin or principle ... is that idle days stand upon a different
footing than production days under the contract. An idle day occurs when coal is not being
produced. Upon such an idle day, maintenance and other work may be performed and
some but not all Employees may be requested to work without a contract violation being
involved so long as the provisions of Article IV, Section (d) for the sharing of the idle day
work are observed and adhered to. There is no limitation under the Contract as to how
many idle days may occur per week. If the mine is only producing coal three days per
week, other
daysResearch
may be treated
as an idle
day so
long as coal is not produced. So long
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to produce coal, it is deemed a production day for purposes of
applying the seniority rules. 369 Similarly, interruptions in production
that do not fully terminate production do not change the status of
a production day. 370 An employer may not violate the seniority rules
by selectively shortening the work days of employees immediately
affected by production breakdowns during a production day.
However, an employer may change a production day to an idle day,
even during the shift, as long as the reporting pay provisions of
Article IX, Section (c) and the idle day work sharing provision of
Article IV, Section (d)(7) are complied with 372
Employers may not unilaterally change practices that have been
mutually recognized by the parties for equally distributing idle day
work. 373 On the other hand, past practice does not require an employer to guarantee idle day work.3 74 Other disputes involving idle
day scheduling concern the definition of production, 371 the rights of

as the mine is idled and not producing coal, a reduction in force or layoff has not occurred
and the Company need not comply with the provisions of Article XVII, Section (b) in order
to work only some Employees. Instead, its obligation in permitting some, but not all,
Employees to work is limited to doing so in accordance with the provisions of Article IV,
Section (d)(7) for the sharing of the idle day work.
369. Enoxy Coal Co. and District 30, 81-30-82-304 cited in Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining
Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1290, 1292 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
370. Armco, Inc. and District 17, KD 79-17-170, cited in Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining
Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1290, 1292 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
371. Valley Camp Coal Co. & District 17, (Lugar 1972) cited in Pittsburgh & Midway Coal
Mining Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1290, 1292 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.).
372. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1290, 1292 (1984) (Roberts,
Arb.).
373. See Scotts Branch Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 30, Local 2264,
87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881 (1986) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the grievance of an
employee whose employer had unilaterally changed his idle day work roster).
374. See Peabody Coal Co. (Bee-Veer Mine) and Local 7688, District 14, United Mine Workers
of America, 76-1 ARB.
8259 (1976) (Sinicropi, Arb.) (where the arbitrator upheld the employer's
right to cancel idle day work previously scheduled and later found nonexistence).
375. See ARB Decision No. 78-61, where Chief Umpire, Richard I. Bloch noted that the parties
had distinguished between "production" and "processing" of coal for purposes of applying the idle
work provision. In that case, where the employer had assigned work on already-mined coal on the
basis of an idle day work plan, the arbitrator declined precisely to distinguish between "producing"
and "processing" but said the following: "This was a unique and limited situation which, by any
test, does not correspond to the range of activities normally associated with the standard production
day. See also Beth-Elkhorm Corp., Mine No. 26 v. United Mine Workers of America, District No.
30, Local 1468, 83-1 ARB 8112 (1983) (Wren, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that processing (as
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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production employees on idle days, 376 and individual employee as-

signments. 377 Where a past practice provides a benefit to employees
in the scheduling of idle days, it will be deemed binding on the
employer and immune from unilateral change.
3. Management Rights and Union Security
Though, as indicated in earlier discussion, the management rights
issue constitutes a dimension of many disputes, the present category
consists of cases involving pure exercises of some traditional management right. While perhaps limited by specific provisions of the
agreement, management's conduct in these cases rests solely upon
the right contained in Article IA, Section (d) of the Agreement. In
all except one case, the issues involved the classification and assignment of employees. 379 Management won about 56% of the management rights cases in this category, published during the study
period. 30 Management was deemed to have the right to reasonably
reclassify3 81 correct a job classification, 38 2 require certification prior
that such processing could take place where idle workdays fell on Saturdays and, possibly, holidays
other than Christmas eve or Christmas day). Cf. Wheelright Mine Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 30, Local 5899, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1281 (1988) (LeRoy, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
found that the simultaneous working of load out and processing crews most of the time did not
establish a practice of requiring that process crews work when load out crews are working).
376. See Consolidation Coal Co., Amonate Mine v. United Mine Workers, District 29, Local
2322, 84-1 ARB 8285 (1984) (Probst, Arb.) (where the arbitrator permitted the production of coal
as incidental to the nonproduction idle day work).
377. See, e.g., Central Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America District 6, Local
1604, 87-2 ARB
8488 (1987) (Lieberman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that past practice did
not prevent the company from changing the grievant's idle day reporting site) and Peabody Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers of America, District 23, Local 3000, 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator held that the grievant had no right of reassignment to idle day work
after a proper assignment in the grievant's absence).
378. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1785,
90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 952 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where the arbitrator reversed the employer's
change in the method of listing idle day work, holding that the past practice of alphabetical listing
was for the benefit of employees, had been in existence for at least two years and had lessened time
and risk associated with trying to find an employee's name on the new non-alphabetical job list).
379. The exception is Maple Meadow Mining Co., Cannelton Industries, Inc. and United Mine
Workers of America, District 29, Local 1961, 83-2 ARB 8402 (1983) (Williams, Arb.) (dealing with
an employer's right to demand the release of medical information as a condition of recall).
380. Five of the nine cases (55.6%) published during this period reported awards favoring management.
381. Jim Walter Resources Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 1928,
84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 805 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
382. Blackwood Fuel Co., Inc., Pardee Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 28,
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to the completion of training, 3 3 eliminate a job, 384 and temporarily
assign employees out of classification. 385 Unreasonable exercises of
management power were not condoned. 386 Of course, management
authority reserved under Article IA, Section (d) could not insulate
clear transgressions against specific contractual rights.387

The union won all three union security cases published during
the study. 38 8 The recurring issue in this category of cases is whether
Article XVII, Section (1) entitling employees to leaves of absence
for union activity encompasses union activity of a political as well
as organizational nature. 389 Like federal courts, arbitrators generally
have distinguished between organizational/collective bargaining activity and political activity, for purposes of determining the extent
383. Valley Camp Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, Local 6271, 77- 1 ARB 8033 (1977)
(Perry, Arb.).
384. Arch on the Green, Inc. v. Local 1605, District 23, United Mine Workers of America, 89
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 892 (1987) (Seidman, Arb.).
385. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., No. 3, Brookwood, Alabama v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 20, Local 1928, 79-1 ARB 8161 (1979) (Clarke, Arb.).
386. See, e.g., Maple Meadow Mining Co., Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 29, Local 1961, 83-2 ARB 8402 (1983) (Williams, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
struck down the employer's attempt to secure medical information not reasonably related to employment as a condition of recall); Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local 1601, 77-1 ARB 8154 (1977) (Perry, Arb.) (where the employer improperly assigned
a helper trainee to a job requiring more training); Saginaw Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 6, Local 9695, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 741 (1984) (Duda, Arb.) (where the arbitrator
sustained the grievance based on the employer's breach of confidentiality).
387. See, e.g., Kentucky Carbon Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 30, Local
1416, 85-2 ARB
8617 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator struck down the employer's
assignment of an employee out of a classification to fill a vacancy in violation of Article XVII,
Section (i).

388. As noted in the Frequency Table, Appendix I, the Union won 4 of 4 union security cases.
389. Article XVII, Section (l), Leave of Absence, reads:
Employees who have an official request for leave of absence shall be granted leave to
participate in Union activities and to serve as district or international officers or representatives and shall retain their seniority and accrue seniority while they are on such leave.
Employees who have an official request for leave of absence shall be granted leave to accept
a temporary Union assignment, not to exceed four (4) consecutive months, and upon the
expiration of such leave shall be entitled to return to their former jobs and shifts. Except
in cases of District or International Conventions or District Conferences relating to national
contract negotiations, no more than two (2) Employees may accept such temporary Union
assignments from the same mine at the same time. Permanent Union appointees and those
Employees who are elected to a district or international office shall be entitled to return
to a job, provided that Employees with greater seniority at the mine are not on layoff
status, and may bid on such vacancies as are posted. Where, by prior practice or custom,
a permanent Union officer or appointee is entitled to return to his job, that practice shall
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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of the employer's obligation under union business leave provisions.3 90

However, the coal industry has featured a debate among arbitrators
about whether Article XVII, Section (1) limits the scope of union

activity to organizational or collective bargaining activity at the exclusion of political activity.3 91 Whether employees are entitled to union business leave to attend meetings of the Coal Miner's Political
Action Committee (COMPAC) presents the issue starkly. The prevailing view is that "union activity" in Article XVII, Section (1) is
to be liberally construed.392 While one arbitrator held that "political

activities were [not] contemplated by the negotiators when they incorporated Article XVII, Section (l)," ' 9 the dominant view was expressed by Arbitrator Feldman in ConsolidationCoal Co. as follows:
Union activities mean union activities. They do not mean some, those that are
liked, those that involve non-political activity, but rather it means all union activity. To hold otherwise would be to change the terms of the contract and, quite
frankly, the general rule
by other arbitrators [giving] meaning, without limitation,
3
to all union activity. 9

4. Discrimination
Article XXV prohibits discrimination in the terms or availability
of employment.3 95 Like statutory and other contractual anti-discrim390. See Eia o1'R & Eououma, How ARnrrATiON Wos, 756-57 (4th ed. 1985). See also Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
391. For example, Arbitrator Stone in denying a grievance based on the employer's refusal of
leave to attend Coal Miner's Political Action Committee (COMPAC) meetings said the following:
My interpretation of this section is in question. Is it there intended to provide for leaves
in order to take care of the business of the union in its capacity of bargaining agent and
to represent the national union in traditional and characteristic ways, such as attendance
at conventions, etc.?
Case No. 84-12 85-88 (April 5, 1985). Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 12, Local 1825, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1042 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
392. See Consolidation Coal Co., Mid-Continent Region, Burning Star Mine No. 5 v. United
Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 2216, 86-2 ARB 8515 (1985) (Hoh, Arb.) (where the
arbitrator held that attending a union organizing committee meeting fell within the ambit of "union
activities"); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12, Local 1826,
83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 992 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.) (where the Arbitrator sustained the grievance against
an Employer's refusal to permit local union president to attend union discussions of selective strikes)
and Sharples Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 2935, 89-1 ARB
8048 (1988) (Volz, Arb.) (holding that pole watching at the direction of COMPAC is union activity
under Article XVII, Section (1)).
393. See Arbitrator Stone's views as excerpted in Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 12, Local 1825.
394. Id. at 1044.
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ination provisions, Article XXV calls for a fact-based inquiry into
the reason for the employer's conduct. 396 Typically, the union claims
that the employer's conduct is motivated by impermissible considerations, often grievance filing. 39 And there are other cases where
discrimination is founded upon the "unequal or unfair application
of policy to an individual or group.1 398 In either type of case the
union has the burden of proving, normally by a preponderance of
the evidence, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory conduct or the
unequal or unfair application of policy. 39 There is also arbitral opinion that the list of prohibited reasons specified in Article XXV is
nonexhaustive. 4°0 For those arbitrators employers and unions are
prohibited from discriminating for any reasons that are deemed arbitrary or capricious. 401
5. Working Conditions
This category encompasses cases involving the employer's obligation to provide hot water in bathhouses, 4 2 to provide a reasonably

Article XXV DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED
Neither the Employee nor the Union shall discriminate against any Employee or with
regard to the terms or availability of classified employment on the basis of race, creed,
national origin, sex, age, political activity, whether intra-Union or otherwise. In addition,
the Employer and Union agree that they will adhere to applicable provisions of the Vietnam
Era Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
396. See, e.g. NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
397. See, e.g., Drummond Co., Inc., Marylee Mine No. 1 v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 20, Local 1881, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 167 (1986) (Kilroy, Arb.); Valley Camp Coal Co., No.
I Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Division No. 4, Local 1417, 67 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 543 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.) and Alabama By-Products Corp. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 20, Local 7813, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 587 (1976) (Grooms, Arb.) (refusal of employee
to sign a receipt for using company tools).
398. North American Coal Co., Powhatan No. 6 Mine, Alledonia, Ohio v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 6, Local 1810, 81-1 ARB 8265, 4181 (Staudter, Arb. 1980) (where the arbitrator
sustained the grievance against the nonuniform assignment of supervisors to employees working casual
overtime) and Princess Susan Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 340,
72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 257 (1979) (Lieberman, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that payment above
scale of certain employees discriminatory against employees paid at scale).
399. See, e.g., Drummond Coal Co. Inc., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 167 (1986) (Kilroy, Arb.) (where
the union failed to produce sufficient evidence of impermissible motivation).
400. See North American Coal Co., Powhatan No. 6 Mine, Alledonia, Ohio v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 6, Local 1810, 81-1 ARB
8265, 4181 (Staudter, Arb.).
401. Id.
402. See Monterey Coal Co., No. I Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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comfortable eating place, 403 and other conditions relating to the qual-

ity of the work environment.4

An intriguing issue relating to em-

ployee working conditions is the extent of an employer's liability

for injuries to employee property occurring on the employer's premises. This question flows from contractual provisions such as Article
XXII, sections (b) and (c) imposing a duty on the employer to main-

tain certain conditions in the workplace. 405
The two published cases dealing with employer liability for employee property damage growing out of contractual breaches apply

slightly different theories. In Consolidation Coal Co., Georgetown
No. 12 Mine and United Mineworkers of America, District No. 6,
Division No. 3, Local 7690,4 the arbitrator sustained the grievance

under Article XXII, Section (c) finding that the grievants were forced
to park on an access road or county road, because the employer
Local 1613, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 989 (1987) (Fullmer, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found that the
employer violated the agreement by failing to provide hot water, noting the dispute about whether
the water was warm or cold). Cf. Valley Camp Coal Co., No. 1 Mine v. United Mine Workers of
America, District No. 6, Division 4, Local 1417, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 930 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.) (where
the arbitrator held that he was without authority to award the grievant additional compensation for
the employer's failure to consistently provide hot water for showers.).
403. See Hobet Mining, Inc., Mine No. 7 and United Mine Workers of America, Local 5817,
85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1077 (1985) (Duff, Arb.) (finding no excessive motion in the cab of a shovel
so as to make it an unreasonably uncomfortable eating place.) and Drummond Co., Arkadelphia
1570 Mine, Arkadelphia, Alabama v. United Mine Workers of America, District 20, Local 1553, 801 ARB 8077 (1979) (Clark, Arb.) (finding that operator positions of bulldozers, scrapers and other
mobile equipment were comfortable eating places within the meaning of Article XXI, Section c, of
the agreement).
404. See, e.g., Amherst Coal Co. 3-A Surface Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
17, Local 1302, 87-2 ARB 8467 (1986) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (where the arbitrator upheld the employer's
right to relocate a parking area a greater distance from the bathhouse, despite a contrary past practice
that would conflict with the agreement) and Ohio Valley Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America,
District 6, Local 1810, 90-1 ARB 8126 (1989) (Lipson, Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained agreements protesting the employer's discontinuation of the practice of providing drinking water in halfpint containers, where the practice did not conflict with the Agreement).
405. Article XXII reads in part as follows:
Section (b) Access Roads.
The Employer shall maintain mine access roads in reasonably good condition to permit safe
passage by Employees and their vehicles. An access road is a road providing access from
a public road to the location where Employees report to work. This provision imposes no
responsibility on the Employer for maintenance of any public road.
Section (c) Parking Facilities
The Employer shall provide and maintain an adequate parking facility for Employees' vehicles. Where such facility is permanently located, it shall be adequately lighted.
406. 67byLab.
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failed to provide adequate parking spaces. 4°7 The arbitrator rejected
the employer's suggestion that it could not be held liable for the
employees' property damage without a showing that its breach caused
the damage. The arbitrator dismissed this suggestion as being premised upon a tort theory rather than a contractual theory of damages
that would make the employer "liable for all damages which naturally flow from the breach." 48
In Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., McKinley Mine and
United Mineworkers of America, Local 1332, District 15,409 the arbitrator rejected arguments asserting the employer's liability for
property damage associated with the condition of an access road
under Article XXII, Section (b).410 In that case the arbitrator applied
a negligence standard, holding that the employer could not be liable
as long as it adhered to a standard of reasonable care in maintaining
the good condition of access roads. 41' Citing an ARB decision in a
similar case, the arbitrator added that the union's burden was to
show the employer's failure of reasonable care as the cause of employee property damage in light of the employer's operational
needs. 412 This standard would seem to give the employer more protection than the conventional negligence standard or the arbitrator's
contractual theory in Consolidation Coal Co. Both cases, of course,
turn on the arbitrator's factual conclusions about the employer's
maintenance of certain employment conditions.
6.

Successorship

Like other job security provisions, successorship clauses reflect
employee concerns about dwindling employment opportunities. 41 3
Specifically, successorship provisions address the possibility of lost

407. Id. at 360-61.
408. Id. at 361.
409. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 792 (1983) (Hogler, Arb.).
410. Id. at 796-97.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 796.
413. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A Step Toward
a Rationale Approach 57 Mn. L. Rv.1051 (1973). See also Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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employment opportunities created by the transfer of ownership. 414
In the 1974, 1978 and 1981 Agreements the parties address this
employee concern in Articles I and IA, Section (h).4 15 Article I imposed an assumption obligation, requiring the employer to secure
a successor's promise to assume the collective bargaining agreement.
Article IA, Section (h) introduced in the 1978 Agreement, protected
employees from the employment effects of leasing, subleasing, and
licensing arrangements. Starting with the 1984 Agreement Article I
also required employers to notify the union at the conclusion of any
transfer of mining operations. That Agreement also expanded employment rights in the context of leasing, subleasing, and licensing
arrangements under Article IA, Section (h). In the 1988 Agreement
the expanded employment rights of Article IA, Section (h) became
part of an employment security provision known as the JOBS Program contained in Article II, Section (B). 41 6 These contractual pro-

414. Id.
415. Article I is the Enabling Clause and reads in part as follows:
This Agreement shall be binding upon all signatories hereto, including those Employers
which are members of signatory associations, and their successors and assigns. In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer promises that its operation as covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred
or assigned to any successor without first securing the agreement of the successor to assume
the Employer's obligation under this Agreement. Provided that the Employer shall not be
a guarantor or be held liable for any breach by the successor or assignee of his obligations,
and the UMWA will look exclusively to the successor or assignee for compliance with the
terms of this Agreement.
In their choice of this contractual mechanism the parties were undoubtedly influenced by Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), where the Court refused to find
a bargaining obligation based on such a clause but suggested that the union could sue the predecessor
promisor under the clause. Later cases show that such actions can also run against successors depending
upon the nature of the obligation. See, e.g., UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038
(W.D. Va. 1985).
Article IA, Section (h) is titled Leasing, Subleasing and Licensing Out of Coal Lands and reads
as follows:
The Employers agree that they will not lease, sublease or license out any coal lands,
coal producing or coal preparation facilities where the purpose thereof is to avoid the
application of this Agreement or any section, paragraph or clause thereof.
Licensing out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under lease or
sublease by any signatory operator hereto shall not be permitted unless the licensing out
does not cause or result in the layoff of Employees of the Employer.
416. The purpose of the JOBS Program and employment rights of employees when coal lands
are leased, subleased or licensed are partially set forth in the following excerpt:
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visions recognize the complexity of ownership arrangements in the

mining industry and attempt to protect employees in a variety of
417
transactions .
During the study period employers prevailed in all the published
successorship cases.4 18 An overwhelming majority of the published

cases dealt with the question of whether a subsequent employer is
a successor for purposes of triggering the protection of Article I of
the Agreement. 419 These cases typically involve new mining operators
who take over defunct mines without entering into any transaction
with the prior owner that could be characterized as a sale, convey-

ance or transfer within the meaning of Article I of the agreement.
The paradigm case was Nephi Coal Properties,Inc., Gut Fork
Mine, and UnitedMine Workers of America, DistrictNo. 17, Local
Union 2935,420 decided by the ARB. In that case Zapata/Dal-Tex

held the mining rights to an underground mine called Gut Fork

Article II, Job Opportunity and Benefit Security (Jobs)
The parties hereto recognize and agree that the production of bituminous coal involves,
by its very nature, the depletion of resources at work locations. The parties agree further
that varied mining arrangements and technological advances can adversely impact on job
security and that their mutual goals of mining coal safely and efficiently can best be achieved
by the use of experienced miners who are knowledgeable of the Employer's standards of
operation.
As a result of the special nature of the bituminous coal mining industry and the parties'
desire to develop a relationship in which the Employees as well as the Employers gain from
a growth in productivity, the parties agree to establish the Job Opportunity and Benefit
Security (JOBS) Program. The JOBS Program is designed to achieve, to the fullest extent
allowed by law, job security for classified employees through extended panel rights and new
training opportunities. Nothing in the JOBS Program shall be construed to diminish any
rights of the Employees or the Union established in any other provision of this Agreement
including, but not limited to, the successorship clause, Article IA(h) and Article XVII.
417. See generally Gies & Smith, Labor Law Successorship Under the NationalBituminous Coal
Wage Agreement and the Union's Campaign for Job Security, 90 W. VA. L. Rnv. 921 (1988).
418. Employers won six of the six published cases.
419. Dealing with the definitional issue were Little Rose Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, District 30, Local 6095, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1103 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.); Seam Coal,
Ltd. v. and United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 6112, 86-1 ARB 8041 (1985) (Duff,
Arb.); Russell Coal Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 7930, 87-1 ARB 8230 (1987)
(Nicholas Arb.); and Amex Coal Co., Wright Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
11, Local 1015, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 254 (1988) (Kilroy, Arb.).
420. ARB No. 78-17 (1979).
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Mine. It leased the mine to the Jasper Mining Company who hired
employees and operated the mine for a period of time before ceasing
operations and laying off employees. One year later, the leaseholder
subleased the mine to Nephi Coal Properties, a separate entity from
Zapata/Dal-Tex or Jasper. Nephi had no dealings with Jasper before
it assumed the operation of the mine. Nephi purchased all new
equipment, retained no former Jasper managerial or supervisory employees, and offered to hire former Jasper employees only as new
employees.4 21 The grievants were former Jasper employees who refused to apply for Nephi openings as new employees and insisted
that their panel and seniority rights as Jasper employees be recognized by Nephi. 422 The ARB held that Nephi was not a successor,
since it lacked the necessary linkage with Jasper. 423 The ARB's reasoning is summarized in the following statement:
Accordingly, the conclusion reached here is that where there is no sale, conveyance
or other transfer assignment of an operation between a former operator of a mine
site or facility and a subsequent operator of a mine site or facility, and no other
financial or organizational linkage between them, there is no basis for finding,
under the National Agreement, that the subsequent operator is the "successor or
assignee" of the former operator for purposes of requiring the subsequent operator to hire the employees of the former operator on the basis of their rights
gained under the National Agreement covered with the former employer.' 2'

The interesting note in the Nephi Coal Properties,Inc., decision
is that the grievants lost their panel rights, even though Nephi became a signatory to the Agreement. The ARB pointed out that the
Agreement was not a contract for hire and only secured the rights
of employees with their own employer. 425 Since Jasper and not Nephi
was the employer to whom the grievant's seniority and panel rights
attached, those contractual rights were ineffective against Nephi.42 6
Arbitrators have been true to the ARB's linkage analysis and denied
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 14-15. The ARB also rejected the Union's argument that the linkage of both Jasper
and Nephi to Zapata/Dal-Tex was a sufficient basis for finding successorship. The ARB was unwilling
to find such a connection, where employees had never worked for Zapata/Dal-Tex and no relationship
could be shown between Zapata/Dal-Tex and Jasper and Nephi.
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grievances where the union has failed to meet its burden of proving
427
the necessary linkage.

Other issues involve the extent of a successor's obligation. In
United States Steel Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local 1559, District29, 421 the arbitrator held that satellite panel
rights were individual obligations that were not transferred with mining operations by the predecessor to the successor. 429 In doing so
the arbitrator affirmed the successor's view that it was only bound
to recall laid-off employees to the newly purchased mine and not
to its other operations. 4 0 And in Enoxy Coal Co. and United Mine
Workers of America, District30, Local 1827,431 the arbitrator held
that the obligation under Article IA, Section (h)(2) of the 1984
Agreement to hire the predecessor's laid off employees when li42
censing the mining operation, applies to the time of transfer. It
does not require the successor to offer such jobs to employees who
were retained by the predecessor at the time of the transfer.433
7.

Procedural Issues

In many cases involving the foregoing substantive issues, procedural issues, particularly those relating to arbitrability, were raised
and decided by arbitrators. 4 4 The reluctance of arbitrators to forfeit

427. See, e.g., Arbitrator Duff's analysis in Seam Coal, Ltd., 86-1 ARB

8041 (1985) (Duff,

Arb.).
428. 86-2 ARB 8323 (1985) (Heekin, Arb.).
429. Id. at 4378-79.
430. Id. In distinguishing between general obligations under the Agreement and individual rights

under the employment relationship the arbitrator's decision is in the spirit of ARB 78-17.
431. 87-1 ARB 8034 (1986) (Feldman, Arb.).
432. Id. at 3134-35.
433. It is not clear from the award whether subsequently laid off predecessor employees have
a right to jobs at the successor as they open up, i.e., deprived only of the right to displace junior
successor employees.
434. See, e.g., Consolidated Coal Co., Central Division, Rose Valley Mine (Hopedale, Harrison,
Ohio) and United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1557, 64 Lab. Arb. 135 (1975) (Stokes,
Arb.); Consolidated Coal Co., Shoemaker Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 6,
Division 4, Local 1473, (1978) (Ipavec, Arb.); Saginaw Mining Co. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 6, Local 9695, 82 Lab. Arb. 743 (1984) (Duda, Arb.); Bethlehem Mine Corp., Mine
No. 33, and United Mine Workers of America, District 2, Local 1368, 84 Lab. Arb. 485 (1985)
(Hewett, Arb.); Peabody Coal Co. and United Mine Workers, District 23, Locals 9800 & 1894, 77https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
2 ARB 8415, (1977) (Witney, Arb.); United Mine Workers, District 29, Local 8784 and H&F Mining88
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substantive rights because of procedural irregularities is well known

in the field. Thus, in most cases, arbitrators construed the circumstances of grievances to find compliance with procedural requirements. 45 However, in a few cases procedural problems prove to be
dispositive, while the merits of other cases involved procedural grievances .43
Perhaps the most clear-cut basis for holding a grievance inarbitrable is res judicata. In cases where a prior award involves "the
same substantive grievance, the same fact pattern (not necessarily
the same occurrence), and the same contractual provisions, in a dispute between the same parties at the same operation" the earlier
award is dispositive. 417 The binding effect of such awards carries
over from agreement to agreement, where the language interpreted
by the award is retained. 438 The ARB announced the following exceptions to the res judicata principle:
Where the Arbitrator is clearly and convincingly persuaded by the evidence
and arguments of the parties before him that a prior award is so plainly and
palpably erroneous that it should not be applied, he may refuse to apply the
principle of arbitral res judicata. However, unless clearly and convincingly persuaded that:
(a) The previous award was clearly an incidence of bad judgment;
or

Inc., 77-2 ARB 8573, (1977) (Rimer, Arb.); Southern Ohio Coal Co. (Meigs Mine No. 1) and United
Mine Workers, Local 1890, 7702 ARB
8471, (1977) (Perry, Arb.); McWane Coal Co., Inc. and
United Mine Workers, Local No. 6969, 84-1 ARB 8151 (1984) (Nicholas, Arb.); Seam Coal, Ltd.
and United Mine Workers, District 17, Local No. 6112, 86-1 ARB 8041, (1985) (Duff, Arb.); Amherst
Coal Co. and United Mine Workers, District 17, Local 1302, 86-2 ARB 8368 (1986) (Hewitt, Arb.);
Guayana Resources and United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local Union 6512, 90 Lab.
Arb. 855 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.).
435. See e.g., McWane Coal Co., Inc. and United Mine Workers, Local No. 6969, 84-1 ARB
8151 (1984) (Nicholas, Arb.) (where the arbitrator found a continuing grievance, not disqualified
by the limitations provisions) and United Mine Workers, District 29, Local 8784 and H&F Mining,
Inc., 77-2 ARB 8573 (1977) (Rimer, Arb.) (where the arbitrator denied the untimeliness claim based
on the confusion produced by the circumstances of the grievance).
436. See e.g., Island Creek Coal Co., Veil Mine, and United Mine Workers of America, District
6, Division 1, Local 1573, 67 Lab. Arb. 211 (1976) (Dworkin, Arb.) and Bethlehem Mines Corp. and
United Mine Workers, District 2, Local Union 7925, 84-2 ARB
8436 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.).
437. The North American Coal Corp. Quarto No. 7 Mine v. United Mine Workers of American,
Local 1941, District 6, ARB 78-24 (1980).
438. Id.
at 20-22.
Disseminated
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(b) The decision was made without benefit of some important and
relevant facts; or
(c) The decision was an obvious and substantial error of fact or
law, or a Decision of the Board has intervened with which the prior
award conflicts; or
(d) A full and fair hearing was not afforded in the prior case;
The Arbitrator is bound to apply the prior award even though he would not have
decided the prior case in that fashion.'49

Reflecting the ARB's clear policy preference for the res judicata

effect, the ARB has imposed the burden of proving the avoidance
of res judicata on the moving party and established the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The prominence of res

judicata in arbitral decision making under the Agreement reflects
the parties preference for finality, predictability and stability in

grievance dispute resolution. The concerns underlying the principle
of res judicata are especially important in the coal mining industry,

because of the historical tendency to rearbitrate settled issues.441 Thus,
res judicatawas a recurring basis for denying grievances as inarbitral
in decisions published during the study period."'2 Clear violations of

contractual timetables also led to grievance dismissals for lack of
arbitrability."

3

Other procedural issues range from whether an employee's termination is covered by the newly signed Agreement to whether one

party can record an arbitral hearing without the consent of the
other. 4" Several of the procedural cases have involved the effect
439. Id. at 2-3.
440. Id. at 3, 20.
441. Id. at 14-17. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text and Article XXVII of the Agreement. The latter observation belongs to Rolf Valtin, who chaired the ARB from 1975 to 1978.
442. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., Shoemaker Mine v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 6, Division 4, Local 1473, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 257 (1978) (Ipavec, Arb.); Hobt Mining,
Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, United Mine Workers of America, 88-2 ARB
8383 (1988) (Seidman, Arb.).
443. See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co., Vail Mine v. United Mine Workers of America, District
6, Division 1, Local 1573, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 211 (1976) (Dworkin, Arb.) and Bethlehem Mines
Corp. v. United Mines Workers, District 2, Local 7925, 84-2 ARB 8436 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.).
444. In Republic Steel Corp., Kitt Energy Corp. Division v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 30, Local 8045, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 924 (1981), (Feldman, Arb.) the Arbitrator relied on
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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(non-resjudicata) of an earlier arbitration award. In Carbon Field
Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District No. 17, Local
2102,441 the arbitrator by order of the ARB reconsidered an award
sustaining a discharge. 446 The arbitrator had sustained the discharge,
based in part on an earlier suspension of the grievant later reversed
in a separate arbitration. 44 7 The Carbon Field Co. arbitrator had
erroneously concluded that the grievant failed to grieve the earlier
suspension. Upon considering whether this error would have changed
his award in the discharge case, the arbitrator held in the negative. 44 8
He also held that it would be inappropriate to consider the arbitrator's award reversing the suspension as new evidence, since it
would "promote instability in the handling of arbitrations involving
disciplinary matters."449 The arbitrator noted the dilemma sometimes
created by the right to immediate arbitration in discharge cases,
which the grievant had exercised and the progressive discipline pro450
cedure characterized by increasingly severe forms of discipline.
Where the right to immediate arbitration is exercised, it may not
be anomalous to have the discharge arbitrated before an earlier suspension is ultimately resolved. 4 1 Where the union protests such a
suspension, it behooves the union to present evidence in the discharge arbitration regarding the validity of the suspension. That, the
42
arbitrator noted, was not done in the case.
While it would be procedurally improper for an arbitrator to
correct the shortcomings of earlier awards, arbitrators have shown
a willingness to order the parties to seek clarification from the orig-

an employer could not unilaterally transcribe the arbitration hearing, such recording being an obligation of the arbitrator in the absence of the consent of the parties and the arbitrator. And in Midway
Coals, Inc. and UMWA, District 17, Local 2935, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 340 (1987), (Murphy, Arb.)
the arbitrator held that the agreement's just cause provisions did not cover the grievant, since he was
not employed at the time the employer entered into the agreement.
445. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1205 (1978) (Wren, Arb.).
446. Id. at 1205-06.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1207.
450. Id. at 1206.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1207.
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inal arbitrator. 4 3 In Peabody Coal Co., UniversalMine and United
Mine Workers of America, District 11, Local 1658,4 1 4 the arbitrator
in an earlier award had omitted any mention of the grievants in the
remedy. 45 The arbitrator held that the grievants' remedial entitlement is an appropriate matter for clarification or reconsideration
by the original arbitrator and ordered the company to join the union
in requesting clarification or completion of the earlier arbitrator's
decision. 456 Similarly, in QuartoMining Co. and UnitedMine Workers, District 6, Local Union 1785,457 the arbitrator refused to resolve
a dispute about the implementation of an earlier award by clarifying
that award. 458 Instead, he ordered the parties to write a joint letter
to the previous arbitrator requesting clarification. 459 The arbitrator
noted that a second arbitrator could not act as an appeals board
and that relitigation of the same case was inappropriate unless the
parties agreed that the first award was nugatory. 46°
Two of the procedural cases raised issues concering the operation of the grievance procedure. For example, in Peabody Eastern
Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local
9177,461 the union filed, withdrew and refiled a grievance regarding
the posting of vacancies after the employer's cleaning plant came
into existence in March of 1986. 62 The initial filing had been "withdrawn, non-precedent."463 The union argued that this withdrawal
entitled it to reffle the grievance, while the employer urged that the
refiling right existed only if an earlier settlement uses the term "with-

453. Note that absent the appellate structure it might be impossible to secure such clarification,
since the doctrine offunctus officio would prevent the original arbitrator from correcting or clarifying
the substance of an award sua sponte or at the unilateral urging of a party. See Expedient Services,
Inc., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082, 1083-84 (1977) (Dworkin, Arb.).
454. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 201 (1987) (Volz, Arb.).
455. Id. at 201.
456. Id. at 202-03.
457. 85-1 ARB 8117 (1984) (Feldman, Arb.).
458. Id. at 3478.

459. Id.
460. Id.
461. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.).

462. Id. at 1090-91.
463. Id. at 1090.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
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out prejudice."" 4 The arbitrator denied the grievance agreeing that
"without prejudice" permitted a refiling of the grievance, while
"withdrawn, non- precedent," did not permit refiling but meant that
the settlement could not be used as a defense in a later grievance
involving similar but not the same facts."" 5 And in Consolidation
Coal Co., PowatanNo. 4 Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 6, Local 1785,4 the arbitrator held that the employer
had not violated the grievance procedure by using its supervisor of
industrial employee relations as a resource person at steps 2 and 3
of the grievance procedure."67 In this role the industrial relations
supervisor was not a representative within the meaning of Article
46 8
XXIII, Section (c)(3).
Finally, several cases raised compliance issues. Article XXIII,
Section (h) provides that "[s]ettlements reached at any step of the
grievance procedure shall be final and binding on both parties and
shall not be subject to further proceedings under this Article except
by mutual agreement." Arbitrators have interpreted this provision
to impose a burden on the party seeking to avoid a settlement to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that compliance should be
excused.4 69 Compliance may be excused where one party seeks to
apply the settlement to a dissimilar situation, where the settlement
was "induced by fraud, gross misrepresentation, or mutual mistake
of fact,' '470 or "where the purpose for the settlement agreement has

substantially changed. "471
464. Id. at 1090-91.
465. Id. at 1091.
466. 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1011 (1988) (Stoltenberg, Arb.).
467. Id.
468. Article XXIII, Section (c), entitled GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE reads as follows in part:
(3) Within seven working days of the time the grievance is referred to them, the district
representative and the representative of the Employer shall meet and review the facts and
pertinent contract provisions in an effort to reach agreement. Members of the Mine Committee shall have the right to be present. No verbatim transcript of the testimony shall be
taken. Neither the district representative nor the Employer representative shall be persons
who participated in steps 1 or 2 of this procedure.
469. See Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 8843,
91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 744 (1988) (Volz, Arb.).
470. Id. at 747.
471. rd. at 748.
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CONCLUSION

More coal cases arising under the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement were published during the fifteen-year study period than
awards under any other private sector collective bargaining agreement. 472 This fact attests to the continuing intensity of arbitral activity under the Agreement. While, perhaps, a cause for some distress,
the concurrent decline in unauthorized grievance strikes on balance
may suggest reasons for optimism about the state of grievance dispute settlement under the Agreement. If coal miners are beginning
to appreciate the merits of peaceful dispute resolution while arbitrators are consistently applying contractual rules that are accepted
4 73
by both parties, the future may indeed be bright.
This study has shown two salient features of coal arbitration.
First, the idiosyncratic features of the industry, notably the omnipresence of hazard and unpredictability of work stoppages, have
influenced arbitral reasoning and outcomes. This can clearly be seen
in a variety of discipline and discharge cases and in safety cases.
Second, clear lines of authority have evolved to govern most issues
that arise under the Agreement. Much of the credit for this clarity
must be attributed to the grievance arbitration procedures established
under the 1974 Agreement. Though the ARB no longer exists, its
influence continues to be seen in the writing of panel arbitrators.
It is also clear that the procedure for selecting panel arbitrators
under the Coal Agreement has led to an arbitral quality that compares quite favorably with other industries.

472. See Lab. Arb. (BNA) vols. 64-94; Lab. Arb. (CCH) vols. 74-2 to 90-1.

473. Indeed, the most recent figures show a marked decline in the number of arbitrations filed.
Under the 1988 Agreement, 1,900 arbitrations were filed as of March 1, 1991, the third anniversary

of the Agreement. Compared to earlier Agreements where 3,000 (1974 and 1978 Agreements), 5,200
(1981 Agreement), and 3,700 (1984 Agreement) were filed. Interview with Steven W. Lindner, UMWA,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/3
94
Department of Contract Services (March 1, 1991).
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APPENDIX I
ARBITRATION FREQUENCY AND SUCCESS RATES
UNDER THE NATIONAL BITUMINOUS
COAL WAGE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN 1974 AND 1990
GRIEVY
ANCE
(I) DISCIPLINE
AND
DISCHARGE
Attendance
Work Stoppage
Insubordination
Alcohol and Drugs

NUMBER

(%OF TOTAL)*

SUSTAINED

(PERCENT AGE)*

(60.8)
(54.51)
(50)
(87.5)
(12.5)

Unsafe Performance

(75)

Unsatisfactory
Performance
Negligence
Other

(100)
(66.7)
(62.5)

(2) COMPENSATION
Holiday Pay
Reporting Pay
Bereavement Pay
Benefits
Travel Expenses
Granted Injury Pay
Side AgreementsWages
Other

58
12
8
5
4
2
2
2
23

(3) WORK
ASSIGNMENT
Subcontracting
Supervisory
PerformanceUnit Work
Jurisdictional
Disputes
Other

(15.7)

58
30

(15.7)

11
8
9

(4) SENIORITY
Job Vacancies
Recall
Layoff
Job Postings
Other

52
18
11
8
8
7

(14.1)

(5) HOURS
Scheduling Idle
Work
Scheduling Work
Overtime

31

(8.4)
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28
5
5
3
2
0
1

(48.2)
(46.6)
(62.5)
(60)
(50)
(0)
(50)

1
11

(50)
(47.8)

23.5
9.5

(40.5)
(31.6)

7

(63.6)

2
5

(25)
(55.5)

18
3
5
3
5
2

(29.5)

9

(16.7)
(45.5)
(37.5)
(62.5)
(29)

(29.2)
(28.6)
(42.9)
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Scheduling
Vacation

Days

5

(6) SAFETY

17

Removal from MHSC
Individual Safety
Rights
Bomb Threat
Absenteeism
Other
(7) REASONABLE
WORK
RULES
New Attendance
Programs
Drug Testing
Unexcused
Absences

Policy

Other
(8) HEALTH
Insurance Benefits
Ability to Return
to Work
Other
(9) PROCEDURAL
ISSUES

.5
(4.6)

[Vol. 93

(10)

7.5

(44.1)

3

1

(33.3)

3

1

(33.3)

2
9

0
5.5

(0)
(61.1)

13

(3.5)

11

(73.3)

2
3

(50)
(75)

1

1

4

(100)

3

(75)

6
5

(46.1)
(55.6)

1
0

(50)
(0)

4
4

13
9

(3.5)

2
2
10

(2.7)

2

(20)

(10) MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS

9

(2.4)

4

(44.4)

(11) WORKING
CONDITIONS

8

(2.2)

3

(37.5)

(12) ARBITRABILITY

8

(2.2)

3

(37.5)

(13) SUCCESSORSHIP

6

(1.6)

0

(0)

(14) DISCRIMINATION

5

(1.4)

3

(60)

(15) UNION SECURITY

4

(1.1)

4

(100)

(16) MISCELLANEOUS

2

(.54)

1

(.50)

166

(45.1)

TOTAL
368
* Percentages are rounded to nearest tenth.

Source: Labor Arbitration Reports Vols. 64 to 94 (BNA); Labor Arbitration Awards Vols. 74-2 to 90-1 (CCH).
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APPENDIX 11*
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN BITUMINOUS COAL MINING
Year

Production
(million tons)

Employment

Productivity
(tons/workday

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

516.3
533.7
466.8
457.3
391.7
464.6
500.9
492.7
410.4

415,582
372,897
335,217
293,106
227,397
225,093
228,163
228,635
197,402

6.77
7.04
7.47
8.17
9.47
9.84
10.28
10.59
11.33

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

412.0
415.5
403.0
422.1
458.9
487.0
512.1
533.9
552.6
545.2
560.5

179,636
169,400
150,474
143.822
141,646
128,698
133,732
131,752
131,523
127,894
124,532

12.22
12.83
12.83
14.72
15.83
16.84
17.52
18.52
19.17
19.37
19.90

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
19791

602.9
552.2
595.4
591.7
603.4
648.4
678.7
688.6
653.8
770.0

140,140
145,664
149,265
148,121
166,701
189,880
202,280
214,777
221,000
243,923

18.84
18.02
17.74
17.58
17.58
14.74
14.46
14.74
14.56
14.56

'Preliminary
Sources:
1947-1975 - U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, "Bituminous Coal & Lignite,"
Annual.
1976-1978 - U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Energy Data Report, "Weekly Coal
Report."
1979 Production data - U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration Energy Data Report,
"Weekly Coal Report."
1979 Employment data - U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, Mine Injuries &
Worktime Quarterly, January-December, 1979.
*President's Commission on Coal (PCOC), Staff Findings, p. 47 (1980).
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APPENDIX III*
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
SHARE OF PRODUCTION

(Millions of Tons)

Year

Total
Bituminous
Production

UMWA Percent
Share of
Production

UMWA
Tons
Produced'

1951
1967
1968
1969

534
553
545
561

78.52
73.6
72.7
72.0

4192
407
396
404

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

603
552
595
592
603
648
679
689

70.3
65.6
70.6
69.1
64.8
62.0
58.6
52.1

424
362
420
409
391
402
398
359

National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement Tonnage, 1951-1977, and Western Surface Agreement Tonnage, 19721977.
2 Estimate based upon 1951-1955 average share.
Source: BCOA.
*

PCOC, Staff Findings, p. 52 (1980).
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APPENDIX IV*
FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF DISABLING
INJURIES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1978
Industry

Incidence
Rate'

11.0
Lumber and Wood Products
10.4
Underground Coal
9.3
Trucking and Warehousing
7.7
Water Transportation
7.6
All Coal
6.3
Construction
5.4
All Manufacturing
3.5
Surface Coal
Lost workday cases per 200,000 work hours.
Total lost workdays per 200,000 work hours divided by incidence rate.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
U.S. Department of Labor,
Mine Safety and Health Administration.
* PCOC, Staff Findings, p. 34 (1980).
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Per Injury"
16
34
19
35
33.5
17
15
33
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APPENDIX V*
EXPLOSIONS, FATALITIES, AND PRODUCTION
IN UNDERGROUND MINING
1960-1969 AND 1970-1979

1960-1969
1970-1979

Production
(millions
of tons)

"Major" Mine
Explosions'

Fatalities
Due To
Explosions

Total
Underground
Fatalities

5,041.4
6,455.2

10
3

258
78

2,383
1,210

' Single accidents in which five or more fatalities occurred.
Sources: U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration.
U.S. Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Mines.
U.S. Department of the Interior,
Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration.
U.S. Department of Labor,
Mine Safety and Health Administration.
* PCOC, Staff Findings, p. 37 (1980).
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APPENDIX VI*
WORKDAYS AND PRODUCTION LOST TO
WILDCAT STRIKES IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
1956-1979
Estimated
Tonnage Lost

Year

Workdays
Lost

1956
1957
1958
1959

190,600
76,900
61,500
58,800

2,056,300
816,500
827,900
866,500

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

58,400
24,700
46,000
40,200
129,800
161,700
485,800
109,500
630,700
626,500

818,100
412,800
717,100
717,300
2,258,800
3,274,600
10,285,100
2,116,300
13,025,500
12,073,900

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

593,100
565,000
515,600
529,200
1,023,800
1,417,400
1,950,300
2,283,400
229,500
315,900

11,388,600
8,762,100
8,372,100
7,043,000
11,687,000
15,826,000
20,477,000
22,176,100
3,641,000
4,648,000

TOTAL

12,123,300

164,556,600

Source: Bituminous Coal Operators' Association.
* PCOC, Staff Findings, p. 48 (1980).
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APPENDIX VII*
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES"*
RIGHT TO SAFE
WORK PLACE

HEALTH L SAFETY
DISPUTE

GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE

DISCHARGE
PROCEDURE

* PCOC, Coal Data Book, p. 149 (1980).
** United Mine Workers of America and

Bituminous Coal Operators Association.
Source: Joint Industry Training Committee.
** PCOC, Coal Data Book, p. 149 (1980).
Individual Safety Rights Dispute Settlement. Article III, Section (i); Article XXIII, Section (c)(3) and (4).
Mine Health or Safety Dispute - Article III, Section (p); Article XXIII, Section (c)(4). Note that Step 3 is deleted
from subsequent agreements.
Grievance Procedure Article XXIII, Section (c). Agreements after 1974 reduced the number of days inStep 2 from
14 to 10.
Discharge Procedure. Article XXIV, Sections (b), (c)and (d). Note that district arbitrator must hear discharge cases,
immediately arbitrated within 5 days of the request (Section (d)). Also the ARB was discontinued after the 1978
Agreement.
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